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This thesis focuses on the evolution of human social norm psychology. More precisely, 
I want to show how the emergence of our distinctive capacity to follow social norms and 
make social normative judgments is connected to the lineage explanation of our capacity 
to form shared intentions, and how such capacity is related to a diverse cluster of 
prototypical moral judgments. I argue that in explaining the evolution of this form of 
normative cognition we also require an understanding of the developmental trajectory of 
this capacity. For this purpose, the thesis is organized as follow. In the first chapter, I 
make some methodological remarks and provide the general overview and plan for the 
dissertation. In the second chapter, I explain what my explanatory target is and why it 
matters. On the view I am defending, shared intentional psychology gives rise to a 
special form of psychology that enables us to engage in social normative thinking. 
These norms are represented as shared intentional states. Moral psychology, in contrast, 
is more diverse. For moral judgments define a quite heterogeneous class of mental 
states—although some moral judgments may involve the representation and execution 
of norms, certainly not all of them do. I show that although much of our distinctive 
social norm psychology can be explained within the framework of shared intentionality, 
moral judgments cannot be unified in the same way. In the third chapter, I provide the 
baseline of social-cognitive capacities that serve as starting point for my lineage 
explanation. I argue that hominin social cognition was for a very long period of our 
evolutionary history essentially a matter of low-level cognitive and motivational 
processes. On this picture, bottom-up affective processes regulated the social lives of 
early hominins without requiring any special top-down mechanism of normative 
thinking such as a capacity for understanding and representing social norms. In the 
fourth chapter, I argue that human-like social norm psychology evolved as a result of the 
selective pressures that gave rise to shared intentionality, especially the demands that 
came from collective hunting. Yet collective hunting was not the whole story of the 
evolution of shared intentionality, for our capacity to form shared intentional mental 
states emerged from the interplay between the selective pressures that led to cooperative 
breeding in humans as well as organized, goal-oriented, collective hunting. Thus, I 
propose an evo-devo account of shared intentionality and its normative dimension since 
I argue that explaining the evolution of this particular form of normative thinking 
crucially depends on information about the developmental trajectory of this capacity. 
Finally, in the fifth chapter, I focus on how social norms are acquired and how the way 
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we learn them gives rise to some prototypical cluster of moral judgments. Thus, this 
chapter returns to some of themes and arguments of the first chapter by explaining how 
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agent-independent representation     a representation is agent-independent if its 
content does not specify any agent—e.g., when a child realizes that a particular 
role in a group activity can be variably filled by different agents over time. This 
form of agent-independency is a matter of degree. A representation is 
increasingly agent-independent when it relies less on the specifics of an agent or 
group of agents (see Nagel, 1986). 
bird’s-eye view representation     a bird’s-eye view is a distinctive perspective to 
represent social interactions. This perspective is a case of functional abstraction 
and role/occupant distinction. The notion of a bird’s-eye view representation is a 
closely connected but different idea from that of an agent-independent 
representation. For an agent could deploy, in principle, a bird’s-eye view 
representation of a certain task only when interacting with specific partners. 
bottom-up cognitive process     the processing of sensory and affective information 
that depends more directly on features of the stimulus input (see Rauss & 
Pourtois, 2013). top-down control is the reverse of bottom-up processing, i.e., 
the processing of sensory and affective information that is driven by more 
cognitive processes such as goals or intentions. 
cognitive process     an operation that affects an agent’s mental content. Examples of 
cognitive processes are perception, memory, language, problem-solving, and 
abstract thinking. Cognitive processes have hierarchical structure. Many 
contemporary models of processes specify a superordinate level (e.g., processes 
of emotional control) that controls and monitors lower level processes (e.g., 
emotions). Similarly, models of representation comprise higher superordinate 
levels that represent information in a more general form and lower subordinate 
levels where information is represented more specifically. 
collective intentionality     intentional states that we share with larger social groups, 
rather than specific individuals with whom we engage in simpler forms of shared 
intentionality. Only some shared intentional states are real collective intentional 
states in the sense of involving, at least to some degree, an agent-independent 
representation of the social interaction. The distinction between shared 
intentional states and full-blown collective states is not only a matter of degree 
but also a matter of cognitive mechanisms. Collective intentionality requires a 
we-mode of representation of mental states, e.g., “We believe that p” or “We 
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want to do p” (see also ‘we-mode representation’). Since we-mode 
representations are representations of intentional states that are held by 
individuals but which make fundamental reference to a collective formed in 
conjunction with the other individuals (Searle, 1990), collective intentional states 
are also irreducible collective. 
collective mental state     a collective mental state is any shared intentional mental state 
ψ in which the subject is represented in a we-mode. A we-mode representation 
of the subject of a shared intentional mental state is a plural representation of the 
agents A1,A2,...,An who collectively are in the mental state ψ such as in “We 
believe that p” (see also ‘we-mode representation’). 
corrective attitudes     see punitive attitudes. 
emotion     the term ‘emotion’ refers here to a set of valenced behavioral and 
concomitant physiological responses that correlate with specific subjective 
experiences (McClure, Botvinick, Yeung, Greene, & Cohen, 2007). These 
emotional processes can be understood as a subset of automatic processes that 
are quick to respond and produce stereotyped effects on behavior. They can be 
differentiated from other automatic processes because they are valenced, i.e., 
because they have valuative significance, carrying a level of attraction or 
aversion to the events that evoke them (McClure et al., 2007, p. 206). For 
example, Ekman and colleagues (Ekman, 1999; Ekman & Friesen, 1971) have 
shown that some emotions such as some forms of anger and guilt are a 
distinctive class of psychological phenomena marked out by their automaticity, 
by unique behavioral and physiological signatures, and by the existence of 
homologous states in other primates. In addition, LeDoux (1993, 1996) has also 
distinguished between ‘cognitive computations’ which yield information about 
stimuli and the relations between them, and ‘affective computations’ which yield 
information about the significance of stimuli for the organism and lead to 
physiological and behavioral responses appropriate to that significance. 
Similarly, researchers also sometimes distinguish emotions from feelings 
(Damasio, 1994, 1999). Emotions are automatic response repertoires, while 
feelings are subjective or experiential counterparts of emotions (mental 
representations of physiological changes that characterize and are consequent 
upon processing emotion-eliciting objects or states). 
emotion regulation     see emotional control. 
x 
 
emotional control     the ability to exercise influence over emotion, and modulate 
emotion through the use of cognitive or behavioral strategies (Gross, 1998b; 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). It can be an attempt to change and regulate aspects 
of a situation and emotional experience prior to the generation of emotion or an 
attempt to alter the responses to the experience of emotion after the emotion has 
occurred (Gross, 1998a, 1999, 2002). 
generalizability     a property of social norms as defined in this thesis (see also ‘social 
norms’). Generalizability refers to the scope of the judgment and its context-
sensitivity—normative beliefs can regulate the behavior of only some 
individuals in specific situations or roles. Thus, normative beliefs can be 
characterized by a gradient of generalization or abstraction depending on how 
tightly they are conceived to be linked to specific individuals or situations. 
I-mode representation     a representation of intentional states that are fundamentally 
egocentric such as “I believe that p” or “I want p”. When a state of affairs is 
represented as something that each agent individually believes, desires, or 
intends, this state of affairs is represented in the I-mode. The mode of a 
representation captures the subject’s perspective or attitude on the intentional 
object. There are different forms of I-mode intentional states such as beliefs, 
desires, and intentions. Each I-mode intentional state has a we-mode counterpart. 
For example, an I-mode representation of an agent’s intention ϕ is called an ‘I-
intention’ of the form “I intend to ϕ”, which has a we-intention counterpart of 
the form “We intend to ϕ” (see also ‘we-mode representation’). 
instrumental rationality     a form of rationality that focuses on the necessary and most 
efficient means of achieving a certain goal. Failing to do so makes an agent 
instrumentally irrationally. For example, if an agent is thirsty and intends to 
drink water, it would be rational for the agent to look for a nearby pond. All 
other things being equal, it would be irrational either to look for a more distant 
pond or not to take any means to this end. 
intentional mental content     the intentional content of a mental state is a propositional 
specification of what this mental state is about. We ascribe other agents with 
intentional mental content and attitudes toward them as part of our practices to 
explain and predict behavior (Dennett, 1987). There is a causal connection that 
explains the emergence and success of these practices. They are explanatory and 
predictively successful because the prolonged demands on cooperation and 
coordination in our lineage have selected not only for an increased ability to 
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predict each other behavior through these practices but also for making our 
behavior more readily interpretable by them (Sterelny, 2003). Our explanatory 
and predictive practices are then causally connected to whatever physical 
implementation of those putative mental states might be through our biological 
and cultural evolutionary history. 
intentional mental state     intentional mental states are the thoughts we ascribe to an 
agent whose content can be roughly specified through a proposition toward 
which the agent takes a propositional attitude (see also ‘propositional attitude’). 
intentionality     a property of mental states which consists in their being directed 
towards objects or events. Mental states that are characterized by its 
intentionality are intentional mental states. Examples of intentional states are 
beliefs, desires, and intentions. An agent cannot have a belief, desire, or intention 
without these mental states being about something. 
intrinsic motivation     a property of social norms as defined in this thesis (see also 
‘social norms’). A mental state possess intrinsic motivation when it motivates 
behavior as an ultimate end rather than solely as a means to other ends. An agent 
A is motivated to do ϕ solely as a means to an end E if and only if (i) A is 
motivated to do ϕ, (ii) A is motivated to achieve E, and (iii) A is motivated to do 
ϕ only because A believes that doing ϕ suffices (or just promotes) achieving E. 
On the contrary, A is intrinsically motivated to do ϕ precisely when (i') A is 
motivated to do ϕ and (ii') for all other ends E1,E2,...,En, that A has, it is false 
that A is motivated to do ϕ solely because A is a means to satisfying one or more 
of these other ends. This means that if A is intrinsically motivated to do ϕ, A may 
recognize that ϕ contributes to achieve some of these other ends, but this cannot 
be the sole motivation for A to do ϕ. Avoiding pain is an intuitive example of 
intrinsic motivation. People seek to avoid pain not only because they think this 
will contribute to some other goals but also because avoiding pain is something 
we want to do for its own sake (see Sober & Wilson, 1998, pp. 200-201). 
Intrinsic motivation is not the same as having overriding power. For example, 
social norms are understood in this thesis as having intrinsic motivation, but its 
motivational force can be overridden by the motivational force of other mental 
states. What is essential for a mental state to be an ultimate end is to motivate the 
agent to bring about a certain state of affairs irrespective of the way it promotes 
other agent’s goals. In contrast, instrumental ends are those mental states that 
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determine the means through which an agent will bring about that state of 
affairs. 
joint intentional mental state     a joint intentional mental state ψ is the mental state of 
an agent who joins the mental state of another. An agent A joins the intentional 
mental state ψ of another agent B when (i) A is intrinsically motivated to be in ψ 
because B is in ψ, and (ii) A co-represents ψ in a way that A and B are 
represented as a singular subject who is in ψ as opposed to each one 
simultaneously being in ψ. A can represent A and B as a singular subject who is 
in ψ either through recursive mindreading (see also ‘recursive mindreading’) or 
through a we-mode representation (see also ‘we-mode representation’). A is 
intrinsically motivated to be in ψ because B is in ψ if and only if A is motivated 
to be in ψ as an end in itself because B is in ψ. An intentional mental state ψ is 
co-represented by a group of agents A1,A2,...,An when A1,A2,...,An are in ψ. An 
agent A can actively join the mental states of another agent B when A is 
intrinsically motivated to intentionally interpret B’s behavior and joins his/her 
mental states. Unless further qualification is made, in all that follows ‘joint 
mental states’ will denote joint, shared, and collective intentional mental states. 
lineage explanation     an explanation that specifies a sequence of changes which aim to 
show how a certain trait or mechanism could be changed into another through a 
set of minor modifications. The aim of these explanations is to make plausible 
certain phylogenetic trajectories. They can be given at the level of phenotypic 
change as well as at the level of developmental mechanisms (Calcott, 2009). 
mental representation     a theoretical construct in cognitive science, especially in 
computational theories of cognition, according to which mental states and 
processes are constituted by the occurrence, transformation, and storage of 
information-bearing structures (representations) of some kind. Representations 
are intentional mental states with semantic properties such as content, reference, 
and truth-conditions. 
mindreading     the capacity to predict, explain, or understand the behavior of other 
agents by attributing intentional mental states to them. 
moral judgment     a heterogeneous class of mental states, which although might be 
unified at a certain level, is not unified at the cognitive level. For this reason, I 
focus in this dissertation on prototypical clusters of moral judgments that are 
central to the philosophical tradition in moral psychology. In particular, I focus 
on moral judgments as defined by the domain theory of moral development 
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(Turiel, 1983) and judgments that are considered inescapable and authority 
independent by the agent (Foot, 1972; Joyce, 2006; Mackie, 1977; Williams, 
1985). Moral judgments can only be partially grouped at the cognitive level in 
terms of the properties stipulated by these theories. 
normative cognition     roughly construed, normative cognition is an umbrella term that 
covers different kinds of symbolically mediated normative information. At a 
very basic level, human and animal cognition is driven, modulated, and 
governed by symbolically mediated information about what to do in a particular 
situation. When a mental state plays this role in cognition, that mental state 
carries normative information. Some mental states carry normative information 
because they govern different aspects of individual cognition and behavior in a 
private way, i.e., they do not govern or regulate other agents’ cognitive precesses 
or behavior. However, humans (and more controversially other primate species) 
can represent normative information that is fundamentally intersubjective and 
social. For humans can produce, share, acquire and implement different kinds of 
norms and conventions that not only govern own behavior but also other agents’ 
behavior. For example, food taboos about what pregnant women can eat are 
represented in a way that apply to all pregnant women regardless of whether one 
is pregnant or not. In this thesis, normative cognition refers more narrowly to 
this social form of normative cognition (see also ‘social normative thinking’). 
normative guidance     a top-down capacity to understand and respond to commands 
(see also ‘top-down cognitive process’). 
normative thinking     see normative cognition. 
norms     see social norms. 
offline cognition     a form of cognition that occurs when an agent is not acting but 
reflecting on the world and its possible actions. Agents switch to offline forms of 
cognition to make more careful considerations in situations that require forward 
planning. 
online cognition     online cognition is concerned with immediate input from the 
environment. It deals with tasks that require fast moment-by-moment processing 
and involves an agent’s active sensorimotor engagement with the world. 
practical rationality     a capacity for solving the question of what one is to do through 
reflection. Deliberation of this kind is practical because is concerned with action 




propositional attitude     a propositional attitude is a mental state held by an agent such 
as intending, believing, desiring, and the like, which possesses a direction of fit 
and expresses how we regard a certain proposition. An agent can have different 
propositional attitudes toward the same proposition—e.g., one can believe that p 
while simultaneously desiring that p. A propositional attitude can have either a 
mind-to-fit-world direction of fit such as beliefs, which are meant to reflect the 
world, or world-to-fit-mind direction of fit such as desires, which are meant to 
influence the world. 
punitive attitudes     a property of social norms as defined in this thesis (see also ‘social 
norms’). Punitive attitudes refer to the motivational force people feel to police, 
punish, or correct others, including themselves, when they think that they have 
violated a norm. These punitive attitudes are sometimes salient and explicit, 
while other times are less evident. For example, in some cases, the violation of a 
norm engenders actual physical punishment. In other cases, the perceived 
violation of a norm engenders punitive attitudes like anger and blame (or shame 
and guilt) toward the transgressor. And yet in other cases, it just drives corrective 
behaviors that target the transgressor without any harshness or evident signals of 
reprisal—e.g., when an adult correct a child for the violation a certain norm of 
etiquette. 
rational action     an action that maximizes the expected utility of the outcome 
according to some model o rational action. Models of rational action assume that 
agents’ decisions are a function of their preferences among a number of 
available choices. In these models, rational agents use available information to 
assess the probabilities of events and the cost/benefit ratio to determine their 
choices, acting consistently with the best option available. Preferences are 
assumed to be both complete and transitive. Preferences are complete when 
agents can always say which of two alternatives they consider preferable (or 
whether neither is preferred to the other). Preferences are transitive if an option 
A is preferred to an option B, and B is in turn preferred to an option C, then A is 
also preferred to C. 
rationality     see practical rationality. 
recursive mindreading     recursive mindreading is the ability to embed representations 
about mental states inside other mental representations. For example, an agent A 
may believe that another agent B believes that A believes that p. This capacity 
allows an agent A to represent multiple agents A1,A2,...,An as a singular subject 
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who is in a joint mental state ψ as opposed to each one simultaneously being in 
ψ. A is able to represent both agents A and B as a singular subject who is in a 
joint mental state ψ through recursive mindreading if (i) A is in a mental state ψ, 
(ii) A believes that B is in a mental state ψ, and (iii) A believes that B believes 
that A is in a mental state ψ. Unlike we-mode representations, the ability to 
represent multiple agents as a singular subject via recursive mindreading is 
constrained by our cognitive capacity to embed representations about mental 
states inside other mental representations. 
representation     see mental representation. 
self-domestication     a process of social selection against aggression in humans that 
resembles the process of adaptation of other wild animals to humans without 
systematic human selective breeding (Hare, Wobber, & Wrangham, 2012; 
Wrangham, 2011). 
shared intentional mental state     a shared intentional mental state ψ is the mental 
state of an agent who shares that mental state with other(s). A group of agents 
A1,A2,...,An shares an intentional mental state ψ when (i') each agent Ai in the 
group is intrinsically motivated to be in ψ because the others are in ψ, and (ii') 
A1,A2,...,An co-represent ψ in a way that A1,A2,...,An are represented as a 
singular subject who is in ψ as opposed to each one simultaneously being in ψ. 
Each agent Ai in the group is intrinsically motivated to be in ψ because the other 
agents are in ψ if and only if each of the Ai agents in the group is motivated to be 
in ψ as an end in itself because the others are in ψ. An agent A can actively share 
a mental state ψ in which A is in when A is intrinsically motivated to display and 
signal ψ for others to join. 
shared intentionality     the capacity to form joint intentional states. Joint intentional 
states are hybrid mental states, which are characterized by the systematic co-
occurrence of cognitive and motivational components. From a cognitive point of 
view, representing activities in a joint form requires being able to represent 
plural subjects of action (e.g., “We want to hunt” or “We are attending to that 
antelope”) and task roles or activities that are not necessarily linked to particular 
individuals (e.g., agent-independent representations of the different roles that our 
particular hunting technique requires). This creates a gradient of generalizability 
and abstraction depending on the scope of the plural subject of action and the 
degree of abstraction with which these activities are represented. From a 
motivational point of view, shared intentional states are intrinsically 
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motivational, e.g., by definition, entertaining a joint intention of the form “We 
want to hunt” implies a motivation to hunt with others that is not purely 
instrumental. That is, an agent joins the activity because he/she finds its 
collective nature intrinsically rewarding, rather than because the agent merely 
thinks that the activity is instrumentally beneficial for him/her, or even 
instrumentally beneficial for everyone. 
social normative thinking     a social form of normative cognition that deals with social 
norms (see also ‘social norms’). On the view I am defending, shared intentional 
psychology gives rise to a special form of psychology that enables us to engage 
in social normative thinking by enabling the sharing of the kind of normative 
mental states that govern the instrumental and practical rationality of hominid 
agency. 
social norms     normative mental states that are generalizable, intrinsically motivating, 
and engender punitive attitudes. A normative mental state is generalizable when 
multiple agents can fall within the scope of the normative mental state and that 
normative state is applicable to multiple counterfactual situations (see also 
‘generalizability’). A normative mental state is intrinsically motivating when the 
agent is motivated to comply with that state as an end in itself rather than as a 
means to fulfill other end (see also ‘intrinsic motivation’). A normative mental 
state engenders a punitive attitude if the agent is motivated to police, punish, or 
correct others, including themselves, when they think that they have violated the 
normative state (see also ‘punitive attitudes’). 
social rationality     a form of instrumental rationality that takes place when agents 
share intentional states such as goals and intentions (see also ‘instrumental 
rationality’). Social rationality gives rise to social expectations about what one 
should do in a given situation as well as to social expectations about what others 
should do in turn to achieve a common goal. For example, when hunters share a 
goal such as “We want meat”, this goal is only achieved when all the hunting 
partners obtain some of the meat. In such a context, sharing the meat is socially 
rational. 
third-person representation     see bird’s-eye view representation. 
top-down cognitive process     the processing of sensory and affective input that is 
driven by higher cognitive processes such as goals or intentions. These processes 
occur at a superordinate level in the sense that they control and monitor lower 
level processes that handle incoming sensory and affective information. Bottom-
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up processing is the reverse of top-down processing, i.e., the processing of 
sensory and affective information that depends more directly on features of the 
stimulus input (see Rauss & Pourtois, 2013). 
we-mode representation     intentional states held by individuals but which make 
fundamental reference to a collective formed in conjunction with the other 
individuals (Searle, 1990). They are agent-independent representations of 
intentional states that cannot be reduced to recursive mindreading. For example, 
knowledge states can be represented through recursive mindreading such as “I 
believe that you believe that I believe that p”. But these mental states can also 
have an irreducible we-mode of representation when the plural subject of that 
knowledge state cannot be represented via recursive mindreading due to 
cognitive limitations in our capacity to embed representations about mental 
states inside other mental representations. The mode of a representation captures 
the subject’s perspective or attitude on the intentional object. As in the case of I-
mode representations, there are different forms of we-mode intentional states 
such as beliefs, desires, and intentions (see also ‘I-mode representations’). A we-





Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The goal of this dissertation is to explain and defend a naturalistic theory of normative 
cognition—particularly, human social norm psychology. Social norms can be roughly 
understood as the rules that govern group behavior. Humans seem to be a unique species 
in this respect since our behavior is largely governed by a widespread network of social 
norms. They have been extensively studied in the social sciences, although they are 
typically seen as exogenous variables that constrain individual behavior. However, 
despite their vital role in organizing human life, there has been relatively little attention 
in philosophy and the psychological sciences to understand this phenomenon. Much 
existing experimental research on the psychology of social norms is relatively recent 
and more often than not, focused on the understanding of moral norms. In the 
philosophical literature, social norms are usually seen as equilibria of coordination 
games or cooperative equilibria in prisoner’s dilemma-type games. But there is little 
mention of the mental processes involved and the implications for both philosophy of 
mind and philosophy of psychology. This thesis aims to fill this gap by building a 
naturalistic account of a distinctively human form of social norm psychology and the 
particular kind of normative thinking it engenders. Although partial and piecemeal, this 
thesis is intended as an important first step towards a more comprehensive theory of 
human norm psychology in particular and normative thinking in general. 
 
1.1. Methodological reflections 
 
Naturalism is understood here as a methodological approach—one that takes the 
philosophical practice to be continuous with the natural sciences. On this view, 
philosophical theories are empirically testable conjectures. Certainly, philosophy is 
often understood as a matter of pure conceptual analysis aimed to find necessary truths. 
But I am skeptical of the prospects of understanding the mind by this method alone. 
Granted, conceptual clarification is a major feature of the philosophical enterprise, but it 
is hardly a methodological tool under the exclusive control of philosophers. Conceptual 
analysis is, and has been always, an important component of the scientific practice. Of 
course, there will be parts of this project that will require more conceptual clarification 
than empirical input. This will be clear at times in certain parts of this work. But the 
whole theoretical enterprise that this thesis attempts will be carried out by a mixture of 
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traditional conceptual analysis, empirical data, and some formal modeling—although I 
do not develops these models myself, many of those on whom I rely do. 
Philosophy is not a scientific enterprise on its own, but it is part of our scientific 
worldview, for its goal is also the pursuit of knowledge. Philosophy and science can be 
integrated in different ways. One is by realizing that many of the most relentless 
problems in science are partly philosophical in nature. Another is by noticing that 
philosophical ventures are often integrative. Philosophical thinking typically takes place 
when our subject matter does not match (or it does only in a very partial way) with any 
of the established sciences. Understanding human nature, for instance, is a too wide 
topic to be monopolized by one of the sciences alone even though individually they can 
make significant contributions to the overall picture. Concerning its topic, this 
dissertation has also a distinctive philosophical flavor since it deals with one striking 
aspect of human nature, namely our capacity to engage in social normative thinking. 
Moreover, the project aims to make a substantive contribution to our understanding of 
this capacity by connecting this issue with what some philosophers have called ‘shared 
intentionality’ (see, for instance, Bratman, 1992; Gilbert, 1989; Searle, 1990; Sellars, 
1963). Thus, although this thesis should be primarily understood as a first-order project 
in the empirical sciences, since despite its highly conjectural nature each of its parts is 
independently testable, it will become clear throughout this dissertation that this first 
order project is directly relevant to many other standard philosophical projects. As 
Godfrey-Smith (2014) put it, one way to do philosophy of science is focusing on 
scientific disciplines as target of philosophical investigation. But another way is to use 
science as a tool to gain an understanding of the universe and our place within it, i.e., 
“[...] working out what the raw science is really telling us, and using it to put together an 
overall picture of the world”. (p. 4) He calls the latter ‘philosophy of nature’. This thesis 
can be understood as project of the latter kind. 
The scope of the dissertation is broad as it is often the case in philosophy. 
Roughly construed, the topic of this thesis is the evolution of normative cognition and, 
more specifically human social norm psychology.1 Evolutionary approaches in 
1 I will not provide here definitions of key terms such as ‘normative thinking’ or ‘human norm 
psychology’. One of the central goals of the thesis is precisely to shed light on those issues by trying to 
build a psychological theory of a special form of normative thinking. This is part and parcel of the 
naturalistic spirit of the project, since on this view, normative thinking, human norm psychology, and the 




                                                          
philosophy are now in vogue. Debunking arguments of morality, for instance, are 
typically grounded in evolutionary considerations and they have been shown to have 
wide philosophical reach. Yet historical approaches are anything but new. They have 
been a common strategy in the humanities and the social sciences to understand human 
nature. Unsurprisingly, they have been an important part of the philosopher’s toolkit 
since an important part of understanding who we are is to understand how we came to 
be. 
In tackling the evolution of human social norm psychology, I also focus on its 
development as well as its underlying cognitive and motivational mechanisms. This 
might indeed sound too ambitious. But as I will try to show in the following chapters, 
this is a necessity because I am interested in the psychological underpinnings of this 
form of normative thinking and how they evolved. And as I will explain in chapter 3, 
explaining the evolution of this form of human norm psychology requires understanding 
the developmental trajectory of this cognitive capacity. So, in order to explain its 
evolution, we need an idea about both the cognitive machinery and the developmental 
trajectory of human social norm psychology. I think we can make significant progress in 
the historical sciences through these integrative views since they allow putting together 
multiple independent lines of evidence, which increasingly constrain the space of 
possible explanations. 
Reconstructing the past is certainly difficult. The causal connections between 
current evidence and past events are remote and the traces of these processes are usually 
eroded by time. Historical processes typically destroy evidence about themselves as they 
unfold. For example, when an organism dies, it triggers a process of cellular decay, 
which is only prevented by the mineralization of small portion of tissues such as bones 
and teeth. The chances of an organism becoming fossilized are poor; the probability of 
intact preservation is even lower. Fossils usually suffer damage from weathering and 
sedimentation before they can be discovered. These evidential problems only escalate 
when our explanatory targets are social-cognitive traits since they can only be indirectly 
inferred from the physical evidence that these processes leave behind. Unlike bones, 
behavior does not fossilize. Thus, evidential issues become a central problem for the 
historical sciences, and this problem is more acute in the case of our evolutionary 
history. Reconstructing the social behavior of early hominins requires serious evidential 
bootstrapping. No single strand of evidence can tell us everything about the social 
behavior of our ancestors in the distant past. 
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One way to do this is by comparing lineages that may serve as models of our 
explanatory target. Closely related species may provide valuable information about our 
past due to their phylogenetic connection with us—e.g., information about ancestral 
morphology, social organization, or baseline cognitive capacities. Also, given enough 
symmetries between relevant selective pressures, even unrelated taxa can offer a 
glimpse into our evolutionary past through parallel, convergent evolution. The 
comparative strategy certainly does not solve the problems of scarcity and low 
resolution of evidence that plague the historical sciences, but it helps us to deal with 
them. Admittedly, we can rarely give an accurate portrait of the past. Yet well-crafted 
comparative analyses within a reasonably tractable chunk of our lineage can yield 
meaningful conclusions. For example, comparative studies in great apes and humans 
have concluded that unlike children, apes do not engage in true imitation (learning 
focused on actions) but rather emulation (learning focused on goals and results) 
(Tomasello, 1996). As a result, emulation is thought to be one of the baseline capacities 
of hominin evolution, while true imitation is not (for a different view, see Whiten, 
McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009).2 
Moreover, the paleoanthropological record can help us to determine the 
significance of the similarities and differences we find between closely related species. 
Fossil evidence can support comparative claims by telling us how compatible our 
comparative analyses are with the physical traces of the past. Phylogenetic 
reconstructions via common ancestry are highly sensitive to patterns of dental abrasion, 
skull morphology, and the like, as phylogenetic inferences generate hypotheses about 
our ancestors that can be later confronted with their physical imprint. For example, the 
number of branches in our evolutionary tree has grown significantly since ‘Lucy’ was 
discovered—in fact, all the three genera predating this specimen, Sahelanthropus 
2 Whiten and colleagues (2009) have argued that chimpanzees possess a minimal capacity for imitative 
learning since diffusion studies in chimpanzees suggest that this species have a capacity for copying local 
behavioral traditions and experiments involving so-called ‘ghost’ experimental conditions have shown 
that chimpanzees cannot learn if there is no agent demonstrating the action. However, in all these studies, 
the specific details of the actions are ignored. Since chimpanzees are not completely blind to goal-directed 
behavior, observing an action could potentially transmit information about the demonstrator’s goal, which 
helps the chimpanzee to learn the relevant actions to achieve the desired goal. Therefore, emulation could 
still be a mechanism for acquiring these behaviors since the focus of attention would be placed on the goal 
of the demonstrator rather than on the actions themselves. This explanation has been argued to be 
consistent with the primate literature on social learning (Call & Carpenter, 2002; Dindo, Thierry, & 
Whiten, 2008; Galef, 2009; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2006, 2009; Tennie & Hedwig, 2010). 
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(Brunet et al., 2002, p. 150), Orrorin (Senut et al., 2001), and Ardipithecus (White et al., 
2006), were discovered after this finding. The discovery of these hominins has crucially 
changed the way we think about the origin of human bipedalism (White, Lovejoy, 
Asfaw, Carlson, & Suwa, 2015). Likewise, convergent selective pressures require 
structurally similar ancestral environments and parallel socioecological pressures. 
Luckily, paleoenvironmental data frequently allows a reliable reconstruction of the 
geology, flora, and fauna of early hominins (see, for instance, Hart & Sussman, 2005). 
All this evidence is framed in the context of the evolution of human sociality and 
cooperation. The type of questions I am interested in are questions like “How did the 
human mind change in response to our living a more prosocial, cooperative life?” and 
“Where does human social norm psychology fit within this change?” So, most of the 
data I offer in this thesis comes from well-established models of great ape and human 
sociality and cooperation, which are built upon comparative and paleoanthropological 
data. These models serve as proxies of early hominins’ and early human hunter-
gatherers’ social-cognitive capacities as well as the crucial differences between, for 
instance, early hominin foraging practices and human foraging. 
More specifically, I aim to provide in the following chapters what can be 
characterized as a ‘lineage explanation’ of this form of normative thinking (see Calcott, 
2009), i.e., an explanation that specifies a sequence of changes that takes us from agents 
with an ape-like baseline capacity for social cognition to agents with human-like social 
norm psychology. The explanation I offer in this dissertation relies, in particular, on a 
model of great ape and human cooperation that has been built over the last two decades 
of psychological research within the theoretical framework of shared intentionality. I 
want to argue that human social norm psychology is closely linked to our shared 
intentional psychology and that this capacity is in turn connected to moral cognition—in 
particular, some prototypical cluster of moral judgments that is central to the 
philosophical tradition in moral psychology. Thus, the primary target of this thesis is 
social norm psychology rather than normative phenomena per se. Most importantly, I 
want to link the emergence of this capacity with the lineage explanation of our capacity 
to form shared intentions. 
As we will see in the following chapters, the lineage explanation I want to 
defend in this thesis bears on some traditional metaethical debates in philosophy. 
Metaethics is sometimes narrowly understood as a discipline focused on moral language 
but it might be more broadly construed as the study of the metaphysical, 
epistemological, semantic, and psychological presuppositions and commitments of 
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moral thought, talk, and practice (Sayre-McCord, 2007; Schroeder, 2012). I understand 
the metaethical consequences of this lineage explanation in the latter, broader sense. For 
example, the proposed lineage has important consequences for debates on moral 
nativism since it relies on the evolution, tuning, and integration of domain-general 
mechanisms. Likewise, it also bears on debates about the mental content of moral 
judgments since joint intentional states are hybrid mental states, which are partially 
cognitive and partially motivational.3 As a result, the class of moral judgments that are 




My goal here is to provide an explanation of how the basic psychological machinery for 
hominin sociality and cooperation worked at each major stage in the evolutionary 
trajectory leading to modern humans. Differences between adjacent stages are of great 
importance here. For they give us crucial information about how hominin basic social-
cognitive machinery changed into another working mechanism through a sequence of 
relatively minor modifications. In the view I am proposing, for instance, subtle cognitive 
and motivational changes in the direction of shared intentionality explain not only much 
of the differences in cooperation between great apes and humans but also the increase in 
complexity of the hominin foraging practices, e.g., as it is evidenced by the gradual 
appearance of big game hunting in the fossil record. This sequence of changes shows the 
plausibility of a certain evolutionary trajectory. It would be implausible, for instance, to 
speculate about the origins of collaborative big game hunting in a highly aggressive and 
dominant hominin species (Boehm, 1999). It is true that some carnivores such as wolves 
and hyenas hunt in groups. But their hunting strategies were neither evolutionarily 
accessible to the hominin lineage nor a case of real collaborative hunting, as I will argue 
in chapter 4. Thus, one advantage of bringing additional information to bear on the 
problem is that it introduces new constraints on our evolutionary narratives—e.g., 
through data in comparative and developmental psychology. These hypotheses are not 
just-so stories. They gain their epistemic credentials because building them gets harder 
3 That is to say, I conceive of shared intentional states as the regular, typical, and systematic co-
occurrence of these cognitive and motivational components. While I think it is possible for one to appear 
without the other, both in development and evolution, the regular co-occurrence and recruitment in 
driving human behavior is what will matter. 
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as the number of possible trajectories that met the imposed conditions significantly 
reduces. 
To put it more precisely, I want to show how the machinery behind the 
psychological phenomenon of shared intentionality is behind human social norm 
psychology and how shared intentionality emerged from variation in the psychological 
machinery for social cognition within our lineage. I will argue that human social norm 
psychology relies on our shared intentional capacities because the underlying cognitive 
and motivational machinery behind shared intentionality accounts for a wide range of 
core cases of social normative thinking, which have played a central role in human 
evolution. In other words, my working hypothesis is that much of human social norm 
psychology is indeed a special form of our distinctively human shared intentional 
psychology. 
This approach is particularly important for those interested in issues about 
continuity in evolutionary explanations. Lineage explanations can be given at the level 
of phenotypic change, but they can also be offered at the level of developmental 
mechanisms (Calcott, 2009). I aim to offer a lineage explanation of the latter kind. Since 
shared intentionality can be decomposed into a number of components, one may explain 
the psychological continuity of our lineage in terms of these components and how they 
are reassembled and rearranged in development. To be clear, when I talk about 
incremental evolutionary explanations, I expect the reader to see some continuity in my 
explanation because the components used to describe hominin social cognition can be 
credibly tuned and reorganized in development in such a way that they give rise to new 
cognitive skills such as the capacity for shared intentionality. In principle, these gradual 
changes in development might lead to abrupt changes in adult phenotypes. Therefore, 
the continuity I am arguing for is developmental, i.e., it is given in terms of gradual 
changes in hominin psychological development. 
This approach also allows us to explain the emergence of key cognitive 
innovations. I argue that the ability to form shared intentional mental states was an 
evolutionary novelty in our lineage—very likely a unique capacity within the 
mammalian clade. As we will see in this thesis, an evolutionary developmental approach 
can use lineage explanations to explain the origins of novel cognitive capacities through 
subtle changes in developmental timing. This means that developmental data in 
psychology is central to this project since they provide crucial information to explain 
how novel, human unique psychological traits such as shared intentionality and its 
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normative dimension are generated in ontogeny through relatively subtle changes in the 
cognitive and motivational machinery that support prosocial, cooperative behavior. 
 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follow. In chapter 2, I start explaining what my 
explanatory target is and why it matters for both philosophy and psychology. I will 
focus on the evolution of our general capacity to grasp social norms and to make a 
special class of normative judgments that I will call ‘shared intentional normative 
judgments’, explaining why this discussion is important for our understanding of human 
moral thinking. On the view I defend in this dissertation, human social norm psychology 
is a form of shared intentionality. These norms are represented as shared, collective 
intentional states that create emergent, social level facts. There might be other kinds of 
norms, but the relevant sense of norm I will discuss in this dissertation is social, i.e., 
they are norms about social interactions that are also expressed and endorsed in public 
contexts. Since I assume that norms have this social nature, I will not focus on 
normative mental states that agents keep for themselves—they will not count as norms 
in the relevant sense. I will try to show in this thesis that this particular form of 
normative thinking defines a unified cognitive kind that has played a central role in 
human evolution. 
Moral psychology, in contrast, is more diverse. For as I will argue in the next 
chapter, moral judgments define a quite heterogeneous class of mental states. Sure, 
normative cognition and moral thinking are related to each other since moral thinking is 
normative thinking. But I do not believe that shared intentionality unifies moral 
judgments in the same way that, say, it defines a clear class of normative mental states, 
namely shared intentional normative thoughts. Indeed, some members of the class will 
be moral judgments, i.e., the ones that are the result of the kind of norm psychology I 
propose in this dissertation. But I am not arguing that all shared intentional normative 
thoughts are moral or that all moral judgments belong to the class of shared intentional 
normative thoughts. Shared intentionality singles out only one particular class of 
normative thinking, so I do not even argue that all moral judgments are a special case of 
shared intentional states. I left this question open to empirical scrutiny. 
In chapter 3, I aim to provide the baseline of social-cognitive capacities from 
which my lineage explanation begins. To a large extent, this is a comparative task, i.e., I 
try to argue for a particular picture of early hominins based on comparative data about 
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the social-cognitive skills of great apes. I argue that, for a very long period of our 
evolutionary history, social behavior was basically a matter of tuning our preexisting 
affective mechanisms against the backdrop of our great ape-like baseline of social-
cognitive capacities. On this picture, early hominin ancestors’ social lives were mainly 
regulated by bottom-up affective processes. It was not organized around social norms. 
No sensitivity to commands was required. So, at the end of this chapter, I suggest that 
high-level cognitive processes of normative guidance evolved as a consequence of the 
selective pressures that led to shared intentional states—more specifically, the demands 
that came from collective hunting. 
I develop this view in some detail in chapter 4. I argue that shared intentionality 
emerged from the interplay between the selective pressures that led to cooperative 
breeding in humans as well as organized, goal-oriented, collective hunting. In this story, 
selection did not only act upon adult cognitive capacities but rather upon the entire life 
cycle. Very basic capacities for shared intentionality such as joint attention and pointing 
behavior emerged as ontogenetic adaptations for early childhood in the context of 
cooperative breeding. These capacities were extended in development into adulthood 
where they were redeployed in the context of cooperative foraging, especially collective 
hunting. As a result, the motivation and commitment with the shared goals and 
intentions of these collective activities were carefully monitored and enforced by all the 
group members. The coupling of these punitive or corrective attitudes with some other 
common features of shared intentional states was the origin of human social norm 
psychology. So, my claim is not only that shared intentionality was an essential 
precursor to normative thinking but also that some special class of shared intentional 
states provides a well-defined target for the psychological study of normative thinking. 
Human social norm psychology is a special form of shared intentionality that is linked 
to punitive attitudes toward norm violators. 
In chapter 5, I shift the focus from the phylogeny of normative guidance to its 
ontogeny, particularly the process of norm acquisition. To put it poetically, I think that 
norm acquisition is fundamentally a process in which we share our normative worlds; 
hence, the title of this thesis. We acquire social norms because we share intentional 
states with a particular motivational profile. This motivational profile is characterized by 
an intrinsic motivation to comply with the norm and a variety of punitive attitudes 
towards norm violators. In fact, we sometimes categorize normative judgments based on 
this motivational profile. I argue in this chapter that the way we learn these norms not 
only gives rise to a prototypical cluster of moral judgments, which has been traditionally 
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associated with the sentimentalist tradition in moral philosophy, but also that we 
sometimes classify these judgments as moral in virtue of their own motivational and 
affective profile. Take for example norms prohibiting stealing. Transgressions of this 
norm reliably trigger reactions of anger toward thieves or guilt for stealing. So, we learn 
to identify these norms and the responses they elicit as moral because a disposition to 
react in such a way in these situations is prototypically linked to moral responses. They 
form a very peculiar cluster of punitive attitudes. These affective and motivational 
dispositions help us to explain why we perceive certain judgments to be prototypically 
moral rather than just normative like the rules of conventional games. For they make us 
perceive normative judgments as being independent and authority independent, which 
are prototypical properties of moral judgments. Thus, this chapter returns to some of 
themes and arguments of chapter 1 by explaining how the distinction between moral 
judgments and nonmoral judgments can be culturally transmitted and by explaining how 




Chapter 2. Fragmenting moral judgments and unifying the 
psychology of norms 
 
One of the central aims of this thesis is to use philosophical tools to advance our 
understanding of normative and moral cognition. More specifically, I want to show how 
and why what some philosophers have called ‘shared intentionality’ (see, for instance, 
Bratman, 1992; Gilbert, 1989; Searle, 1990; Sellars, 1963) can help us to understand our 
distinctive capacity for normative thinking and how this capacity is closely related to a 
particular cluster of prototypical moral judgments. Thus, the primary target of this 
dissertation is normative and moral cognition rather than normative or moral 
phenomena, i.e., the features of the world that normative and moral judgments are 
about. 
The goal of this chapter is to explain the relationship between the type of 
normative thinking on which I focus in this thesis and moral judgments. On the view I 
propose, the distinctive shared intentional capacities of the hominin lineage help us to 
define an important form of normative thinking, namely shared intentional normative 
thoughts. These thoughts are generated by a peculiar, but important, kind of psychology 
of norms. Hereafter, I will understand norms as social norms. There might be other 
kinds of norms but my interest will focus on the psychology of this particular class of 
norms. Roughly speaking, social norms are rules of behavior that are considered 
acceptable in a group or society. These norms are represented in the form of shared 
intentional states, or so I will argue. When a norm is executed in cognition, it generates 
shared or joint intentional normative judgments. Since joint intentional states are hybrid 
mental states, I will argue in this chapter that shared intentional normative judgments 
are also hybrid mental states, i.e., states which are functionally defined by both its 
cognitive component and its motivational component. I will explain the essential 
psychological properties that this kind of normative thinking picks up in virtue of these 
components. 
The kind of psychology of social norms I will propose accounts for a large and 
important spectrum of our normative cognition. Moral judgments, in contrast, are more 
diverse. For as I will try to argue in this chapter, they seem to define a quite 
heterogeneous class of mental states. Although in metaethics the term ‘moral judgment’ 
is sometimes used to denote a kind of speech act, the term is being treated here as 
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denoting a mental state.4 We can isolate different kinds of prototypical moral judgments 
that map onto particular psychological processes, e.g., moral judgments about harm, 
justice, or rights which possess a particular functional profile (see Nucci & Turiel, 1978; 
Nucci, Turiel, & Encarnacion-Gawrych, 1983; Turiel, 1983, 1998) or judgments about 
moral demands that are seen by the agent as inescapable and authority independent (see 
Joyce, 2001; Mackie, 1977; Mameli, 2013). But we can do this only in a fragmentary 
fashion because these theories define local psychological kinds that only cover 
particular cases (I will expand on this issue in section 2.5). To put it briefly, while we 
can define within the shared intentional framework a family of normative judgments as 
what some philosopher would call a ‘natural kind’ (Quine, 1969), moral judgments as a 
whole are not a natural kind in the psychological sciences but a family of prototypical 
kinds (Machery, 2012; Parkinson et al., 2011; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008; Sinnott-
Armstrong & Wheatley, 2012, 2013; Sripada & Stich, 2007; Stich, 2016). In this 
chapter, I will focus mainly on the negative part of this claim, i.e., that there are good 
reasons to doubt that moral judgments define a unified natural kind in psychology. At 
the end of this chapter, I will outline the general strategy that I will follow in the rest of 
thesis. 
This way to conceive of moral judgments is important for the overall argument 
of the thesis. Thus, before getting into details, it may be important to explain how this 
chapter fits into the larger landscape of my project. For to say that moral judgments are 
not a unified target for the psychological sciences is not the same as saying that they 
cannot be a subject of study for psychology. It means that our understanding is 
piecemeal and that we should advance research without a preconceived view of what 
make some mental states to be moral judgments. Certainly, normative cognition and 
moral thinking are related to each other since moral thinking is always normative. This 
is a plausible working assumption. As a result, there are reasons to think that the kind of 
normative thinking that shared intentionality defines subsumes an important class of 
moral judgments. Since there are plausible explanations of the ontogeny and phylogeny 
of shared intentionality, there are grounds to connect the lineage explanation of our 
shared intentional capacities with the psychological machinery of prototypical kinds of 
moral judgments (see figure 2.1). 
 
4 If one understands metaethics more narrowly as the study of moral language, one might be inclined to 
treat moral judgments as some kind of speech acts rather than as a class of mental states. Of course, 
understood as speech acts they may perhaps express a mental state, but that is a different matter. 
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Figure 2.1. Diagram of the relation between joint intentional states, normative 
judgments, and moral judgments. Shadow zones represent empty zones. All moral 
judgments are assumed to be normative but not all moral judgments are taken to be a 
special class of joint intentional states, i.e., they are not shared intentional normative 
judgments. Normative and moral judgments include claims that are perceived by the 
agent as right, true, correct, valid, or justified, as well as those that are perceived by the 
agent as wrong, false, incorrect, invalid, or unjustified. Dashed lines indicate that the 
domain is not a natural kind but likely possesses a prototypical structure. 
 
To be clear, shared intentional normative thoughts are a special and important 
subclass of normative thoughts. This means that there are normative thoughts that are 
not shared. One can imagine thoughts that regulate individual behavior in rather 
egocentric way such as the normative thoughts that stem from individual instrumental 
rational action (Camp & Shupe, 2017). Non-human animals seem to be able of some 
sort of instrumental reasoning. Chimpanzees, for instance, display a form of strategic 
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reasoning to outsmart conspecifics, although they do not hold others to the same 
standards of rational action. Humans are a much more complex case. If I want to drink 
water from the drinking fountain, I think that I should go to the fountain. But unlike 
apes, we are inclined to hold others to our standards of rationality. When someone does 
not meet our expectations of what the rational course of action should be, we often (and 
perhaps always) judge others as stubborn, incompetent, or just simply foolish. To be 
clear, it is not that norms of social interaction are shared while norms of reasons are not. 
Instead, the point is that great apes do not share these mental states at all—these 
normative mental states are useful to outcompete conspecifics rather than to cooperate 
with them. 
The evolution of the capacity for shared intentionality is foundational for our 
capacity to form the class of shared intentional normative judgments. Moreover, an 
important class of moral judgments, though not all moral judgments, are shared 
intentional normative thoughts—i.e., some shared intentional normative thoughts are 
just not moral judgments. As I will argue in chapter 4, the psychology of the norms that 
govern conventional games fall within the spectrum of shared intentionality. These 
norms apply selectively to those that we think share with us the relevant information 
about the rules of the game, so we enforce those norms only on them and expect others 
to do the same when someone violate the rules. But norms of conventional games do not 
lead to prototypical cases of moral judgments—at least not of the kind that we will 
discuss in this chapter. 
Shared intentionality gives us a framework that allows singling out a particular 
class of normative judgments. As we will see in section 2.5, these normative judgments 
can be characterized by a distinctive gradient of generalizability, intrinsic motivation, 
and punitive attitudes. There might be other kinds of social normative thoughts that are 
not covered by this account. Yet as we will see throughout the thesis, they define a class 
of social normative judgments that is central to our social lives. They are normative 
because they give rise to a certain form of social rationality (e.g., about how we should 
share the meat among hunting partners) and because we enforce them in ourselves and 
others (e.g., when excluding partners who do not meet our expectations). But although 
judgments like “We ought to share the meat fairly” may perhaps significantly overlap 
with prototypical moral judgments, the framework does not define by itself any special 
class of moral judgments. 
These judgments, however, could be said to be moral because they are linked to 
features of prototypical moral judgments. They could be, for instance, judgments about 
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practical demands that are considered inescapable and authority independent by the 
agent, and which have traditionally played a central role in Western moral philosophy 
(Foot, 1972; Joyce, 2006; Mackie, 1977; Williams, 1985). These features go beyond the 
explanatory scope of the shared intentional framework, so explaining their emergence is 
explaining how the shared intentional lineage split into particular branches of moral 
judgments due to the ramification of our cultural practices and how we learn them. 
Perhaps all moral judgments are a special case of shared intentionality but I am also 
cautious about this generalization. For unconscious, automatic responses may also count 
as moral judgments, though they are not joint intentional states. For example, implicit 
aversive reactions against utilitarian harms are often taken to be exemplars of moral 
judgments, although they are not joint intentional states. 
A cautionary note is in order here. In the cognitive science literature, dual 
process theories distinguish between two different types of cognitive process. Type 1 
processes that are usually characterized as fast, automatic, and non-conscious, and type 
2 processes that are typically depicted as slow, controlled, and conscious (Evans & 
Frankish, 2009; Frankish, 2010; Frankish & Evans, 2009; Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich, 
1999; Stanovich & Toplak, 2012). The framework I will develop in the following 
chapters is primarily intended as an account of the second type of processes. As a result, 
I will leave open the question about the extent to which this account can explain 
implicit, automatic, normative or moral responses. 
The rest of this chapter is divided as follow. In section 2.1, I will provide the 
philosophical background of the discussion, i.e., the problem of providing a unified 
account of moral judgments. In section 2.2, I will talk about what I call the ‘unification 
hypothesis’, i.e., the idea that there is a property (or set of properties) that unifies moral 
thinking as an explanatory target for psychology. In section 2.3, I will focus on some 
particular version of this hypothesis, which relies on the domain theory of moral 
development (Turiel, 1983), and explains why it fails. In section 2.4, I will argue that we 
are better off by fragmenting moral judgments into different classes of prototypical 
moral judgments. In section 2.5, I will argue that although moral judgments may not be 
a natural kind, an important form of norm psychology can be unified within the 
framework of shared intentionality. Finally, in section 2.6, I will propose that this form 




2.1. Defining moral judgments 
 
Some dominant views in moral psychology (Dwyer, 1999; Hauser, 2006b; Mikhail, 
2011; Mikhail, Sorrentino, & Spelke, 1998) and moral development (Nucci & Turiel, 
1978; Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Turiel, 1983) argue that there is a well-delimited 
domain of moral cognition. These views claim to reveal the essential way in which 
moral thinking is psychologically unified. When they do so, they make an empirical bet. 
They characterize moral cognition in ways that are empirically testable—e.g., they 
hypothesize that there is one single moral domain (Turiel, 1983) instead of several 
distinct ones (Haidt, 2007). This assumption of unification is in some cases implicit, for 
researchers not always engage with definitional issues, although they draw general 
conclusions from them. For example, in the developmental psychology literature 
(Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932), emotions play little or no role in moral cognition 
because the target is typically conceived as a cognitive process closely linked to certain 
kinds of justifications and forms of reasoning. 
Sometimes these assumptions are more explicit. Lengthy discussions about what 
moral judgments are supposed to be are somewhat common in the scientific literature 
(see, for instance, Haidt, 2007; Killen & Smetana, 2015; Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, 
Krueger, & Grafman, 2005; Nucci, 2001). An influential view in moral development 
called the ‘social domain theory’ argues, for instance, that there is a distinct and 
identifiable moral domain (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Turiel, 
1983). Social domain theorists argue that their account “[...] allows us to define what is 
meant by the moral domain in a manner that transcends cultural and religious 
boundaries” (Nucci, 2001, p. xvii). They think that moral judgments are distinctive and 
unified since “[...] the moral domain forms a universal core set of values around issues 
of human welfare and justice” (Nucci, 2001, p. xx). For they argue that moral thinking is 
a single organized system, or domain, of social knowledge along with others such as a 
societal domain (concerned with conventions, social institutions, group norms, 
traditions, and cultural rituals) and a psychological domain (concerned with personal 
goals, autonomy, identity, and individual prerogatives) (Killen & Smetana, 2015). 
The question at hand here is whether we are able to provide a definition of moral 
judgments that is able to cover all (or at least a significant majority of) intuitive cases of 
moral judgments, and do so in a way that increases the explanatory power of 
psychological theory. What is at stake here is whether moral judgments define a single 
natural kind in the psychological sciences or whether moral judgment divides into 
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several distinct subclasses. Roughly speaking, supposed natural kind terms intend to be 
natural ways to classify phenomena that we discover through scientific investigation. 
Examples of natural kinds are chemical elements, some biological taxa, some 
psychological categories such as the distinction between short-term and long-term 
memory, and different types of cells, including some complex neuronal structures. 
More precisely, natural kinds can be minimally characterized as classes of 
objects, processes, states of affairs, and the like, that: (a) have a common property (or 
set of properties) that are shared by all, and only all, the members of that natural kind 
and (b) allow interesting (or nontrivial) inductive inferences (see, for instance, Quine, 
1969). Other approaches to natural kinds may have more stringent conditions. Some 
accounts may require from kinds to form a hierarchy (Ellis, 2001, 2002; Kuhn, 2000) or 
to be the subject matter of natural laws (Lowe, 2006). But what all these definitions of 
natural kinds have in common is at least some version of conditions (a) and (b). 
I will set aside the metaphysical issue of the naturalness of kinds and I will focus 
instead on the explanatory and inferential roles of natural kinds in science. For scientific 
theories classify objects, events, and processes, in kinds that are the target of systematic 
generalizations and in ways that allow us to draw nontrivial inferences about the natural 
world. These scientific classificatory schemes are then modified when these empirical 
generalizations prove to be wrong. In many empirical sciences, such as physics or 
chemistry, natural kinds are typically intrinsic physical kinds, but in psychology and 
other cognitive sciences, kinds are rather classes of states and processes that are 
characterized by their functional role. For arguments of multiple realizability point out 
that it is possible for physically diverse cognitive systems to be in the same kind of 
mental state. As a result, a mental kind would not be essentially realized by a certain 
neurophysiological kind but rather by the same functional role that particular instances 
of such a kind of state play in cognition. In what follows, I will focus on views in moral 
psychology that share this functionalist flavor. 
Interpreting the moral domain as a cognitive natural kind has been the focus of 
recent philosophical debate (Kelly & Stich, 2008; Nado, Kelly, & Stich, 2009; Sripada 
& Stich, 2007; Stich, 2016). These debates gravitate around Turiel and colleagues’ 
social domain theory of moral development (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana & Braeges, 
1990; Turiel, 1983). According to social domain theorists, moral judgments are 
characterized through a particular functional profile which is defined by the seriousness, 
authority independence, generalizability, and type of justification that is used to evaluate 
a normative transgression. They contrast moral judgments with conventional normative 
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judgments, such as judgments about norms of etiquette or the rules of conventional 
games, for moral transgressions are considered to be more serious, authority 
independent, generalizable, and typically justified in terms of harm, justice, and rights. 
Moreover, they are natural kinds in the sense above because moral judgments are 
defined through (a) a set of common properties that are shared by all, and only all, moral 
judgments, which (b) classify psychological phenomena in ways that facilitate the 
generalizations and predictions of the social domain theory. 
Other theories that take moral judgments to be a cognitive kind are nativist views 
of moral cognition. These views usually explain the functional role of mental kinds in 
terms of the modularity of the mind (Fodor, 1983). Nativist views of moral cognition 
deserve, and will receive, an independent discussion later in chapter 5 when I discuss 
the role of norm acquisition in moral cognition. But for the purpose of this chapter, it is 
important to point out that even those views crucially rely on Turiel and colleagues’ 
characterization of moral judgments and the findings of the social domain theory. For 
example, Mikhail (2009) considers these findings to be the most persuasive case for an 
innate moral faculty. Thus, the key question I would like to address in this chapter is 
whether is theoretically possible to unify moral judgments as a natural kind via the 
functional definition that the social domain theory provides. 
In the view I am proposing, in contrast, there may be no single class of moral 
judgments in psychology but different prototypical subclasses that may pick up 
important features of our psychology. These subclasses may turn out to be cognitive 
kinds on their own. The study of memory is a well-known example that fits this pattern. 
For the study of memory is actually the study of different types of systems which are 
classified according to different information processing features—e.g., episodic and 
semantic memory are subclasses of declarative memory, which in turn is a subclass of 
long-term memory. The issue at hand is not that there is a great variety of states and 
processes that we can call ‘memory’ or ‘moral judgment’. Instead, the problem is that 
this variety of processes does not meet the minimal conditions (a) and (b) for being a 
natural kind. Moreover, I will argue that if moral judgments as a whole are a natural 
kind in the psychological sciences, the best way to reveal this is by fragmenting our 
explanatory target in ways that track real differences in mental processing and then 
asking ourselves what these processes have in common and how they are integrated into 
cognition. Even if moral judgments are not a disunified class in psychology, we can 
discover the nature of this class bottom-up by exploring what culturally varying but 
prototypical subclasses of them have in common. 
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Cross-cultural research would be crucial for this type of project. One could 
examine, for instance, if moral judgments conceived in a certain way are only a Western 
practice, a practice only seen among large-scale societies, or perhaps a highly 
widespread and a central part of our social lives. There might be a partial fit, i.e., some 
human groups could have practices that resemble in some respects, but not in others, the 
ones seen in other social groups. But we can only know this if we take these antecedent 
concepts of moral judgments and confront them with cross-cultural data. Information 
about this variability, in turn, tells us something about the overall landscape of moral 
thinking as an explanatory target for moral psychology. For example, moral foundation 
theorists (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Graham, 2007) have argued for a more complex 
taxonomy of moral judgments. According to this theory, evidence in cultural 
psychology reveals that some innate and universally available psychological systems are 
the foundations of intuitive moral judgments such as care/harm, fairness/cheating, 
loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. A similar research 
agenda has also been carried out by experimental philosophers who integrate cross-
cultural data to delineate the moral domain through different techniques of data 
exploration such as cluster analysis (Fessler et al., 2015; Machery, 2012; Nado et al., 
2009; Sinnott-Armstrong & Wheatley, 2012, 2013). 
To sum up, the issue at stake here is whether moral judgments, conceived as 
mental states, are a unified natural kind in the psychological sciences. In the next 
section, I will explain what specific conditions have to be met in order to unify the class 
of moral judgments as a natural kind in psychology. This issue has methodological 
implications for this thesis. If we have reasons to think that a certain hypothesis along 
these lines is correct, then one could address the phenomenon directly based on the set 
of essential properties that ones’ hypothesis postulates. If correct, there would be a 
lineage of processes and mental capacities that lead to the emergence of this cognitive 
kind. One would have to worry only about explaining the emergence of those essential 
functional properties that define the kind and one would have explained the whole class 
of moral judgments. There would be no reason to worry anymore about, say, cross-
cultural diversity in the same way that one does not need to bother about it to determine 
whether subjects with anterograde amnesia have problems with their declarative 
memory. Otherwise, if we cannot assume that moral judgments are natural kinds, we 
have to proceed in a fragmentary way. We have to focus on cases that perhaps are 
culturally relative, topic-specific, or functionally idiosyncratic, and then wondering how 
these different targets are linked to each other, if they are at all. 
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 2.2. What does it mean to claim that moral judgments are a unified 
cognitive kind? 
 
I will focus in this chapter on psychology rather than the cultural and evolutionary 
history of these practices because my primary focus is on the distinctive psychological 
features (if there are any) of moral cognition. The evolutionary and cultural history of 
these diverse practices might well be an organizing feature of them—e.g., species are 
organized in lineages despite being highly diverse. But the question at hand here is 
whether these organizing features can define a unified target for the psychological 
sciences. In fact, I will show in the next chapters that although there is a great diversity 
of moral judgments, parts of them at least, are historically structured in the form of a 
common genealogy whose branches cluster around the socioecological demands and the 
basic cognitive and motivational mechanisms that distinguish the history of the human 
lineage. That said, although I will identify a unified class of normative thinking that can 
be explained through mechanisms of shared intentionality, this is not the same as saying 
that they are specific mechanism of moral thinking, for they also explain normative 
judgments that are prototypically nonmoral—e.g., the representation of norms that 
govern conventional games. 
Kitcher’s (2011) evolutionary explanation of normative cognition, which I will 
discuss in chapter 3, is an example of this type of project. He is not interested in 
unifying the genealogy of human moral thinking to define a natural kind in the 
psychological sciences. He thinks that the distinction between moral and nonmoral 
normative thinking is not psychologically or cognitively fundamental—his target is our 
distinctive capacity for normative guidance. For him, the distinction between moral, 
religious, and customary practices emerges from both the evolutionary and cultural 
history of normative cognition. I agree on this. For the kind of complex genealogy that 
he proposes does not intend to tell us anything specific about the psychological 
mechanisms of moral judgments. He is not arguing, for instance, that the history of 
moral thinking reveals that the distinction between moral judgments and nonmoral 
judgments is psychologically robust. He is not trying to unify moral thinking as a 
natural kind in psychology. 
One can aim to unify moral judgments in different ways such that they are 
potentially useful for moral psychology. As Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley (2012, 
2013) have shown, one can try to unify these mental states by their content, 
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phenomenology, brain mechanisms, among other dimensions. Here, however, I will 
focus on a prominent version of the unification hypothesis, the social domain theory of 
moral development (Turiel, 1983), which try to unify moral judgments by their 
seriousness, authority independence, generalizability, and type of justification (see also 
Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Nucci et al., 1983; Turiel, 1998). I will focus on this theoretical 
approach because many researchers in this tradition have tended to assume that there is 
a correct definition of moral judgments, e.g., Turiel’s well-known definition of moral 
judgments as “[…] prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining to 
how people ought to relate to each other” (1983, p. 3), and on the other hand, because 
this is perhaps the most influential theoretical framework where a definitional approach 
to moral judgments has been linked to empirical research aiming to identify a unified 
cognitive domain.5 
More precisely, a unification hypothesis can be understood as the conjunction of 
three conditions, which must be satisfied when a candidate definition aims to unify 
moral judgments as a natural kind: 
 
Exhaustiveness: There is a property (or set of properties) that unifies all, 
or almost all, the members of the class of moral judgments. 
Specificity: The property (or set of properties) in question should only be 
shared by all, or almost all, the members of that class. 
Nontriviality: The property (or set of properties) should allow 
interesting psychological generalizations and predictions. 
 
Conditions of exhaustiveness and specificity are demarcation criteria, i.e., general 
conditions of satisfaction that a candidate definition should meet in order to distinguish 
moral judgments from nonmoral ones. Nontriviality is the condition that guarantees that 
there is a scientifically informative connection between the candidate definition of moral 
judgment and the psychological theory. 
I think that all attempts to satisfy these criteria fail in one way or another. The 
reason is that the class of moral judgments seems to be a very heterogeneous domain 
across many dimensions. Thus, this diversity does not allow interesting psychological 
5 I understand here the domain of a cognitive mechanism as the class of representations that it can take as 
input. However, cognitive domains could also be defined in terms of the task they perform. For example, I 
will argue in chapter 5 that the mechanisms responsible for norm acquisition are not domain specific in 
the sense that they are not specialized learning devices for the acquisition of norms. 
21 
 
                                                          
generalizations. One definition of moral judgments may reveal some important features 
of our psychology. But these definitions only work for some particular subclasses of 
moral judgments—they do not unify moral judgments within a single kind. Other 
definitions may encompass all sorts of prototypical moral judgments in a nontrivial way. 
However, these definitions also include judgments that would not count as intuitively 
moral for a large sample of the population. If this is correct, one should explain moral 
thinking in a fragmentary way. One should show the connection between a particular 
cluster of judgments (e.g., judgments about a special class of obligations) and 
psychological mechanisms that are not exhaustive or specific to the whole moral 
domain.  
To put it briefly, my main goal in the following sections is to argue that the 
project of unifying moral judgments, in the sense of satisfying the conditions of 
exhaustiveness, specificity, and nontriviality, is oversimple. But this does not mean that 
moral cognition lack of structure or that it is methodologically intractable. For as I will 
develop further in the rest of this chapter, the following strategy seem to be still 
defensible: (i) although the class of moral judgments is broad and heterogeneous, there 
might be a distinctive subset of that class (e.g., judgments that are inescapable and 
authority independent, as some moral philosophers propose) that is both theoretically 
important and a central case of lay judgments; (ii) then one can offer a psychological 
account of that core subset; and (iii) explain the respects (which may vary from case to 
case) in which other relatively more peripheral cases resemble core cases. 
 
2.3. Social domain theory 
 
There is probably no candidate definition of moral judgement with a better empirical 
support that Turiel and colleagues’ social domain theory. 
Over the past 40 years, the most important attempt to unify moral judgments in 
psychology has come from the social domain theory of moral development proposed by 
Turiel and colleagues (for reviews, see Helwig, Tisak, & Turiel, 1990; Killen, 1991; 
Nucci & Lee, 1993; Tisak, 1995; Turiel, 1998). This theory began as a departure from 
Kohlberg’s (1969) approach to moral development. According to Kohlberg, children are 
only preconventionally moral (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) because they are oriented in 
their moral reasoning by heteronomous considerations such as fear of external sanctions 
and obedience to authority commands. Instead, Turiel and others (Killen, 1991; 
Smetana, 1995; Smetana, Killen, & Turiel, 2000; Tisak, 1995) argue that early moral 
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thinking is legitimately moral because young children do make moral judgments that go 
beyond heteronomous considerations of authority and obedience (see, for instance, 
Killen, 1991, p. 155; Turiel, 1983, p. 148). 
To make their case, developmental psychologists in this tradition focus on the 
capacity to distinguish moral from conventional transgressions by putting forward a set 
of features that aims to draw a sharp distinction between the resulting judgments 
(Hollos, Leis, & Turiel, 1986; Nucci, 2001; Nucci & Turiel, 1978, 1993; Nucci et al., 
1983; Smetana, 1993; Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Turiel, 1978, 1983, 1998). 
In particular, according to Turiel’s (1983, 1998) theory, moral judgments are 
considered: 
 
(i) more serious, 
(ii) authority independent, 
(iii) generalizable to cultures in other times and places, 
(iv) and justified in terms of harm, justice, or rights. 
 
Following Kelly and colleagues (2007), I will call this cluster of properties the 
‘signature moral pattern’, and I will consider these features to be intended to specify a 
reliable nomological cluster rather than necessary conditions of moral judgments. For it 
is likely that unknown mechanisms might be in place such that they cluster properties 
(i)-(iv) together, while constraining the co-presence of other sets of properties (Boyd, 
1991, 1999; Millikan, 1999). 
In contrast, according to Turiel, conventional judgments are considered: 
 
(i') less serious, 
(ii') authority dependent, 
(iii') applicable only to some groups in particular times and places, 
(iv') and not justified in terms of harm, justice, or rights. 
 
Similar to the case of moral judgments, I will call this cluster of properties the ‘signature 
conventional pattern’, and I will consider the co-presence of these properties a reliable 
law-like effect of the underlying mechanisms behind conventional normative judgments. 
Briefly, Turiel and colleagues’ idea is that every time we see the transgression of 
a social norm, our judgments about these normative transgressions possess either the 
signature moral pattern or the conventional one. In the former case, these judgments 
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usually (but not necessarily) are justified in terms of harm, justice, or rights. In other 
words, transgressions that are considered moral produce responses with the respective 
signature moral pattern (i)-(iii), and then reliably elicit the pattern of justification 
explained in (iv) (see figure 2.2). 
 
Judgment Justification
How is the transgression 
judged?






Justified in terms of 
harms, justice, or 
rights
Not justified in 







Figure 2.2. Diagram of the relation between transgressions, signature patterns, and 
types of justification in Turiel’s (1983) social domain theory. According to this theory, 
moral judgments are nomologically linked to some types of transgressions. 
Transgressions that involve harm, injustice, or rights violations reliably lead to 
judgments with the signature moral pattern. Transgressions that involve a breach of 
conventions without the involvement of harm, injustice, or rights violations typically 
lead to responses with the signature conventional pattern. Consequently, judgments of 
the former kind are typically justified in terms of harm, justice, or rights. In contrast, 
judgments of the latter class are not justified in those terms. 
 
The most substantive claim of the theory is that we can consistently predict how the 
distinction will be drawn by manipulating certain features of the set of transgressions 
that we use as experimental stimuli. Transgressions that prima facie involve harm, 
injustice, or violation of rights are expected to be categorized as moral (Turiel, 1983). 
However, I will also focus on the more modest claim that the distinction between moral 
and conventional norms is robust with respect to the proposed patterns, i.e., that given a 
set of prototypically moral and conventional transgressions, they will be reliably 
clustered into the patterns described by the features (i)-(iv) and (i')-(iv'). 
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Turiel and colleagues’ approach is of special importance here because it relies on 
an impressive body of psychological data, and because it leads to nontrivial empirical 
generalizations and predictions about human moral thinking. This approach is supported 
by evidence derived from the ‘moral/conventional task’. In this experimental paradigm, 
subjects have to differentiate different transgressions according to a questionnaire. The 
questionnaire is designed to determine whether the participants consider an action as a 
moral or as a conventional transgression following the distinctive patterns described in 
(i)-(iv) and (i')-(iv'). 
Empirical results have shown that people from different cultures (Hollos et al., 
1986; Nisan, 1987; Nucci et al., 1983) and children as young as three years of age are 
able to distinguish moral from conventional judgments (Nucci, 1982; Nucci & Nucci, 
1982; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Turiel, 1983, 1998). More 
impressively, the pattern can be found in maltreated children (Smetana, Kelly, & 
Twentyman, 1984), children with autism and other cognitive disorders (Blair, 1996; 
Blair, Monson, & Frederickson, 2001; Nucci & Herman, 1982; Smetana et al., 1999), 
but not among psychopaths and children with psychopathic tendencies (Blair, 1995, 
1997). 
The moral/conventional task provides the most compelling evidence in favor of 
the idea that the distinction between moral and nonmoral domains is psychologically 
robust. Based on this experimental support, for instance, many evolutionary 
psychologists have argued for a nativist account of our moral capacities (Dwyer, 1999; 
Dwyer, Huebner, & Hauser, 2010; Hauser, 2006b; Mikhail, 2011; Mikhail et al., 1998) 
and that moral thinking relies on a distinctive class of moral computations (Cushman & 
Young, 2011; Hauser, 2006b; Mikhail, 2007, 2008, 2011). Though it certainly does not 
have to be, this approach is usually framed within the so-called ‘linguistic analogy’—a 
view according to which moral cognition and language share several important features 
such as its universal development, its compulsory operation, and so on (for a more 
detailed discussion of this view, see chapter 5). 
There are reasons, however, to think that Turiel-style moral judgments are still 
not able to unify the class of moral judgments in the desired way, i.e., meeting the 
conditions of exhaustiveness, specificity, and nontriviality. For the distinction between 
these forms of social evaluations and judgments is not always clear (Kelly & Stich, 
2008; Kelly et al., 2007; Machery & Mallon, 2010; Nado et al., 2009; Nichols, 2004). 
Critics of this tradition have shown, for instance, that strong feelings of disgust trigger 
responses of the sort that are typical of moral transgressions (Nichols, 2004; Nichols & 
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Folds-Bennett, 2003). Spatial and temporal distance have also been shown to make 
moral transgressions be judged as conventional ones (Kelly et al., 2007). In addition, 
research to date on the moral-conventional distinction has relied almost exclusively on 
scenarios designed for young children (Kelly et al., 2007), even when the participants 
were adult psychopaths (Blair, 1995; Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; King, Blair, Mitchell, 
Dolan, & Burgess, 2006), or on large-scale societies, which share a number of key 
cultural features such as education and familiarity with formal legal systems (Henrich, 
Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Thus, the apparent unity of the moral domain may also be 
an artifact of the scenarios used or the type of societies surveyed. As we will soon see, 
there are sufficient reasons to think that this is indeed the case. 
Turiel and colleagues’ findings are empirically informative, but the problems are 
twofold if we interpret them as supporting the unification hypothesis. First, defining 
moral judgments through Turiel and colleagues’ cluster of properties leads to failures of 
specificity. Transgressions that do not involve harm, injustice, or violation of rights can 
be judged (i) more serious, (ii) authority independent, and (iii) generalizable to cultures 
in other times and places. Empirical evidence, for example, strongly suggests that 
transgressions of this kind that generate strong disgust reactions have the distinctive 
signature moral pattern (Nichols, 2002; see also Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; 
Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). These transgressions can show this pattern even when 
participants explicitly agree that the respective transgression is not moral—e.g., 
experimental evidence shows that disgust sensitivity can predict intuitive disapproval of 
gay people even in cases where participants do not explicitly judge homosexuality to be 
morally reprehensible (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009b). Therefore, a 
transgression that may be classified as conventional, according to the experimenter’s 
stimulus selection criteria, may have the signature moral pattern. 
Of course, one could argue that the moral/conventional distinction is still useful 
because it tracks our implicit categorization practices. However, our implicit 
categorization of transgressions varies cross-culturally. One example comes from 
studies in the Turiel’s social domain tradition. Prima facie moral and conventional 
transgressions, i.e., transgressions that involve harm, injustice, or violation of rights and 
transgressions that do not, can trigger the standard signature patterns among Kibbutz 
children and urban secular kids in Israel. Yet in traditional Arab villages, both moral and 
conventional judgments are taken to be (ii) authority independent and (iii) generalizable 
(Nisan, 1987). It is not only that they moralize what we take to be conventions, but 
rather that they do not moralize à la Turiel. The cluster that emerges from the implicit 
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categorization practices in those communities does not match the predictions of the 
theory because what are taken to be prototypical conventional transgressions possess a 
mix of features from both the signature moral pattern and the signature conventional 
pattern. Therefore, moral judgments are classified into Turiel-style moral judgments and 
judgments that are half-way moral and half-way conventional, according to Turiel’s 
criteria. 
Similarly, food, clothing, terms of address, sex roles, and ritual observances are 
usually considered moral by orthodox Hindu children (Brahmins and Dalits), and there 
is no normative belief viewed predominantly in conventional terms among Judeo-
Christian American children under 10 (Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987). In both of 
these cases, the distinction between moral and conventional domains is murky with 
respect to the proposed features (i)-(iv) and (i')-(iv'). For example, unlike the American 
adult sample, five- to seven-year-old American children tend to judge eating beef if you 
want to as a moral right. But for most Oriya Brahmans the taboo on eating beef is a (i) 
very serious, (ii) authority independent, and (iii) universal type of transgression—
although the wrongness of the action is (iv') not justified in terms of harm, justice, or 
rights. So at least in some cultures, norms of religion and ritual are hybrids between 
moral and conventional norms. Children across different cultures classify the 
prototypical set of stimuli in different ways such that they get clustered in groups that 
sometimes resemble one of the patterns but frequently neither of them because what is 
expected to be classified as a conventional transgression, according to the social domain 
theory, possesses some or all the features of moral ones. 
Overall, there may be a pattern of quite rigid normative judgments in early 
childhood that becomes more sensitive to the conventional aspects of one’s cultural 
environment. It is known that younger children are more likely than older children to 
believe that boys cannot play with dolls, that women cannot be doctors, and that people 
cannot eat with their fingers, even though adults typically consider all these 
transgressions (which do not involve harm, injustice, or violation of rights) a matter of 
social convention. In one child study, for instance, half of the subjects considered that 
social conventions of etiquette were (ii) authority independent and (iii) generalizable to 
other cultures (Carter & Patterson, 1982). This would suggest that the clustering pattern 
proposed by Turiel and colleagues would be flexible and culturally canalized, rather 
than a robust psychological trait emerging early in ontogeny. Indeed, one could argue 
that the trait could require maturation to emerge, but the more maturation it requires, the 
more likely it is (at least in a highly culturally embedded species like us) that the mature 
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form will largely depend on cultural input. If this is correct, one could expect the pattern 
to be more labile and cross-culturally malleable, with different cultural groups carving 
up the normative domain in different ways that only partially overlap. 
There might be identifiable socioeconomic factors that correlate with these 
deviations of Turiel’s distinction. Turiel and colleagues’ cluster of properties are usually 
found among WEIRD subjects (i.e., people from western, educated, industrialized, rich 
and democratic countries). But non-WEIRD subjects, such as low socioeconomic status 
participants from Brazil and the USA, normally judge conventional transgressions to be 
(ii) authority independent and (iii) generalizable. It has been also pointed out that 
participants from these populations consider a (i) serious moral transgression to eat the 
family dog, to clean one’s toilet with the national flag or to masturbate with a dead 
chicken, even when these practices are kept in private (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). 
Hence, these studies suggest that what seems to be a robust cluster of properties can 
actually come apart in different ways. This is an important objection to the idea that 
Turiel and colleagues’ cluster of properties defines a natural kind in psychology. Their 
characterization of moral judgments cannot be merely understood as the claim that a 
judgment is a moral judgment if and only if it possesses features (i)-(iv). If they define a 
natural kind, the signature moral pattern must form a nomological cluster, i.e., there 
must be a strong, lawlike tendency for the members of the cluster to co-occur. Features 
(i)-(iv) should not come apart. If anything, the moral/conventional syndrome is more 
diverse than previously assumed by social domain theorists. 
Second, defining moral judgments through Turiel and colleagues’ cluster of 
properties also leads to failures of exhaustiveness. So far I have argued that what is 
expected to be treated as a conventional transgression may be partially or completely 
treated as a moral transgression across some cultures. I have also suggested that 
deviations from this pattern seem to be correlated with cultural, socioeconomic, and 
developmental factors. Likewise, judgments about some prototypical moral 
transgressions may also lack some of the features of Turiel-style moral responses. 
People can think, for instance, that judgments prohibiting harmful actions that are not of 
the schoolyard variety are (ii') authority dependent and (iii') applicable only to some 
groups in particular times and places. Some studies, for instance, have shown that 
people judge to be OK to whip derelict sailors 300 years ago, but not OK to whip them 
now (Kelly et al., 2007). Similar results have been found when alleged confounds 
(Fraser, 2012) were controlled in subsequent studies (Quintelier & Fessler, 2015; 
Quintelier, Fessler, & De Smet, 2012). 
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Kelly et al. (2007) found that participants are more likely to condone harmful 
acts when they occur in distant times and places, or when they are not sanctioned by law 
or any other authority, than when it happens in the present time and in a familiar place, 
or when it is sanctioned by an authority or law. Fraser (2012) argues that in cases as the 
one depicted above, it is not the temporal differences or differences in authority 
dependency the ones that generate the deviation from Turiel’s predictions, but rather a 
moral principle stating that harming others is permissible if needed as a means to a 
sufficiently valuable end. Subjects may have thought, for instance, that 300 years ago 
whipping “[…] was the only punishment fierce enough to deter sailors from drinking on 
duty and thus the only way to safeguard the lives that could depend on a watchful 
lookout’s warning” (Fraser, 2012, p. 7). However, such a post hoc explanation is 
unlikely to account for this experimental results since removing temporal differences 
and keeping utilitarian considerations constants, yield the same result when the 
transgression is still sanctioned by law (Quintelier et al., 2012). 
If Kelly and colleagues are right, then prototypical harmful actions would fail to 
trigger responses with the signature moral pattern as predicted by Turiel’s theory. 
However, it is not just that harmful transgressions do not trigger the expected responses 
of the social domain theory. To give an example, if Fraser’s post hoc explanation of the 
Sailor’s scenario were on the right track, then there would be transgressions involving 
harm whose wrongness is (iv) justified by referring to the harm inflicted, but which are 
(iii') not generalizable and even perhaps (ii') authority dependent. For although this 
explanation aims to account for the variability of moral judgments, introducing a 
condition to control for this alternative explanation would not reveal that the subjects’ 
judgments are authority independent. In such an explanation, it could still be the case 
that subjects would reason that physical harm is an appropriate punishment only in 
situations in which authority allows this kind of punishment. 
Experimental studies show that, in Turiel’s own terms, children tend to evaluate 
the refusal to help as morally blameworthy (Killen & Turiel, 1998; Sierksma, Thijs, & 
Verkuyten, 2014), but they display more negative evaluations in intragroup situations 
when compared to intergroup ones (Sierksma et al., 2014). This suggests that the 
assessment of the seriousness of a transgression is driven by factors such as ingroup 
loyalty, which are located outside the moral domain as delineated by Turiel and 
colleagues. Given this, the social cognitive domain theory would predict that children 
evaluate not helping others as morally blameworthy independently of the group context. 
Instead, these results seem to be largely compatible with Haidt’s (2007) moral 
29 
 
foundations theory—a theory that carves up moral judgments in a more pluralistic way, 
rather than trying to unify them across a certain set of psychological dimensions as 
explained in section 2.1. 
Yet again, prototypical moral transgressions seem to be highly sensitive to 
cultural input rather than cross-culturally robust traits. One possible reason why 
previous studies have repeatedly failed to notice this diversity is that comparative 
studies have not focused on truly dissimilar social groups such as large- and small-scale 
societies. Another is that studies in the moral/conventional tradition, following the 
historical focus on children, have typically used simple binary measures, which tend to 
obscure what otherwise is a graded and multidimensional continuum. 
In what is perhaps the most comprehensive study to date on moral judgments, 
Fessler et al. (2015) conducted a cross-cultural analysis of five small-scale societies: two 
egalitarian indigenous societies in South America with economies based on horticulture, 
hunting, and fishing, Tsimané (Bolivia) and Shuar (Ecuador); a semi-stratified clan-
based indigenous group reliant on fishing and horticulture, Yasawa (Fiji); a clan-based 
rural group focused on rice agriculture, Karo Batak (Indonesia); and a clan-based 
horticulturalist group, Sursurunga (New Ireland, Papua New Guinea). The study also 
included two large-scale societies as a control for comparison: a sample from 
Storozhnitsa (Ukraine) and another from California (USA). 
The adult subjects were presented with a range of transgressions involving harm, 
injustice, or violation of rights that included the following: a man stealing a stranger’s 
money; a man battering his wife without provocation; a man intentionally injuring a 
friend after been unintentionally injured by him; a man cheating a stranger in a financial 
transaction; a man spreading a false rumor about a rival; a man bribing a witness to 
blame an innocent person for an incident he initiated; and a man raping an unfamiliar 
woman (Fessler et al., 2015, p. 3, see also supplementary material). Then, Fessler and 
colleagues replaced dichotomous judgments of the acceptability of actions with 
judgments about the wrongness of the action on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 
‘extremely bad’ to ‘extremely good’. 
Similar to Kelly et al. (2007), researchers in this study asked the participants to 
judge those transgressions in cases in which an authority figure stated that the action 
was not wrong, or when the action occurred in a distant time or place. They found that 
participants in all these societies the transgression were systematically judged as (i') less 
serious when they happened a long time ago and far away, in another society. 
Unsurprisingly, all small-scale societies, with the exception of the Karo Batak in 
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Indonesia, were more likely to see a transgression involving harm, injustice, or violation 
of rights as (i') less serious when they were endorsed by an authority. In contrast, the 
two large-scale societies and the Karo Batak displayed non-significant trends in the 
direction of reduced severity. 
In all these experiments, participants did not display all the properties of the 
signature response patterns (Kelly & Stich, 2008). The relevant types of transgressions 
also did not reliably trigger the expected responses. This is particularly important 
because, as it has been pointed out before, one feature that differentiates Turiel and 
colleagues’ approach from the rest of the candidate hypotheses explored so far is that it 
leads to interesting empirical generalizations and predictions about the phenomenon in 
question. Yet transgressions that involve harm, justice, or rights can trigger the signature 
conventional pattern (Kelly et al., 2007; Quintelier & Fessler, 2015; Quintelier et al., 
2012), and similarly, transgressions that do not involve harm, justice, or rights can 
trigger the signature moral pattern (Haidt et al., 1993; Nichols, 2002, 2004; Nisan, 
1987). 
Thus, an attempt to unify moral judgments through Turiel and colleagues’ social 
domain theory of moral development seems to exhibit both failures of exhaustiveness 
and specificity. That is to say, what is expected to be treated as a conventional 
transgression can be partially or completely treated as a moral transgression across 
different cultures. Likewise, judgments about some transgressions involving harm, 
injustice, or violation of rights can have some of the features of Turiel’s signature 
conventional pattern. The moral/conventional syndrome is diverse. Turiel and 
colleagues’ cluster of properties shatters into different clusters that partially overlap with 
each other. If this is correct, there is no reason to understand the above account as an 
exhaustive and specific theory of moral judgments as opposed to a theory about a 
particular class of prototypical moral judgments, which seems to be correlated with 
particular cultural, socioeconomic, and developmental factors. 
 
2.4. Fragmenting moral judgments 
 
I have argued in the previous section that there are sufficient reasons to think that the 
social domain theory does not unify moral judgments as a psychological natural kind. 
This theory offers what may be the unification hypothesis with the best empirical 
credentials in the literature but it is certainly not the only possible candidate. One could 
construct other definitions and subsequently test whether they unify moral judgments as 
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a natural kind. This is still a possible avenue of research but one that does not seem to be 
promising. Satisfying the conditions of exhaustiveness, specificity, and nontriviality 
seems too demanding. The most empirically supported psychological theory of moral 
judgments to date fails to meet these criteria. Of course, we could keep testing 
alternative unification hypotheses, but I would like to suggest a different methodology 
that allows us to explore different kinds of non-unificationist relationships between 
prima facie members of the class of moral judgments. More precisely, what I would 
suggest in the following sections is a divide-and-conquer strategy that aims to identify 
particular subclasses of prototypical moral judgments that can be clustered around the 
lineage of the psychological mechanisms for human norm psychology. In this section, I 
will explain what I mean by fragmenting those judgments. 
The idea that moral judgments is a heterogeneous domain is a common view in 
contemporary philosophy (see, for instance, Flanagan, 1991; Nado et al., 2009; 
Parkinson et al., 2011; Scanlon, 1998; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008; Sinnott-Armstrong & 
Wheatley, 2012, 2013; Stich, 2006; Taylor, 1978). For example, in the Kantian tradition, 
moral judgments are thought to be inescapable and authority independent if they are 
applicable to all the individuals regardless of their goals, desires, or preferences, and if 
its normative force is not derived from someone’s approval, endorsement, or capacity 
for coercion. In some interpretations, inescapability and authority independence are 
features of at least some important cluster of moral judgments, which are important for 
independent reasons, e.g., due to the role they play in practical deliberation. They single 
out a particular and central cluster of judgments, which are characterized by those 
properties. 
I align myself with this view. Richard Joyce (2014), for instance, argues that 
moral judgments are inescapable and authority independent, but he does not argue that 
all moral judgment possess these features: 
 
Perhaps there is simply no fact of the matter as to whether moral rules 
have or lack this authoritative quality. Certainly people seem to generally 
imbue their moral prescriptions with this kind of strong authority, so 
maybe having a theory that provides this authority is a theoretical 
desideratum. But perhaps this authority is not an indispensable 
component of morality; maybe if we can make no sense of this authority 
and have to settle for a normative system lacking it, the system would 
still deserve the name ‘morality’. One way of diagnosing this situation 
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would be to say that strictly speaking morality has this authoritative 
quality, but loosely speaking it need not. (p. 132)  
 
Joyce seem to recognize here that not all moral judgments involve imperatives, or that 
not all moral imperatives are categorical imperatives, which would allow some moral 
judgment to be escapable or authority dependent (see also Joyce, 2006, p. 61).6 I will 
follow his suggestion. 
This understanding of moral judgments has been the focus of much discussion in 
recent evolutionary moral psychology (see, for instance, Fraser, 2010; Joyce, 2001, 
2006; Mameli, 2013). One reason is methodological, for some researchers have 
recognized that inchoate notions of what moral judgments are hamper progress in 
evolutionary moral psychology. Inescapability and authority independence are then 
thought to help us to tackle this problem by singling out, at least, a particular class of 
well-defined judgments. Another reason is the philosophical implications that this view 
of moral judgments might have. For example, evolutionary debunkers in moral 
psychology have argued that the genealogy of moral judgments understood in this way 
undermines their epistemic status and ultimately erode their authoritative role in our 
practical deliberations (see Joyce, 2006). If one assumes that all and only moral 
judgments are inescapable and authority independent, then one could arrive at a robust 
form of error theory, i.e., the idea that all moral beliefs are systematically false (see 
Garner, 2007; Joyce, 2001; Mackie, 1977; Olson, 2010). It is not just that moral 
judgments in Joyce’s narrow sense are false. Instead, the issue would be that moral 
thinking is systematically wrong across-the-board.7 
6 Joyce (2001) claims that the authority of morality is a problem that leads to error theory, while Joyce 
(2006) argues for a certain kind of moral nativism (according to which moral judgments did not evolve to 
track truths) in order to establish the epistemological conclusion that moral judgments lack justification. 
The passage quoted above is part of neither argument, but rather is a concession to opponents of Joyce 
(2001). 
7 The inescapability of moral judgments plays a central role in Joyce’s (2001) debunking argument, where 
he thinks that no sense can be made of categorical reasons because they are entirely divorced from an 
agent’s desires, goals, and the like. However, this feature of moral judgments seems to play a less 
prominent role in Joyce’s (2006). For in this version of the argument, the debunking of moral judgments 
is thought to be a consequence of their being a product of an evolutionary process that is insensitive to 
moral truth. Inescapability only helps to explain why the capacity to make moral judgments promotes 
action and, therefore, why it is advantageous and selected for. 
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So, following Joyce’s caution, I think that only some moral judgments are 
inescapable or authority independent (for a similar strategy see, Mameli, 2013). I agree 
that the motivational features that Joyce and others take to be diagnostic of moral 
demands can give us epistemic leverage to generate interesting psychological hypothesis 
about a special class of prototypical moral judgments. But inescapability and authority 
independence are neither exhaustive nor specific features of moral judgments. Giving 
money to charity, to give a toy example, may be seen as an act of kindness, which might 
also be understood as a morally good action. It seems plausible, then, to think that 
although one can judge these actions as morally good, they are not judgments about 
moral demands.8 
It is not clear that the distinctive feature of moral judgments is their 
inescapability and authority independence, for not only moral judgments are inescapable 
and authority independent. These are features of other forms of norms, not just moral 
norms. A person cannot opt out of the disgustingness of certain norm violations. I might 
not care whether I am disgusting, but others can and will judge me to be disgusting. 
Similarly, disgust reactions exhibit little authority dependence (Haidt et al., 1993; Inbar 
et al., 2009b; Kelly, 2011; Nichols, 2004; Nichols & Folds-Bennett, 2003; Schnall, 
Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). 
There are also right and wrong ways to solve mathematical equations or to use 
screwdrivers. These nonmoral normative standards can also be judged as inescapable or 
authority independent as moral judgments. Given a certain goal, for instance, using a 
tool in a certain way may be the most suitable means to our ends. The use of 
screwdrivers can be then linked to normative standards of instrumental rationality. This 
means that although those normative standards are not inescapable because they are 
relative to a certain end, they are authority independent—their normative force is not 
derived from someone’s approval, endorsement, or capacity for coercion. 
8 On this view, charity is a supererogatory act that is morally good but not strictly required. However, 
some views in moral philosophy argue that potentially good actions create reasons to carry out those 
actions. These views reject the existence of supererogatory acts on the basis that whatever is thought to be 
good, ought to be done (Feldman, 1986; Moore, 1903; New, 1974; Pybus, 1982). The key question here is 
not which philosophical view is correct, but rather whether it makes sense to think that thoughts like 
“Giving money to charity is morally good” are moral thoughts. I think the very philosophical debate 
shows that these thoughts are taken to be intuitively moral for a significant part of the population. 
Certainly, an important open question would be whether a normative system could count as a moral 




                                                          
Moreover, the norms of rationality involved in mathematical proofs can be 
considered not only authority independent but also as inescapable as those of morality 
since they are quite robust standards with respect to our goals, desires, or preferences. If 
by an inescapable moral judgment one means a judgment that is applicable to all the 
individuals regardless of their goals, desires, or preferences, then one could say the same 
about rational judgments. Norms of rationality are considered inescapable because 
asking “Why should I be rational?” is asking for a reason. Thus, questioning them seems 
unintelligible. In fact, since practical rationality is often considered inescapable, the 
inescapability of moral judgments has been also traditionally linked to the inescapability 
of practical reasons (Kant, 1785/1998; Smith, 1994). 
Inescapability and authority independence are features of some non-moral 
normative thoughts. Although important for philosophical reasons, not all moral 
judgments are judgments about moral demands in the sense of being demands that are 
judged by the agent as inescapable and authority independent. Inescapability and 
authority independence are features of some moral judgments, but not features that 
make judgments to be moral. These are a specific subclass of moral judgments that has 
attracted a lot of attention in the moral philosophy literature. They are prototypical 
rather than essential features of moral judgments in the sense that, if a judgment is 
moral, there is a good chance that such judgment is inescapable and authority 
independent. But these are diagnostic features of a prototypical class of moral judgments 
even though they do not make judgments intrinsically moral. 
Finally, before going ahead, it is important to clarify why fragmentation is 
important for evolutionary explanations of moral thinking. Because if moral judgments 
form indeed a disunified psychological kind, then we should provide independent (or 
partially independent) genealogies explaining the different special features of each 
subclass. Moreover, and although beyond the scope of this dissertation, this kind of 
project could also help us in the long run to understand how prototypical subclasses of 
moral judgments are related to each other in terms of both their function and evolution. 
For example, if moral judgments are cognitively unified in a way that we have not 
discovered yet, we would expect to see an overlap in the trajectories of the different 




2.5. The psychology of norms 
 
In the past few sections, I have argued that the class of moral judgments cannot be 
unified as natural kind in the psychological sciences. Moral judgments likely form a 
fragmented class of mental states. However, as I will argue in this section, an important 
methodological option available is to cluster prototypical moral judgments within a 
more encompassing class of normative thinking. In particular, I want to formulate in this 
section the basic proposal that I will explore in the rest of the thesis, i.e., the idea that 
human social norm psychology defines a cognitive kind that is able to subsume at least 
some important classes of prototypical moral judgments. 
A theoretical possibility left open by the above discussion is that different well-
defined classes of prototypical moral judgments can be clustered around a certain 
unified form of normative psychology (see Sinnott-Armstrong & Wheatley, 2012, 2013; 
Sripada & Stich, 2007). Following this line of thought, Sripada and Stich (2007) have 
suggested that there is a class of normative thinking that is a theoretically interesting 
target for psychology, even though there is no unified and cross-culturally robust moral 
domain (Turiel, 1983). This form of normative thinking is generated by our evolved 
norm psychology. This does not mean that normative cognition is entirely reducible to 
this psychology of norms, but rather that, unlike the moral domain, this type of 
psychology is a unified social-cognitive domain. 
In a similar way, Tomasello and colleagues have shown that some normative 
judgments have a distinctive psychological profile that is very similar to the one 
proposed by Stich and colleagues (see Kelly & Stich, 2008; Sripada & Stich, 2007). 
This profile is explained through a family of well-defined psychological processes that 
fall under the umbrella of shared intentionality (see, for instance, Göckeritz, Schmidt, & 
Tomasello, 2014; Rakoczy, 2008; Rakoczy, Hamann, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2010; 
Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013; Rakoczy, Wameken, & Tomasello, 2008; Schmidt, 
Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011a; Wyman, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2009a, 2009b). One of 
the central goals of the next few chapters is to show that shared intentionality and the 
kind normative thinking it engenders is a natural kind in the psychological sciences 
since they play a central explanatory role in psychological generalizations and in 
explaining a broad class of mental phenomena. As we will explore further in chapters 4 
and 5, the framework of shared intentionality not only help us to explain the early 
expansion of our cooperative tendencies but also all the central aspects of the kind of 
norm-based cognition that I will outline in this section. 
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Much of the discussion in the following chapters focuses on explaining the 
importance of this class of normative thinking in human evolution. But the basic idea is 
relatively straightforward. There are reasons to assume that normative judgments are 
intentional states because they are judgments, i.e., they are mental states about 
something. Importantly, some of these judgments are private, while others are shared. 
That is, there are normative mental states that only play a salient role in individual 
cognition. Normative judgments about what is a prudential course of action are not 
necessarily judgments about what other agents should do because the agent may simply 
not care about the bad decision that other agents take—in a highly competitive social 
environment, instrumentally irrational agents that one has to outcompete might well be a 
good thing. However, in other cases, we may care about what others actually do and the 
social expectations they have, so we face the selective pressure to share our normative 
thoughts with them. It is true that in some cases the sharing of those thoughts fails. An 
agent may share with others his/her normative thoughts about what they should do in a 
given situation, but they may not join the agent’s intentional state. But despite these 
difficulties, when the sharing of these expectations is successful, it enables more 
complex and efficient social coordination. It is in this sense that this kind of normative 
thinking is norm-based thinking. For it means that we have managed to share at some 
degree the social expectations and the attitudes we have toward those who violate those 
expectations. I think this is the reason why shared normative thinking is a central kind of 
normative cognition. Only the normative thoughts that we can (or we are willing to) 
share with others play a role in social cognition. It is only when we share these mental 
states that we can reliably generate the collective benefits derived from coordinating our 
social expectations. Thus, one of the goals of my lineage explanation is to show that this 
is kind of thinking has played a central role in the evolution of our lineage and convince 
the reader that shared normative thinking is an important part of who we are.9  
More precisely, the view I will defend in this thesis is that an important subset of 
normative thoughts that are generated by our norm psychology are joint intentional 
9 It might be important to differentiate two different senses in which the term ‘social’ could be understood 
here. One refers to norms that are about public, social interactions. Another is refers to normative 
judgments that are made public, rather than private. In the sense introduced in section 1.3, social norms 
require both features, i.e., they are not only norms about social interactions, but also norms that are 
expressed and endorsed in public contexts. However, both senses of ‘social’ do not necessarily go hand in 
hand. One could make public one’s self-directed norms as much as one could keep private one’s 
normative views about how everybody should act. 
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states that can be characterized by a gradient of generalizability, intrinsic motivation, 
and punitive attitudes. Generalizability refers to the scope of the judgment and its 
context-sensitivity—normative beliefs can regulate the behavior of only some 
individuals in specific situations or roles. So, normative beliefs can be characterized by 
a gradient of generalization or abstraction depending on how tightly they are conceived 
to be linked to specific individuals or situations. Intrinsic motivation refers to the 
subjective pressure a person feels to comply with a certain normative belief. For 
sometimes normative beliefs are treated as ultimate ends, rather than as a means to other 
ends.10 Similarly, punitive attitudes refer to the motivational force people feel to police, 
punish, or correct others, including themselves, when they think that they have violated 
a norm. These punitive attitudes are sometimes salient and explicit, while other times 
are less evident. For example, in some cases, the violation of a norm engenders actual 
physical punishment. In other cases, the perceived violation of a norm engenders 
punitive attitudes like anger and blame (or shame and guilt) toward the transgressor. 
And yet in other cases, it just drives corrective behaviors that target the transgressor 
without any harshness or evident signals of reprisal—e.g., when an adult correct a child 
for the violation a certain norm of etiquette. 
This does not aim to account for all the range of normative beliefs, since at least 
some norms such as norms of instrumental rationality (e.g., about the appropriate use of 
corkscrews and screwdrivers) do not necessarily involve intrinsic motivation or punitive 
attitudes. So-called ‘prudential norms’ in philosophical theories of individual rational 
action are not social norms in the required sense. Normative judgments as a whole could 
indeed share a similar fate as moral judgments, i.e., they could be a disunified category 
in terms of their psychology. But normative judgments can be conceived as a 
supercategory that contains moral judgments as a subcategory and the class of 
normative judgments generated by human social norm psychology can contain as a 
proper subset at least some subclasses of moral judgments (see figure 2.1.). Arguably, 
then, a large portion of normative mental states, including some prototypical forms of 
moral judgments, can be understood as a class of joint intentional states. 
10 This does not mean that these normative beliefs have overriding power. A normative belief can be 
treated as an ultimate end, but its motivational force can be overridden by the motivational force of other 
mental states. What is essential for a mental state to be an ultimate end is to motivate the agent to bring 
about a certain state of affairs irrespective of the way they promote other agent’s goals. In contrast, 
instrumental ends are those mental states that determine the means through which an agent will bring 
about that state of affairs. 
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Joint intentional states are mental states that are partially cognitive and partially 
motivational. These mental states can vary across a cognitive gradient of 
generalizability and abstraction as much as they can across a motivational one. From a 
cognitive point of view, representing activities in a joint form requires being able to 
represent plural subjects of action (e.g., “We want to hunt” or “We are attending to that 
antelope”) and task roles or activities that are not necessarily linked to particular 
individuals (e.g., agent-independent representations of the different roles that our 
particular hunting technique requires). This creates a gradient of generalizability and 
abstraction depending on the scope of the plural subject and the degree of abstraction 
with which these activities are represented. This cognitive component makes at least 
some shared intentional states to be belief-like. For example, even entertaining a joint 
intention like “We want to hunt” can misrepresent the social situation, e.g., when there 
is no actual partner who wants to hunt with me. 
From a motivational point of view, shared intentional states are intrinsically 
motivational, e.g., by definition, entertaining a joint intention of the form “We want to 
hunt” implies a motivation to hunt with others that is not purely instrumental. That is, an 
agent joins the activity because he/she finds its collective nature intrinsically rewarding, 
rather than because the agent only thinks the activity is instrumentally beneficial for 
him/her, or even instrumentally beneficial for everyone. The peculiar normative 
dimension of some of these mental states is also closely related to the motivational 
component of shared intentional states because this dimension can be spelled out in 
terms of the punitive attitudes that these states are associated with. Not all shared 
intentional states are shared normative mental states. But the divide between the two 
types of states can be made clear via the punitive attitudes that are specifically linked to 
the kind of shared normative thoughts that I want to single out in the thesis. To be clear, 
not all shared intentional states entail punitive attitudes. If we are hunting together and I 
let you alone in the task, this will likely trigger punitive attitudes, for collaborative 
hunting requires commitment. But not all shared intentional states require this degree of 
commitment to collective activities. For example, if we are jointly attending to the 
reflection of the moon on the river and I lose the interest in the event, this will likely not 
trigger any form of reprisal. 
Shared intentionality is a very distinctive package of cognitive and motivational 
mechanisms that coevolved as part of the psychological infrastructure that supported the 
expansion of the cooperative capacities of our lineage. It is a package built of separate 
elements, but, as I will argue in the rest of this dissertation, is a package of cognitive and 
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motivational elements that share a common lineage. Functional integration of an 
existing capacity leads to coevolution and codevelopment—cognitive subsystems that 
fire together wire together. Showing that this package of cognitive mechanisms became 
highly integrated and entrenched in human development, as well as providing an 
evolutionary explanation for this, is one of the central goals of this thesis. That is to say, 
I agree that the component of the shared intentional infrastructure coevolved, although 
this is different from saying that normative thinking coevolved with shared 
intentionality since normative thinking is not a cognitive subsystem of the shared 
intentional infrastructure. 
Conceiving normative beliefs as shared intentional states has also a desirable 
theoretical consequence. When we single out a class of normative beliefs as a subclass 
of shared intentional states, we draw a distinction in mental processing across a number 
of well-defined functional dimensions. In the above framework, normative thinking is 
characterized by a cognitive gradient of generalization and abstraction that captures 
what Tomasello and colleagues’ call ‘bird’s-eye view’ of the social interaction. This 
bird’s-eye view is a distinctive cognitive process involved in shared intentionality—e.g., 
in role-reversal tasks, young children seem to integrate different roles into a single 
bird’s-eye representational format that is not present in great apes (see, for instance, 
Fletcher, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2012). A social interaction is represented from a 
bird’s-eye view when the agent representing the interaction steps away from his/her own 
egocentric perspective of the interaction to take into consideration the point of view of 
one’s partners (e.g., their roles in the interaction, visual perspectives, or any other 
relevant perspectival information). The capacity to represent objects and events with a 
bird’s-eye view perspective coevolved with the rest of our shared intentional 
infrastructure. This perspective is essentially a case of functional abstraction and 
role/occupant distinction. Not all shared intentional states are like this since basic forms 
of shared intentional states such as joint attention might be carried out through recursive 
mindreading capacities, which can support simple joint activities. 
This cognitive process leads to some shared intentional states to be called 
‘collective intentional states’, i.e., mental common ground that we share with larger 
social groups, rather than specific individuals with whom we engage in simpler forms of 
shared intentionality (for a more detail exposition, see Tomasello, 2015). On the view I 
am outlining, the distinction between joint intentional states and full-blown collective 
states is not only a matter of degree but also a matter of cognitive mechanisms. As 
previously mentioned, joint intentional states can vary along a gradient of 
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generalizability. Over that gradient, collective intentional states are characterized as 
joint intentional states that we engage with a relatively large number of agents in a 
rather abstract way—i.e., abstracting away the details of particular agents such that it 
facilitates the interaction with unspecific teammates, our local tribe, and the like (for a 
similar distinction, see Mead, 2015). Other cases of shared intentionality are more 
discrete in the sense that they are joint intentional states that we engage with a relatively 
small number of identifiable agents—e.g., episodes of joint attention that we share with 
particular others. This may lead to constraints in the kind of representational machinery 
that we deploy in order to entertain these thoughts. When collective activities are carried 
out by multiple agents performing different tasks, building common ground on the basis 
of recursive mindreading capacities becomes cognitively implausible. I think norm-
based cognition is a form of collective intentionality in that sense (see also Tomasello & 
Vaish, 2013; Vaish & Tomasello, 2013). They require what I will call a ‘we-mode’ of 
representation. That is, they require from the subject to conceive the norm from an 
increasingly agent-independent point of view that relies less on the specifics of an agent 
or group of agents (for a more philosophical discussion, see Nagel, 1986). 
Similarly, it has also been argued that shared intentional states are intrinsically 
motivational (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). In primates, for 
instance, gaze following and attention-directing gestures involve individual, parallel 
attention to an object, rather than real joint attention. For joint attention requires 
knowing together that others individuals are sharing attention as well as a motivation to 
share attention and interest with others with no other instrumental goal in mind (see 
Carpenter & Call, 2013). Of course, an agent can know that other individuals are sharing 
attention but not being motivated to share attention and interest with others. But this 
type of attentional states would be parallel rather than truly joint. As they are understood 
here, real shared intentionality implies a motivation to share the intentional state in 
question. Moreover, it also implies sharing the motivational component of that mental 
state when the state has one, e.g., it requires from the agent not only co-represent the 
content of another agent’s belief but also share his/her propositional attitude. 
In contrast, primates do not share attention and interest with others in situations 
of joint attentional engagement (Bard & Vauclair, 1984; Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005; 
Tomonaga et al., 2004) or declarative gestures (Gómez, Sarriá, & Tamarit, 1993; 
Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005; Tomonaga et al., 2004). Unlike any other primate, 
humans have an intrinsic motivation to share psychological states without requiring any 
external motivation, and this intrinsic motivation predisposes them to engage in a 
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collective activity just for the sake of it (Call, 2009; Tomasello et al., 2005). We are 
motivated to share these states as ultimate ends, i.e., ends that we pursue at least in part 
for their own sake. Even young children conceive collaborative activities as ends in 
themselves, rather than mere means to a personal reward (see, for instance, Gräfenhain, 
Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006; Warneken 
& Tomasello, 2007). 
All shared intentional states entail by its operational definition an intrinsic 
motivation. Only some shared intentional states are real collective intentional states in 
the sense of involving, at least to some degree, an agent-independent representation of 
the social interaction. Nevertheless, what differentiates this class of normative beliefs 
from other shared intentional states is that they distinctively engender punitive attitudes. 
Punitive attitudes are not essential for shared intentional states, but they are often part of 
the package deal of cooperation as a form of partner control. Think, for instance, about 
the role it would have played in early human collaborative foraging and how 
collaborative foraging is thought to be linked to morality (Boehm, 2012; Mameli, 2013; 
Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). 
 
2.6. From norms to morals 
 
In the previous section, I have proposed that the cognitive and motivational 
infrastructure of shared intentionality help us to define a psychology of norms that is 
cognitively unified in the sense specified in section 2.2. That is, this psychology 
generates shared intentional normative thoughts that define a unified cognitive kind of 
normative judgments. This idea follows the proposal of Sripada and Stich’s (2007) 
framework for the psychology of norms, which I roughly map onto the psychological 
mechanisms of shared intentionality. The reasons why I think shared intentional 
normative thoughts define a unified psychological kind will become clearer in the 
following chapters since they are related to the evolutionary lineage of shared 
intentionality and its normative dimension. In particular, I will argue in chapter 4 that 
this kind of normative judgments played a central role in the expansion of our 
cooperative lifestyle—more precisely, in the shift from a form of ape-like individualistic 
form of foraging to a more complex form of collective foraging. As I will try to argue, 
this evolutionary lineage accounts for the functional integration of the different 
cognitive and motivational aspects of the social norm psychology that I have outlined in 
the previous section. 
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The cautionary tale of this chapter has been that moral judgments, understood as 
mental states, can be a heterogeneous target for psychology. But another, more 
optimistic message is that there may exist a class of mental states and processes in the 
vicinity of that concept that can help us to manage that complexity, for we can link 
different prototypical types of moral judgments to a well-defined class of mental states 
that are normative, i.e., the class of shared intentional normative thoughts. For example, 
we still can ask whether in a certain small-scale society of hunter-gatherers 
transgressions about the distribution of resources possess the Turiel’s signature moral 
pattern. Or one could wonder if in those societies there is also a distinctive class of 
judgments that is defined by their being conceived as inescapable and authority 
independent (Joyce, 2006; Mackie, 1977; Mameli, 2013). These judgments could then 
be linked to the psychological machinery underlying shared intentionality and its 
distinctive normative dimension, which could help us to explain different aspects of 
moral judgments in virtue of their being a special class of shared intentional states. 
As a consequence, prototypical forms of moral thinking could be linked to the 
evolutionary lineage of this ontogenetically robust psychological capacity, while the 
distinction between these different types of moral judgment could be explained, for 
instance, as a matter of our particular sociocultural history. Judgments that possess the 
Turiel’s signature moral pattern or which are judged to be inescapable or authority 
independent can be considered prototypically moral and, as I will argue in chapter 5, 
they can be connected to the lineage of our shared intentional capacities. Whether all 
types of moral judgment can be covered under the umbrella of processes of shared 
intentionality is an open question, although I remain skeptical. So, one hypothesis I will 
explore in the following chapters is that at least some prototypical cases of moral 
judgments, i.e., judgments with Turiel’s signature moral pattern or judgments about 
moral demands as defined by some philosophers (Joyce, 2006; Mackie, 1977; Mameli, 
2013), stem from the evolutionary lineage of our shared intentional capacities as a result 
of the process of norm acquisition. I will try to show how this core capacity for 
normative cognition is able to ramify into these different ways to carve up normative 
judgments and why I think that, unlike moral psychology, the former is an 
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Figure 2.3. Diagram of the relation between shared intentionality, social norms, and 
prototypical moral judgments. The class of moral judgments fractionates into different 
clusters, each of which might be a culturally relative class of prototypical moral 
judgments. The lineage of shared intentionality leads to shared intentional normative 
judgments, which in turns leads to judgments with Turiel’s signature moral pattern and 
Joyce’s judgments about moral demands. Some ancestral features are retained in the 
lineage, while others are modified or functionally integrated downstream in the 
trajectory. The purpose of the lineage explanation I will provide in the following 
chapters is to explain the evolutionary trajectory of these features. 
 
If it turns out to be true that there is no unified class of moral judgments in 
psychology, perhaps the partial overlap between different prototypical types of moral 
judgments is partially biologically channelized with different prototypical forms of 
moral judgments diverging from each other through culturally driven processes. This 
could help to explain, for instance, why although both Turiel’s and Joyce’s types of 
moral judgments are authority independent, these prototypes are dissimilar in other 
respects. For these prototypical moral judgments are partially biologically entrenched 
and partially culturally driven psychological phenomena. But while the distinction 
between different prototypical types of moral judgments, as well as the difference 
between moral judgments and other types of judgments, may be a matter of cultural 
history, the type of normative thinking that emerge from our capacities for shared 
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intentionality are much more cross-culturally robust and entrenched in human 
psychological development. There is a reason to expect this since, as we will see in 
chapter 4, shared intentionality in general and shared intentional normative thinking in 
particular played a crucial role in human social evolution (see also Tomasello, 2009b, 
2014; Tomasello et al., 2005; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). 
One interesting suggestion would be then that although there are different classes 
of prototypical moral judgments that share, at best, a certain family resemblance, these 
judgments can be closely linked to our shared intentional normative psychology. This 
type of psychology leads to a well-defined class of social normative judgments that 
splits into different branches of prototypical moral judgments. For example, following 
Mameli (2013), I will argue in chapter 5 that the tuning of the motivational gradient of 
punitive attitudes of shared intentional normative judgments during infancy explains 
how we acquire Joyce’s concept of moral demands, i.e., how we develop the capacity to 
entertain judgments about demands that are considered inescapable and authority 
independent. A similar explanation via the cultural tuning of our affective responses to 
transgressions involving harm, injustice, or rights violations will explain the Turiel’s 
signature moral pattern—an idea put forward by Nichols (2002) and others. 
In the following chapters, I will try to explain how these different classes moral 
judgments are clustered around the psychological gradients that define shared 
intentional states—i.e., how certain shared normative mental states come to have the 
Turiel’s signature moral pattern or how they become able to represent inescapable and 
authority dependent demands. A large part of my lineage explanation in chapters 3 and 4 
will deal with the biological evolution of our shared intentional capacities and the 
genetic assimilation and biological entrenchment of shared intentional normative 
thinking. But the ramification of these judgments into prototypical moral judgments is 
culturally relative and, therefore, acquired. So, I will come back to this issue in chapter 5 
when discussing the developmental trajectory of shared intentionality and its distinctive 
normative dimension. I will argue there that emotional and affective dispositions not 
only play a key constitutive role in normative thinking but also in explaining the special 







In this chapter, I have tried to argue that moral judgments define a quite heterogeneous 
class of mental states. I argued that the best theory that we have to assume that moral 
judgments are a unified cognitive kind, i.e., Turiel’s social domain theory of moral 
development (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Nucci et al., 1983; Turiel, 1983, 1998), fails in its 
attempt. There seems to be no property (or set of properties) that unifies moral thinking 
as an explanatory target for psychology. Instead, we should understand particular 
accounts of moral judgments as targeting particular classes of judgments that are 
prototypically moral. For example, judgments that are inescapable and authority 
independent pick up an important class of normative judgments (Joyce, 2001; Mackie, 
1977; Mameli, 2013), although not all moral judgments are judgments about moral 
demands in the sense of being inescapable and authority independent (Joyce, 2006, 
2014). Similarly, not only moral demands are inescapable and authority independent, 
e.g., what counts as the correct solution for a mathematical equation can also be judged 
as inescapable or authority independent as prototypical moral demands. Judgments that 
evoke Turiel’s signature moral pattern or judgments about inescapability and authority-
independent demands seem to be only prototypically moral. However, this does not 
entail the collapse of the psychological investigation of moral judgments. We can still 
explain in what sense a certain class of normative judgments is prototypically moral as 
well as why and how they share their family resemblance by linking those judgments 
(which may be culturally relative) to the lineage of more robust and developmentally 




Chapter 3. On social tolerance and the evolution of human normative 
thinking11 
 
This thesis aims to provide a lineage explanation of a central form of normative 
thinking, i.e., an explanation that specifies a sequence of changes that takes us from 
agents with a certain baseline capacity for social cognition to agents with social 
normative thinking (see Calcott, 2009). As I have argued in the previous chapter, the 
class of moral judgments fractionates into different clusters, each of which might be a 
culturally relative class of prototypical moral judgments. However, as I have proposed 
at the end of that chapter, the lineage explanation of shared intentionality can help us to 
define an important form of norm-based cognition, which in turn leads to judgments 
with Turiel’s signature moral pattern and Joyce’s judgments about moral demands. On 
this view, the share intentional normative judgments that this psychology generates give 
rise to these subclasses of prototypical moral judgments by retaining some ancestral 
features of this kind of judgments, while modifying or integrating others. 
I frame this lineage explanation within the hominin lineage. Providing an 
explanation of this kind means that I take the baseline of social-cognitive capacities to 
be the one of the common ancestor of chimpanzees (P. troglodytes), bonobos (P. 
paniscus), and humans (H. sapiens), for chimpanzees and bonobos are our closest living 
relatives. I will focus in particular on the key differences between that baseline and 
human normative thought. In this context, the aim of this chapter is twofold. I not only 
want to provide such a baseline but also to locate the emergence of the high-level 
cognitive processes that distinguish human normative thinking within the evolutionary 
trajectory that led to human social organization. The lineage here is not the lineage of 
organisms but of mechanisms. More specifically, since I have identified in chapter 2 a 
unified form of human norm psychology with our distinctive capacity for shared 
intentionality, I will propose at the end of this chapter that the lineage leading to the 
emergence of our capacity for normative guidance is the same as the one that leads to 
shared intentionality. The central goal of chapter 4 will be to flesh out this lineage 
explanation from the hominin baseline of social cognition that I defend in this chapter. 
Reconstructions of the last common ancestor of chimpanzees, bonobos, and 
humans are in general important to understand human origins (Lovejoy, 1981; McGrew, 
11 This majority of this chapter is based on worked published in Gonzalez-Cabrera (forthcoming) and has 
been modified to meet university guidelines. 
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2010; Stanford & Allen, 1991; Tooby & DeVore, 1987). These discussions usually 
portray the Pan/Homo last common ancestor (Pan/Homo LCA hereafter) as a 
chimpanzee-like hominid (see, for instance, Dart, 1953; Lee & DeVore, 1969; 
Wrangham & Peterson, 1996; for a historical reconstruction of this debate, see also 
Pickering, 2013). This has long been the prevailing view in the philosophical and 
biological literature, and normative cognition is no exception. Recent accounts of the 
evolution of the human capacity for normative guidance such as Kitcher (2011) rely on 
this approach. I will argue that since the demonic male view and evolutionary models of 
normative thinking based on it no longer stand up, we need an alternative explanation of 
this capacity that relies on a different view of human origins. 
This view has been challenged in different ways. According to some theories, 
the bonobo is in some important respects a suitable model of early hominins (de Waal, 
1995, 2001; de Waal & Lanting, 1997; Zihlman, 1984; Zihlman & Bolter, 2015; 
Zihlman, Cronin, Cramer, & Sarich, 1978). Other models have focused on more 
distantly related great apes such as gorillas (Geary, Bailey, & Oxford, 2011; Geary & 
Flinn, 2001) and orangutans (Crompton, Vereecke, & Thorpe, 2008; Grehan & 
Schwartz, 2009; Schwartz, 1987; Schwartz, 2004), while yet another group, thinking in 
terms of convergent evolution rather than shared ancestry, have looked beyond the 
apes—e.g., through comparisons of human ancestors with savanna baboons (DeVore & 
Washburn, 1963; Jolly, 1970, 2001; Skybreak, 1984), capuchin monkeys (Fernandes, 
1991; Perry, 1997; Perry et al., 2003), or even wolves and other social carnivores (King, 
1976). Regardless of whether they are based on convergence or shared recent ancestry, 
what all these models have in common is the idea that reconstructions of human 
evolution can take advantage of much broader phylogenetic comparisons. 
I will argue in this chapter that we are more justified in using an alternative 
model of early hominins, and perhaps even the Pan/Homo LCA, than we are in 
believing that early ancestors were chimpanzee-like. According to this model, early 
hominins were much more socially tolerant and less aggressive than usually assumed. I 
ground this claim in both the comparative evidence and the paleoanthropological record. 
As a result, I will argue that this model does not fit well with views such as the demonic 
male view (Wrangham & Peterson, 1996) or the killer ape hypothesis (Dart, 1953).12 
12 Something similar can be said about the man-the-hunter hypothesis (Lee & DeVore, 1969). For hunting 
and aggression are usually considered to be a package deal. However, the model of the Pan/Homo LCA I 
will propose in this paper does not rule out the idea that hunting played an important role in the evolution 
of normative guidance. For these reasons, I sympathize with evolutionary views such as those Pickering 
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More important, I will show here that such a model has important consequences for 
philosophical debates about the origin of our capacity for normative guidance (Kitcher, 
1998, 2006, 2011). For they give us reasons to think that the emergence of top-down 
cognitive processes of normative guidance goes hand in hand with the emergence of 
shared intentional capacities (this will expand on this basic proposal in the next chapter 
through the connection between hominin hunting and social tolerance; see also 
Pickering, 2013). 
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.1, I will explain the 
philosophical motivations behind genealogical approaches to human social cognition. In 
section 3.2, I will discuss the perils of reconstructing the social behavior of our early 
hominin ancestors. In section 3.3, I shall explain the specific model of these ancestors I 
want to propose. In sections 3.4 and 2.5, I will provide evidence in favor of this model. 
In section 3.6, I will discuss whether these similarities are homologies, or whether they 
have evolved independently. Finally, in section 3.7, I will draw out the philosophical 
moral of this discussion for our understanding of our capacity for normative guidance. 
 
3.1. The demonic male hypothesis 
 
Philosophers have argued that that the deep history of why we became moral agents is 
relevant to normative philosophy. For one way to understand human nature is to 
understand its genealogy. I take genealogical accounts to be close relatives of lineage 
explanations. One primary example is the role that various origin stories of morality 
have played in moral philosophy (Hobbes, 1668/1994; Nietzsche, 1887/1967; Rousseau, 
1755/1992; see also Korsgaard, 2010). Another example is the way in which the 
evolutionary genealogy of our moral faculties have become a way to vindicate (Kitcher, 
2006, 2011) or debunk morality (Joyce, 2006; Ruse, 1998; Street, 2006). As a result, 
genealogical projects in philosophy become highly sensitive to different assumptions 
about our hominin baseline. Depending on these assumptions, for instance, some 
evolutionary narratives will become more vindicatory than others (see Hobbes, 
1668/1994; Hume, 1740/1978; Locke, 1689/1988; Rousseau, 1755/1992, 1762/1987; 
Sterelny, 2012b). 
(2013) who reject the demonic male hypothesis while still defending the central role of hunting (for a 
complete rejection of both, see Sussman, 1999). 
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According to the demonic male hypothesis (Wrangham & Peterson, 1996) and 
the killer ape hypothesis (Dart, 1953), we evolved from a chimpanzee-like hominin 
whose basic social nature was characterized by hostile intergroup relations. Human and 
chimpanzee males share a capacity for violence because our common ancestor also 
possessed a genetic predisposition for such capacity (see Crofoot & Wrangham, 2010; 
Wrangham & Glowacki, 2012). Intergroup conflict, for instance, plays a central role in 
some prominent accounts of the evolution of human cooperation (Bowles, 2008, 2009; 
Bowles & Gintis, 2011). On this view, this predisposition not only is an important 
aspect of human psychology but also substantially contributed to the evolution of our 
lineage by constraining the path and setting the pace of human social-cognitive 
adaptations. 
 Human ancestors were distinctively aggressive, and this trait was preserved 
thanks to the role of war and interpersonal aggression in the evolution of our lineage. On 
this picture, emotional reactivity led to social groups controlled by aggressive alpha 
males, but the increased cognitive demands of cooperative hunting and tool-making 
helped us to control our aggressive tendencies. Put another way, from a cognitive point 
of view, human evolution can be seen as the story of the emergence of different forms of 
top-down control over our more disruptive and less reliable emotional nature.13 Humans 
are predisposed to violence and dominance, but we overcame these limitations through 
the steady increase of our intellectual capabilities (see also Pinker, 2011). 
This picture has implications for our view of the relative roles of rational 
reflection and emotion in our normative lives. For emotional reactivity would be a 
challenge to overcome rather than support normative thinking. But this picture radically 
changes, however, if a different ape species such as the bonobo, not the chimpanzee, 
turns out to be a comparatively better model of the social behavior of our last common 
ancestor. If the social world of our forebears was more cooperative and peaceful than 
depicted by the chimpanzee referential model, neither the killer ape hypothesis nor the 
demonic male view of our social nature would be completely right. I will argue in this 
chapter, for instance, that, to a large extent, emotional and affective processes played a 
central role in the evolution of peaceful and cooperative human societies, rather than 
being solely a matter of emerging top-down control mechanisms. Most of chapter 4 and 
13 Top-down control is understood here as the processing of sensory and affective information that is 
driven by more cognitive processes such as goals or intentions. Bottom-up processing is the reverse of 
top-down processing, i.e., the processing of sensory and affective information that depends more directly 
on features of the stimulus input (for a more detailed discussion, see Rauss & Pourtois, 2013). 
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5 are devoted to understand the implications of this view about the role of emotions and 
affective processing for human normative cognition and development. 
This hypothesis has consequences for ongoing philosophical debates. For 
example, recently there has been a lot of interest in the connection between morality, 
sexual selection, and cooperation (see, for instance, Alexander, 1987; Fraser, 2010; 
Joyce, 2006; Kitcher, 2006, 2011; Miller, 2000, 2007; Nesse, 2007; Ruse, 1986; Ruse & 
Wilson, 1986; Sober & Wilson, 1998; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). But all these theories 
are built on the assumption that the social organization of early hominins closely 
resembled the social organization of the chimpanzee. If the sexual behavior of these 
hominins was less characterized by high levels of intermale and intersexual aggression 
than in chimpanzees, then the conditions for sexual selection would be radically 
different. Similarly, cooperation in a more socially tolerant ancestor would be different 
from the type of cooperation we find in highly hierarchical and aggressive primate 
social groups—the cognitive challenges are different and so are the mechanisms 
required to face them. 
I shall illustrate this point with Philip Kitcher’s (2011) hypothesis about the 
evolution of our capacity for normative guidance. According to Kitcher, the origins of 
the ethical project cannot be understood neither in terms of biological altruism nor in 
terms of behavioral altruism. The social life of our primate ancestors required a capacity 
for ‘psychological altruism’—roughly, a capacity to align one’s desires in response to 
the perceived desires of others, and not in expectation of some future benefit. In other 
words, Kitcher understands the emergence of human altruistic capacities as the gradual 
evolution of the cognitive and motivational psychological mechanisms underlying them 
(see also Sober & Wilson, 1998). This presupposes a form of belief-desire psychology, 
for “[…] altruists are intentional agents whose effective desires are other-directed” (p. 
20). In this view, psychological altruism fostered complex forms of cooperation, and 
vice versa, that ultimately led to the appearance of norms and the beginning of ethical 
practice. 
Yet according to Kitcher, psychological altruism in chimpanzees is limited in 
scope, as it was also in early hominins. To overcome these limitations, Kitcher argues, 
ancestral hominin groups developed quickly after the split with our sister lineage a 
capacity for normative guidance, i.e., a capacity to understand and respond to 
commands. He then offers a vindicating genealogy of this capacity since “[a]n ability to 
apprehend and obey commands changed the preferences and intentions of some 
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ancestral hominids, leading them to act in greater harmony with their fellows and thus 
creating a more smoothly cooperative society” (p. 74; see also Kitcher 2006, p. 172). 
Kitcher’s genealogy of our capacity for normative guidance is vindicating 
because it leads to ethical progress, beginning with its ancestral role in remedying 
failures of altruism in our chimpanzee-like hominin ancestors: 
 
Tens of thousands of years ago, our remote ancestors began the ethical 
project. They introduced socially embedded normative guidance in 
response to the tensions and difficulties of life together in small groups. 
They were equipped with dispositions to psychological altruism that 
enabled them to live together, but the limits of those dispositions 
prevented them from living together smoothly and easily. Out of their 
normative ventures have emerged some precepts we are not likely ever to 
abandon, so long, at least, as we make ethical progress, the vague 
generalizations that embody ethical truths. (p. 409) 
 
On Kitcher’s view, the ethical project is a form of social technology that has 
played a central role in the gradual improvement of our hominin social life. This role is 
a vindicating one. Certainly, his strategy might seem unconventional since progress is 
usually explained in terms of truth. Instead, he thinks that his genealogy of moral 
cognition can make sense of ethical truth and ethical knowledge based on this notion of 
progress—the second part of his book is devoted to this issue. Progress is just functional 
efficiency. For moral practices have an original function, namely to remedy the failures 
of altruism that lead to social conflict. This is what Kitcher calls ‘pragmatic naturalism’. 
As Kitcher put it: “Pragmatic naturalism retains a notion of ethical truth for expository 
purposes, but it starts from the concept of ethical progress” (p. 210). 
As with any other genealogical argument, Kitcher’s vindication of the ethical 
project is sensitive to issues about our hominin baseline. For his account of the role of 
normative guidance only makes sense in the context of a demonic male view. Male 
aggression is not a marginal feature of Kitcher’s analysis since he takes chimpanzees, 
rather than bonobos, as the model for our hominid past (p. 59, footnote 40) and 
chimpanzee societies are male-dominated societies. This is not a marginal feature of 
Kitcher’s analysis. In his view, the evolution of normative guidance was initially 
grounded in fear of punishment, and the actual beginnings of the ethical project are seen 
as a transition from a state of limited psychological altruism to one in which commands 
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are followed out of fear (see, for instance, p. 87). This was so because the social life of 
our forebears was chimpanzee-like: 
 
Begin with chimpanzee societies in which a crude precursor of 
punishment is already present. Conflicts within these groups are often 
settled through the interventions of a dominant animal. Here rank or 
physical strength (or both as concomitants of each other) prevail, and a 
dispute is settled—not always, of course, through the infliction of pain or 
discomfort on the animal whose initial defection gave rise to the conflict. 
(p. 87) 
 
In these social groups, the capacity to understand and obey commands was favored by 
natural selection because it helped us to avoid the cost of being punished by the 
dominant. Thus, Kitcher’s view can be understood as a form of demonic male view. 
Kitcher’s account of our capacity for normative guidance is important and 
enlightening. But his evolutionary account relies too heavily on the so-called 
‘chimpanzee referential doctrine’, i.e., the idea that chimpanzees are good referential 
models of our hominin ancestors (see Sayers, Raghanti, & Lovejoy, 2012), and a version 
of the demonic male view, i.e., the idea that dominance and male aggression were the 
cardinal challenges in the evolution of human sociality. His vindicating genealogy thus 
follows the typical narrative of this family of views in which top-down cognition plays 
the leading role in the expansion of the prosocial tendencies of our lineage, chaining the 
monster within. But as we will see later, if the model of our early ancestors I will 
propose here is right, Kitcher’s account of the emergence of normative guidance would 
not be quite right. To the extent that his philosophical views rely on his evolutionary 
genealogy, they need to be reassessed in light of the plausibility of the different models 
of the social behavior of early hominins. 
 
3.2. The puzzle of hominin evolution 
 
Evolutionary explanations of cognition require a historical and a comparative context in 
order to determine the hominin baseline of social-cognitive capacities. This baseline can 
be established through research in comparative psychology (see, for instance, Kappeler 
& van Schaik, 2004; Tomasello & Call, 1997). Most of the supporting evidence for the 
proposed model I will present here comes, in particular, from the comparative literature 
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between chimpanzees and bonobos. Chimpanzees and bonobos are our closest living 
relatives. According to current estimates, the human lineage diverged from the Pan 
lineage about 6 to 4.5 mya (Prüfer et al., 2012), while chimpanzees and bonobos 
diverged from each other more recently, about 1-2 mya. As a result, chimpanzees and 
bonobos are very similar in many respects, but they are also significantly different in 
key social and sexual behaviors (Boesch, Hohmann, & Marchant, 2002; de Waal & 
Lanting, 1997). This differences suggests that the Pan/Homo LCA could have been 
either chimpanzee-like or bonobo-like with respect to those key traits. More 
importantly, it also suggests that these social and sexual behaviors are evolutionary 
labile, since these differences evolved quickly from the genetic and developmental 
package inherited by the common ancestor of chimpanzees and bonobos. 
The differences in social behavior are particularly intriguing. Chimpanzees show 
a clear linear dominance hierarchy among males, with male dominance over females 
(Goldberg & Wrangham, 1997). They also display relatively low levels of cooperation 
(Hirata & Fuwa, 2007). In contrast, hierarchical relationships among bonobos are not 
always clearly defined (Kanō, 1992). Female dominance is common, and it is based on 
female alliances against aggressive males (Vervaecke, de Vries, & van Elsacker, 2000). 
Moreover, experimental evidence also suggests that bonobos are more similar to 
humans in the way they solve various cooperative problems (Hare, Melis, Woods, 
Hastings, & Wrangham, 2007). 
Sexual and play behaviors are different as well. In bonobos, sexual interaction 
occurs in mixed and same-sex pairings, and it is also used for conflict resolution (de 
Waal, 2001; de Waal & Lanting, 1997). Play behavior is common in adult bonobos, 
especially among females (Palagi, 2006). In contrast, chimpanzee sexual behavior is less 
rich and diverse. Sexual interaction does not typically occur in same-sex pairings, and 
(as in other primates) high-ranking males monopolize estrus females (Goodall, 1986). 
Unlike bonobos, play behavior is only frequent among chimpanzee infants (Goodall, 
1986), and no gender bias in terms of play behavior has been found so far. 
These behavioral differences are important because apes can be used as 
referential models, i.e., anatomical and behavioral proxies of our last common ancestor. 
In these models, the ethology, ecology, and cognitive skills of great apes are used to 
infer the traits that are most likely the ancestral condition of modern humans. These 
traits are either homologies (traits inherited from a common ancestor) or analogies 
(traits that have evolved independently due to similar selective pressures) or a 
combination of both. Moreover, although it is true that the recent split and stark 
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differences between both species suggest that a wide range of social behaviors are quite 
plastic and evolutionarily labile, this could hardly be the whole explanation of these 
differences. As we will soon see, comparative studies in Pan show that neuroanatomical 
differences may be responsible for these behaviors, which indicates that these traits are 
not just a consequence of immediate differential responses to highly idiosyncratic 
socioecological factors.14 Thus, given the behavioral differences between chimpanzees 
and bonobos, it is reasonable to assume that our early hominin ancestors were in part a 
mosaic of traits seen in both Pan species.15 
This constitutes a puzzle for hominin evolution. For chimpanzees and bonobos 
are two very different models of our last common ancestor, especially with respect to 
some key social and sexual behaviors. In the next sections of this chapter, I will argue 
that our best model of the social behavior of early hominins is not only one that carries 
features of chimpanzees, bonobos, and probably other species, but also one that stresses 
the comparative similarities between bonobos and those early ancestors. This ‘mosaic 
model’, I claim, has important consequences for our understanding of the evolutionary 
trajectory of our distinctive prosocial tendencies. 
 
3.3. The mosaic hypothesis 
 
On the view I want to defend here, early hominins were a mosaic of different traits seen 
not only in chimpanzees but also in other primate species. I make this claim clear in 
what I call the ‘mosaic hypothesis’, i.e., the idea that the morphology and social 
14 Evolutionary lability can lead to these neuroanatomical differences. In plasticity-first hypotheses, 
phenotypic plasticity can produce developmental variants that might increase fitness (Levis & Pfennig, 
2016). Selection can then refine the trait from an initial suboptimal version through genetic 
accommodation or even genetically assimilate the trait when environmental sensitivity is not favored 
(Moran, 1992; Waddington, 1953; West-Eberhard, 2003). However, although the robust neuroanatomical 
differences between chimpanzees and bonobos might be the result of some form of genetic 
accommodation or assimilation, they cannot be explained merely as an immediate response to 
environmental change or stress. 
15 Of course, this does not rule out the possibility that early hominins and the Pan/Homo LCA would have 
been in some respects very different from both Pan species. Along with comparative phylogenetic 
analysis (Duda & Zrzavý, 2013), the paleoanthropological record suggests that our early hominin 
ancestors were quite unlike chimpanzees or bonobos. Fossil evidence in Ar. ramidus, for instance, 
indicates that the Pan/Homo LCA could have possessed anatomical adaptations for bipedalism and 
omnivory. This evidence will be discussed in more detail in section 5. 
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behavior of early hominins, including the Pan/Homo LCA, can be reconstructed using 
comparative data from a wide range of extant and extinct primate species. 
The key problem is then to determine which particular aspects should be 
included in the mosaic on the basis of the available evidence. I will focus, in particular, 
on a version of this hypothesis, similar to the one I have ascribed to Zihlman (Zihlman, 
1984; Zihlman et al., 1978) and de Waal (de Waal, 1995, 2001; de Waal & Lanting, 
1997), i.e., the idea that bonobos are to some degree a constitutive part of that mosaic. 
Of course, my concern here is not whether bonobos are closer to us than chimpanzees, 
which would not make sense given the current genetic evidence. Nor is it which species 
better resembles, say, the Pan/Homo LCA. I am not arguing for Zilhman’s and de 
Waal’s specific views either, but rather for what I take to be their essential insight.16 My 
claim is a comparative one, namely that bonobos are in some important respects a more 
suitable model of the social behavior of early hominins and the Pan/Homo LCA than the 
chimpanzee, and that this undermines the demonic male hypothesis. 
The overall picture of this comparative model is one in which early hominin 
ancestors were characterized by a level of social tolerance and prosocial skills that went 
beyond the usual chimpanzee referential model. This is not a minor issue. For increased 
social tolerance and enhanced prosocial skills diminish the role of aggression and 
dominance in the evolution of our lineage. Adaptations for tolerance and prosociality 
make the evolutionary trajectory toward seemingly distinctive human traits such as 
imitative learning (Galef, 1996, 2009; Tomasello, 2009a) or collaborative foraging 
(Tomasello, Melis, Tennie, Wyman, & Herrmann, 2012) more accessible. 
The feasibility of the mosaic hypothesis and the Zilhman-de Waal conjecture is 
supported in the first place by genetic evidence (for a general discussion, see Pääbo, 
2003). Recently, Prüfer and colleagues (2012) have completed the sequencing of the 
bonobo genome and have compared it to the already sequenced genome of chimpanzees 
and humans. According to this study, the bonobo genome is affected by incomplete 
lineage sorting among the three species, which occurs when an ancestral polymorphism 
persists, diverging only partially or not at all, within new evolutionary lineages 
16 For example, unlike the model I will propose in this section, Zilhman views focus on morphology 
(Zihlman & Bolter, 2015; Zihlman et al., 1978; Zihlman & Lowenstein, 1983). Zihlman ideas were 
quickly criticized on the assumption that bonobos might be an ecologically and morphologically divergent 
species instead of having traits homologous with early hominids (Stanford, 1998b; see also Latimer et al. 
1981; Johnson 1981). As I will argue in section 5, there are reasons to think that certain aspects of the 
social behavior of bonobos are not as divergent as they may at first appear. 
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following a speciation event. This suggests that 3% of the human genome is more 
closely related to (i.e., more similar to homologues in) either chimpanzees or bonobos 
than these are to each other. They showed, in particular, that about 1.6% of the human 
genome is more closely related to bonobos than to chimpanzees while 1.7% of the 
human genome is more closely related to the chimpanzee than to the bonobo genome 
(Prüfer et al., 2012, pp. 2-3). Given the behavioral differences between chimpanzees and 
bonobos, they argue that, at least in principle, the last common ancestor of these three 
species could have possessed traits seen in both Pan species (2012, p. 527). 
 
Technical box 3.1. Comparative analysis of cooperation in great apes and 
humans 
Lineage sorting is the process by which, following the separation of two species, the 
ancestry of every gene converges to the overall phylogeny of the species. This is also 
called ‘coalescence’, i.e., the convergence of the genealogy of multiple gene copies 
backward in time into their common ancestor. Incomplete lineage sorting implies, in 
contrast, discordance between genealogies. For example, when one compares the 
genome of three related species, such as gorillas, chimpanzees, and humans, one 
infers that humans and chimpanzees are closer to each other than they are to gorillas 
through an average pattern of relatedness. This pattern suggests a more recent 
divergence between chimpanzees and humans than between gorillas and humans. 
However, this is typically only an average result. For if we compare these genomes 
closely, we will find specific genes and DNA regions where the gorilla sequence is 
more similar to the human sequence than to the chimpanzee sequence (Scally et al., 
2012). If we looked at only these genes or DNA regions, we would conclude that 
gorillas are closer to us than chimpanzees. As a result, this phenomenon produces 
different evolutionary trees for humans and many other primates, depending on 
which DNA fragment is used for the analysis. No clear path of common ancestry 
between humans and various primates can be inferred. The same occurs with 
chimpanzees, bonobos, and humans with respect to a relatively low percentage of 
about 3% of our genome. What Prüfer and colleagues (2012) found was that about 
1.6% of the human genome is more closely related to (i.e., more similar to 
homologues in) bonobos than chimpanzees while 1.7% of the human genome is more 




Certainly, the presence of incomplete lineage sorting in chimpanzees and 
bonobos is not an argument for the view that bonobos actually possess traits of the 
Pan/Homo LCA that the chimpanzee does not—although this would be possible if the 
chimpanzee lost an ancestral trait that bonobos and humans kept. Instead, what I am 
arguing here is that given the behavioral differences between chimpanzees and bonobos, 
incomplete lineage sorting in humans, chimpanzees, and bonobos indicates that the last 
common ancestor of these three species could have possessed traits seen in one but not 
the other Pan species. 
This genetic evidence not only gives prima facie motivation for the idea that the 
Pan/Homo LCA had some bonobo-like traits. It also suggests that bonobos can be useful 
referential models—a methodological assumption that underlies comparative studies on 
ape cognition (see, for instance, Tomasello & Call, 1997). The value of bonobos as 
models of early hominins is likely not only limited to common ancestry, though. It is 
also plausible that many features we see in this extant species resemble those we see in 
human because both species underwent similar selective regimes, e.g., the retention of 
juvenile traits such as playfulness and social tolerance due to a parallel process of self-
domestication. Roughly, self-domestication refers here to a process of social selection 
against aggression in humans that resembles the process of domestication of other wild 
animals to humans without systematic human selective breeding (Hare et al., 2012; 
Wrangham, 2011; see also section 2.6 in this chapter for discussion). Either way, I 
would like to argue that it is quite possible that our early hominin ancestors, and even 
perhaps the Pan/Homo LCA, were characterized by: 
 
(i) group hunting behavior, 
(ii) enhanced emotional control, 
(iii) increased aversion against aggression (specially intermale and intergroup 
aggression), 
(iv) enhanced brain connectivity for empathy (top-down and bottom-up 
control of aggressive impulses), 
(v) increased mind reading skills, 
(vi) increased cooperative and sharing tendencies, 
(vii) non-linear/ill-defined hierarchy, 




Traits (ii)-(vi) are comparative features, i.e., they are traits of early hominins that are 
well above the hypothesized levels of a chimpanzee-like model of that ancestor (for a 
defense of a picture of early Homo quite similar to this, see Gamble, Gowlett, & 
Dunbar, 2014) . According to these features, the social life of our early ancestors was in 
these respects more bonobo-like than chimpanzee-like. For the evolutionary trajectory 
would be less constrained by our aggressive and dominant tendencies, such that 
overcoming them would be displaced (so to speak) from the center of gravity of our 
evolutionary narrative. 
Moreover, from a philosophical point of view, this model would lead us to 
reassess naturalistic arguments based on these assumptions, such as Kitcher’s 
evolutionary narrative of the emergence of our capacity for normative guidance. For the 
above model would be linked to a different picture of the trajectory of hominin social 
evolution and the timing of the appearance of more complex forms of social cognition. 
As I will argue later, the fossil record supports the view that very early in our lineage, 
hominins were less aggressive and more tolerant than commonly assumed by 
chimpanzee referential models. Moreover, current explanations of our unique human 
cognitive capacities assume that they emerged relatively late with the emergence of the 
genus Homo. 
 
3.4. Evidence for the model 
 
The features of the proposed model are closely linked to social behavior. In behavioral 
phylogenetics, it is possible to reconstruct an ancestor’s behaviors if such behaviors are 
present in all of its living descendants (Boehm, 1999, 2012; Brosnan, 2006; Wrangham 
& Peterson, 1996). This argument relies on considerations of parsimony. To the extent 
that parsimony is a guide, group hunting would be characteristic of our last common 
ancestor. For recent evidence shows that this behavior is also present in the bonobo 
(Surbeck, Fowler, Deimel, & Hohmann, 2009; Surbeck & Hohmann, 2008). The same 
goes for some aspects of physical cognition such as tool manufacture and use (Gruber, 
Clay, & Zuberbühler, 2010; Ingmanson, 1996). 
Since humans also possess those behavioral traits, it is possible to infer that the 
Pan/Homo LCA did (i) hunt in groups—although only small game, and not as a core, 
essential feature of their subsistence strategy. It is true that, given that traits such as tool 
manufacture and use are present in all great apes (Breuer, Ndoundou-Hockemba, & 
Fishlock, 2005; Goodall, 1964; van Schaik, Fox, & Sitompul, 1996) and also in other 
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primate species (Chevalier-Skolnikoff, 1990; Chiang, 1967; Fernandes, 1991; Oyen, 
1979; Phillips, 1998), their presence in early hominins is a more conservative 
phylogenetic inference than group hunting. The set of data points is significantly smaller 
in that case. Nonetheless, there is evidence that by 3.4 mya hominins were using stone 
tools to hunt large mammals (McPherron et al., 2010), which pushes the plausibility of 
ape-like hunting much deeper in the hominin lineage. Therefore, it is just as likely, if not 
more likely, that group hunting was present in the Pan/Homo LCA as assuming that it 
emerged very early in our lineage and then independently in Pan. 
In addition, the neural circuitry that mediates anxiety, empathy, and the 
inhibition of aggression in humans is better developed in bonobos than in chimpanzees 
(Rilling et al., 2012). Recent comparative studies have shown that the bonobo has a 
more human-like circuitry for key nodes in the limbic system, including the amygdala, 
the hypothalamus, and the anterior insula (Rilling et al., 2012). The limbic system plays 
a crucial role in emotional processing, e.g., the anterior insula and the amygdala are both 
implicated in human empathy. Moreover, two pathways, one connecting the amygdala 
and the anterior cingulate cortex, and another connecting the amygdala and the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, are larger in bonobos than chimpanzees. The former is 
implicated in emotion regulation in humans while the latter enables the restraint of 
aggression via top-down suppression of aggressive impulses from the amygdala 
(Davidson, Putnam, & Larson, 2000; Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2006; Pezawas et al., 
2005). The same pathway may also be involved in controlling aggressive impulses 
through a bottom-up relay of perceived distress in others to the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex that inhibits antisocial behavior (Blair, 2007, 2008). This would mean that, for 
example, even if cooperating were a good decision for instrumental reasons, those 
instrumental reasons would have problems influencing chimpanzee behavior because 
they often would require controlling aggressive impulses via a relatively 
underdeveloped pathway. Similarly, there would also be little influence from bottom-up 
biases against instrumental forms of aggression because perceived cues of distress from 
others would not bias behavior. This would be different in bonobos and humans. When 
our amygdala senses that our actions are causing someone else distress, we may use that 
pathway to adjust our behavior in a prosocial direction. 
Insofar as the above neurobiological traits are examples of fine-grained 
similarities, then parsimony suggests that the early hominins possessed (ii) enhanced 
emotional control, (iii) increased aversion against aggression, and (iv) enhanced brain 
connectivity for empathy with respect to a hypothetical chimpanzee-like model of these 
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ancestors. A broader look at the neurobiology of other empathic and tolerant primate 
species gives some additional support to this view. For callitrichid monkeys, for 
instance, are quite socially tolerant but their social behavior relies on somewhat different 
neural circuitry. They possess small brains and their empathic behavior is mediated by 
physiological responses that are especially geared to cooperative breeding (Fernandez-
Duque, Valeggia, & Mendoza, 2009). This indicates that empathy and emotion 
regulation are not necessarily related to an increase in gray and white matter 
connectivity as in bonobos and humans, which makes a hypothesis about convergent 
evolution less likely. 
Bonobos are also more socially tolerant than chimpanzees, especially when co-
feeding (Hare et al., 2007). They show a stronger stress hormone response to feeding 
competition (Wobber et al., 2010). They have also been described as more nervous and 
shy than chimpanzees (de Waal & Lanting, 1997; Herrmann, Hare, Cissewski, & 
Tomasello, 2011). As in humans, these differences in temperament are associated with 
enhanced social-cognitive skills. Studies with young children, for instance, show a 
strong connection between shyness and mindreading skills (Wellman, Lane, LaBounty, 
& Olson, 2011). Similarly, bonobos outperform chimpanzees in tasks related to 
mindreading, while chimpanzees are more skilled at tasks requiring the use of tools and 
an understanding of physical causality (Herrmann, Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2010; see 
also Rosati & Hare, 2012; Wobber, Herrmann, Hare, Wrangham, & Tomasello, 2014)). 
Differences in mindreading skills, however, cannot be explained solely on the 
basis of social tolerance. These differences are products of a particular neural system for 
understanding the intentional states of others. The medial prefrontal cortex and the 
temporoparietal junction are known to be implicated in mindreading capabilities in 
humans (Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe, Xiao, Kovacs, 
Perrett, & Kanwisher, 2004). Thus, the fact that bonobos also have increased gray 
matter in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex compared with chimpanzees seems to be 
telling. Mindreading skills in apes are typically linked to competitive contexts (Call & 
Tomasello, 2008), but there is no reason to think that food and mating competition is 
stronger in bonobos than chimpanzees. Thus, explaining this increased capacity in 
bonobos through a convergent selective gradient seems problematic. 
Levels of tolerance also affect sharing behavior in Pan. Chimpanzees share food 
with conspecifics only under some circumstances—e.g., food transfer from mother to 
offspring (Ueno & Matsuzawa, 2004) or when the food is not valuable and not 
monopolizable (Blurton-Jones, 1987; de Waal, 1989; Gilby, 2006). However, peaceful 
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food sharing in wild bonobos seems to contradict the usual sharing-under-pressure 
hypothesis (Yamamoto, 2015). As the possessor of a food resource becomes satiated 
over the time, the relative value of the resource decreases for the possessor with respect 
to the non-possessors. Thus, the sharing under pressure hypothesis predicts that the 
utility costs caused by the pressure exerted by the non-possessors (e.g., the risk of 
aggression or the time invested in monopolizing a resource whose value diminish with 
time) is the explanation of food transfer. However, under experimental conditions, 
active and voluntary food sharing also seems to be present in bonobos (Hare & 
Kwetuenda, 2010), even among strangers and when food is easily monopolizable (Tan 
& Hare, 2013). In a slightly different way, Bullinger and colleagues (2013) have argued 
that bonobos do not have a preference to feed together, but rather a preference to be 
together. Either way, inhibition of aggression and social tolerance are linked to sharing. 
Moreover, experimental evidence supports what has been called the ‘emotional 
reactivity hypothesis’. Recent studies suggest that selection on emotional reactivity 
critically shapes a species’ ability to solve social problems (Hare et al., 2005; Hare & 
Tomasello, 2005). This hypothesis, for instance, predicts that bonobos will cooperate 
more successfully in food-retrieval tasks than chimpanzees because tolerance levels are 
higher in bonobos. So, although experimentally both species have been shown to be 
equally successful at cooperating when food is difficult to monopolize, tests with 
monopolizable food have shown that bonobos are much more able to cooperate than 
chimpanzees. For example, in Hare and colleagues’ (2007) food retrieval paradigm, a 
food resource was placed on a platform such that the resource could only be retrieved if 
two subjects pulled both ends of a rope at the same time. When the food was difficult to 
monopolize because there were two piles of food placed at either end of a platform, 
chimpanzees and bonobos performed the task equally well. But when food was placed 
in a single pile in the center of the platform and, therefore, was easily monopolizable, 
the bonobos outperformed the chimpanzees, i.e., bonobos cooperated more often, and 
after successful cooperation, they co-fed more. Same results were obtained with 
different cooperative partners, even though the bonobos were naïve before testing while 
the chimpanzees had been previously tested using similar experimental setups (Melis, 
Hare, & Tomasello, 2006a, 2009). 
Given the differences in temperament between chimpanzees and bonobos, it is at 
least as plausible that early hominins possessed (v) increased mindreading skills and (vi) 
increased cooperative and sharing tendencies with respect to a hypothetical chimpanzee-
like model of the Pan/Homo LCA as it is to adopt the standard chimpanzee referential 
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model. This is a non-negligible difference in social-cognitive abilities. The fact that 
these differences are correlated with particular neurobiological similarities between 
bonobos and humans also deserves attention. The chimpanzee’s mindreading and 
cooperative capacities cannot simply be taken to represent the ones of early hominins. 
What is more, even if the Pan/Homo LCA was very chimpanzee-like, the social-
cognitive differences seen in bonobos suggest that a fairly tolerant and cooperative 
primate was relatively readily evolvable from the genetic and development package 
inherited by the Pan/Homo LCA. Tolerance and cooperation did not depend on the 
subsequent evolution of high-end cognitive capacities beyond those possessed by great 
apes. Evolutionary plasticity could have been enough to adapt the three lineages to 
different socioecologies, which suggests that social tolerance and other social-cognitive 
traits could have evolved very early as a result the evolutionary plasticity of our 
common ancestor. There are good reasons to think that aggression and dominance are 
not traits deeply entrenched in our lineage. So, one could argue that chimpanzee-like 
sociality and cognition did not impose sharp constraints on evolutionary options, 
somewhat independently of the actual character of our last common ancestor. 
Another aspect of the social behavior that one could expect to be influenced by 
structural similarities in the hypothalamus and the amygdala is sex. These brain regions 
play a central role in controlling sexual behavior in non-human animals (Breedlove, 
Watson, & Rosenzweig, 2010; Newman, 1999) as well as in processing visual sexual 
stimuli in humans (Hamann, Herman, Nolan, & Wallen, 2004; Karama et al., 2002). 
This suggests that bonobos could use sex to reduce tension and anxiety produced by 
everyday social interactions (de Waal, 2001; de Waal & Lanting, 1997; Hare et al., 
2007; Hohmann, Mundry, & Deschner, 2009; Parish, 1996). For example, the enlarged 
bonobo amygdala could elicit anxiety while motivating sexual behavior that helps 
reduce it (Rilling et al., 2012). 
Naturally, sexual behavior in all the three species has important differences. But 
a crucial similarity between bonobos and humans is that both species use sexual 
behavior in a social context. Unlike chimpanzees, female bonobos are continuously 
sexually active and attractive. So, in bonobos and humans, sexual intercourse can be 
initiated at any point, which in turn increases bonding between individuals. Bonobos 
with lower testosterone levels and attenuated testosterone responses engage more often 
in amicable relationships with unrelated females and have greater reproductive success 
(Surbeck, Deschner, Schubert, Weltring, & Hohmann, 2012). Therefore, bonobo males 
benefit from affiliative long-term association with females (Hohmann & Fruth, 2003; 
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Hohmann, Gerloff, Tautz, & Fruth, 1999; Surbeck et al., 2012), which facilitates more 
egalitarian and more peaceful social lives. 
Similarly, hypothalamus size and amygdala size have been shown to predict 
social play frequency in non-human primates but not nonsocial play (Lewis & Barton, 
2006). Bonobos—females more than males—seem to use play to assess physical skills, 
the willingness of other individuals to invest in a relationship, and to strengthen already 
existing social bonds. Adult bonobos play much more frequently than chimpanzees. 
This asymmetry is important because it has been experimentally shown that both species 
use grooming and play as social currency (Schroepfer-Walker, Wobber, & Hare, 2015). 
Play is a valuable social interaction and can be used to establish social preferences 
depending on the amount of playful interactions between individuals. Thus, play 
behavior could also have a crucial role in the bonobo social organization and its 
typically weak dominance hierarchy. 
To the extent that the above neurobiological similarities are correlated with the 
more egalitarian social structure of bonobos, they would suggest that early hominins 
lived in (vii) less hierarchical and arguably (viii) less male-dominated social groups with 
respect to a hypothetical chimpanzee-like model of the Pan/Homo LCA. Explanations 
of the evolution of the bonobo usually argue that reduced male aggression toward 
females was sexually selected (Hare et al., 2012; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996). But it is 
at least equally likely that this trait was inherited from the common ancestor, especially 
in light of the fact that the traditional evolutionary scenario for the split between 
chimpanzees and bonobos is not supported by our current knowledge about the 
formation of the Congo River (Takemoto, Kawamoto, & Furuichi, 2015).17 
Granted, this is not conclusive evidence for the mosaic hypothesis or the 
particular model I have offered in the previous section. However, even if the case for the 
model is not compelling enough, we have good reasons to think that the social behavior 
of early hominins, including the Pan/Homo LCA, was in many respects not 
17 According to this hypothesis, the formation of the Congo River isolated an ancestral population of the 
common ancestor of chimpanzees and bonobos around 2 mya (Wrangham, 1993; Wrangham & Peterson, 
1996). This population did not have to compete with gorillas for resources, which allowed females to 
form coalitions and resist the advances of males. Since coercion was not an efficient mating strategy, 
sexual selection favored less aggressive males. This led to the evolution of bonobos and their distinctively 
low levels of aggression. However, the current geological evidence contradicts this scenario because it 
indicates that the present Congo River was formed much earlier, around 34 mya. 
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chimpanzee-like. At the very least, the chimpanzee referential model should not be 
anymore the default assumption. 
 
3.5. Paleoanthropological support 
 
Although certainly thin, the above evidence suggests that the Pan/Homo LCA was in 
some respects more bonobo-like than chimpanzee-like. In this section, I will argue that 
even if the Pan/Homo LCA was not characterized by the features ascribed in the model, 
we still have reasons to think that they evolved very early in our lineage. For the 
paleoanthropological evidence suggests that early hominins were much more socially 
tolerant than the chimpanzee referential doctrine actually tells us. 
Fossil evidence is central to whatever model of our hominin ancestry we choose. 
Referential models are constrained by phylogenetic inferences. After all, phylogenetic 
analysis can be understood as a form of referential modeling—one that does not rely on 
individual species as models but species traits’ distributions as indicators of their 
conserved or derived nature (Duda & Zrzavý, 2013; Moore, 1996; Whiten et al., 2010; 
Wrangham, 1987). On top of this, fossil evidence particularly restricts the scope and 
shape of these models. Generally speaking, for instance, referential models are either 
based on homology through shared descent (McGrew, 1981) or analogy through 
convergent evolution (DeVore & Washburn, 1963; Fernandes, 1991; Jolly, 1970, 2001; 
Perry, 1997; Perry et al., 2003; Skybreak, 1984). The above model can be considered 
rather neutral regarding this issue. 
Paleoanthropological evidence, however, suggests that even if some aspects of 
the proposed model are not homologies, i.e., ancestral traits of the Pan/Homo LCA that 
have been retained by bonobos and humans, they might have evolved fairly early in our 
lineage. This view is supported by fossil evidence from Sahelanthropus, Orrorin, and 
Ardipithecus, which indicates that our lineage was less aggressive and less male-
dominated than assumed by the traditional chimpanzee referential model because these 
extinct homininae species lack the adaptations for agonistic male-male competition 
present in other living primates—i.e., large canine and body-size sexual dimorphism 
(Brunet et al., 2002; Haile-Selassie, 2001; Haile-Selassie, Suwa, & White, 2004; Haile-
Selassie & WoldeGabriel, 2009; Lovejoy, 2009; Pickford & Senut, 2001; Suwa et al., 
2009; White, Asfaw, et al., 2009; see also Pickering, 2013). Haile-Selassie and 
colleagues (Haile-Selassie et al., 2004; Haile-Selassie, Suwa, & White, 2009), for 
instance, see enough anatomical continuity between all three to suggest that they might 
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belong to the same genus—pushing the earliest known appearance of Ardipithecus one 
million years deeper into prehistory, based on Sahelanthropus, at 7 mya (Pickering, 
2013, pp. 28-29). 
Early hominins and the Pan/Homo LCA could also have been very different 
from both Pan species. Fossil evidence from Ar. ramidus, for instance, indicates that 
this early hominin was well-adapted to bipedalism, although it retained arboreal 
capabilities (Lovejoy, Latimer, Suwa, Asfaw, & White, 2009; White, Asfaw, et al., 
2009). This means a more human-like locomotion system, quite different from that seen 
in any extant ape. Another important difference is that Ar. ramidus appears to be neither 
a ripe fruit specialist like Pan, nor a folivorous browser like Gorilla, but rather a more 
generalized omnivore (Suwa et al., 2009; White, Asfaw, et al., 2009). However, the 
same fossil evidence also suggests that the social behavior of the Pan/Homo LCA was 
in many important respects more bonobo-like than chimpanzee-like and that this social 
behavior is likely to be an ancestral condition. 
Evidence from Ardipithecus ramidus is particularly telling. The fossil record of 
this ancestor is rich and the completeness of some remains makes sex assessment 
relatively reliable (White et al., 2015; White, Suwa, & Asfaw, 1994). Dating estimates 
place the earliest remains of this hominin at circa 4.4 mya, close enough to the split 
between these two lineages as to make this ancestor highly relevant for reconstructing 





Figure 3.1. Partial skeleton (right) and artist’s reconstruction (left) of a relatively 
complete female specimen of Ar. ramidus, ARA-VP 1/500. The specimen, nicknamed 
‘Ardi’, is estimated to be around 120 centimeters tall and to weigh around 50 kilograms. 
The remains were dated as about 4.4 mya based on their stratigraphic position between 
the volcanic strata of the Gaala Tuff Complex and the Daam Aatu Basaltic Tuff. Source: 
http://www.scien§cemag.org/ 
 
Large canine and body-size sexual dimorphism are important because they are 
traits associated with agonistic male-male competition. But Ar. ramidus remains reveal 
that this hominin was characterized by reduced canine teeth and low body size 
dimorphism. In basal dimensions, the canines of Ar. ramidus are approximately as large 
as those of female chimpanzees and male bonobos, although their crown heights are 
shorter; they are comparable to those of Australopithecus anamensis and 
Australopithecus afarensis (Suwa et al., 2009; White, Asfaw, et al., 2009; White et al., 
1994; White et al., 2006; see also supplementary material of Suwa, Kono, et al., 2009). 
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They are also ‘feminized’ in shape. The size of the upper canine tooth is not only similar 
to that of females but also less sharp than those of chimpanzees. 
Reduced canine teeth dimorphism is a common feature of the hominin clade 
(Brace, 1972; Greenfield, 1992; White, Asfaw, et al., 2009; Wolpoff, 1976). Along with 
Ar. ramidus, this trait is seen in Sahelanthropus (Brunet et al., 2002, p. 150), Orrorin 
(Senut et al., 2001), and Ar. kadabba (Haile-Selassie, 2001; Haile-Selassie et al., 2004; 
Haile-Selassie & WoldeGabriel, 2009). Since the canine tooth is usually used as a 
weapon in intermale and intergroup conflicts, the less pronounced upper canine teeth 
suggests that early hominins, including Ar. ramidus, were characterized by relatively 
little intermale and intergroup aggression compared to chimpanzees. 
Similarly, Ar. ramidus is also expected to have shown little sexual dimorphism 
in body size—comparable to that of chimpanzees or humans, as opposed to orangutans 
or gorillas (White, Asfaw, et al., 2009, p. 80; White et al., 2015, p. 4881). In higher 
primates, body size dimorphism is usually coupled with strong canine dimorphism 
(Plavcan & van Schaik, 1997). Using dimorphism to infer behavior in early hominids is 
usually problematic because their unique combination of minimal canine size 
dimorphism and intense body mass dimorphism (Plavcan & van Schaik, 1997). But this 
is not the case in Ar. ramidus, which is characterized by a combination of reduced 
canine and body size dimorphism, unlike Pan and other early hominids. As a 
consequence, lack of sexual dimorphism seems to indicate that males did not compete 
against each other for dominance. 
While intermale and intergroup aggression is frequent among chimpanzees, Ar. 
ramidus possessed low levels of agonistic male-male competition (Clark & Henneberg, 
2015; Suwa et al., 2009)—and even, perhaps, male-female codominance as in bonobos 
(Suwa et al., 2009, p. 57). We cannot be sure about these aspects of the social behavior 
of our early ancestors, but we can infer them indirectly. For early hominins do not seem 
to have any of the adaptations for agonistic male-male competition present in other 
living primates. This would suggest that the frequency of intermale and intergroup 
aggression seen in chimpanzees is likely a derived condition, which in turn 
compromises its status as the behavioral model of the Pan/Homo LCA. 
Parallel evolution does not always seem to give us the most parsimonious 
reconstruction of these traits. Chimpanzees are more sexually dimorphic than bonobos 
and humans, and australopithecines were more sexually dimorphic than both extant Pan 
species. Therefore, to the extent that australopithecines are direct ancestors of modern 
humans (and not a paraphyletic sister lineage, which they may be), this loss of sexual 
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dimorphism must have not only occurred twice independently, in Pan and in Homo, but 
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Figure 3.2. Traditional phylogenetic arrangement of five hominid species. According to 
this view, Ar. ramidus and A. afarensis are direct ancestors of humans (H. sapiens). But 
Ar. ramidus, bonobos (P. paniscus), and humans are characterized by low sexual 
dimorphism and low levels of intermale and intergroup aggression while A. afarensis 
and chimpanzees (P. troglodytes) show increased levels of sexual dimorphism and 
aggression. On top of that, Ar. ramidus and humans are characterized by an omnivorous 
diet and a similar dentition, although A. afarensis and Pan have specialized masticatory 
apparatus. 
 
Another option would be to suggest that low sexual dimorphism and reduced 
intermale and intergroup conflict is, in fact, the ancestral condition, with a pattern of 
increasing dimorphism in australopithecines and chimpanzees. Australopithecines 
would be a paraphyletic sister lineage (an alternative pointed out to me by Kim Shaw-
Williams, personal communication), or not as sexually dimorphic as it has often been 
claimed (McHenry, 1991; Plavcan, Lockwood, Kimbel, Lague, & Harmon, 2005; Reno, 
McCollum, Meindl, & Lovejoy, 2010; Reno, Meindl, McCollum, & Lovejoy, 2003). In 
this way, the evolutionary trajectory of the human lineage could be explained without 
postulating so many evolutionary reversals, or by invoking less drastic shifts. However, 
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this would challenge the current picture of Australopithecus as a very aggressive, highly 
sexually dimorphic genus, or even its place as direct human ancestor—a hypothesis that, 
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Figure 3.3. Alternative evolutionary arrangement of five hominid species. According to 
this view, Ar. ramidus is a direct ancestor of humans (H. sapiens), while A. afarensis is 
part of a paraphyletic sister lineage. A dashed line bypassing A. afarensis, but 
connecting Ar. ramidus with humans represents this alternative phylogenetic relation. 
This provides a more parsimonious reconstruction by making low sexual dimorphism 
and reduced intermale and intergroup conflict the ancestral condition.  
 
Placing A. afarensis as our direct ancestors is an important issue if we assume 
that australopithecines were indeed a very aggressive, highly sexually dimorphic genus. 
If they are our direct ancestors, then the social behavior of early hominins was likely 
chimpanzee-like before the split between Pan and Homo. If they are a side branch, and 
early hominins were ardipithecines all the way through to encephalization, then early 
hominins were probably very unchimpanzee-like, more similar to bonobos and humans 
at least in some important respects of their social and sexual behavior. Except that on 
either reconstruction, it seems that social and sexual behavior come out as evolutionarily 
plastic, so we cannot put very much weight on phylogenetic parsimony inferences. 
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It is not clear whether body size dimorphism in australopithecines is a 
consequence of male-male competition (Plavcan & van Schaik, 1997) since their 
canines have a variety of features inconsistent with their use as a weapon (Greenfield, 
1992). There are multiple reasons that could potentially explain the increase in body size 
dimorphism in australopithecines, e.g., reduction in female body size (Leigh & Shea, 
1995), predator defense (Clutton-Brock, Harvey, & Rudder, 1977), the Rench’s rule, 
i.e., the idea that size dimorphism will increase with increasing body size when the male 
is the larger sex (see Fairbairn, 1997), or even niche differentiation, as in raptors where 
the female is typically larger than the male. 
Although there is no necessary link between the specific features ascribed by the 
model and the paleoanthropological evidence, the common theme of reduced (or 
controlled) aggression in early hominins stands, which would make these ancestors 
behaviorally more similar to bonobos and humans than chimpanzees in this respect. 
Even if the Pan/Homo LCA was very different from the proposed model, a decrease in 
these aggressive tendencies seems to have occurred very early in our lineage. If this 
were the case, many of the features ascribed by the proposed model would be cases of 
parallel evolution rather than common ancestry. They could be explained, for instance, 
by parallel heterochronic shifts of ancestral developmental patterns that have cascading 
effects on social behavior. For as we will see in the next section, there is an explanation 
for the emergence of similar social behavioral traits in bonobos and humans due to a 
process of self-domestication, which lead to the retention of juvenile traits. 
 
3.6. The self-domestication hypothesis 
 
In the last two sections, I have argued that the demonic male view of human evolution 
and the chimpanzee referential doctrine very likely do not give us an accurate picture of 
early hominins. In section 3.4, I have argued that comparative evidence suggests that the 
Pan/Homo LCA was in some respects more bonobo-like than chimpanzee-like. In 
section 3.5, I have argued that even if the Pan/Homo LCA is not correctly described by 
the model, these features could have evolved very early in our lineage since the 
paleoanthropological evidence suggests that early hominins were much more socially 
tolerant than the chimpanzee referential doctrine actually tells us. This is a plausible 
evolutionary scenario given the evidence that many of the social-cognitive traits of the 
model are evolutionary plastic. As a result, many of the features ascribed by the 
proposed model could be cases of parallel evolution rather than common ancestry—i.e., 
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humans and bonobos would share these traits via an ancestral character that 
independently evolved in similar ways.18 
The increased social tolerance and the enhanced prosocial skills that the model 
presupposes, occurred either before the split between the ape and hominin lineages or 
very early in the evolutionary history of the latter. They can be explained either by 
parallel evolution, or by shared recent ancestry, or (quite likely) by a combination of 
both—i.e., with some features of the model being cases of parallel evolution in bonobos 
and humans while others being inherited from the common ancestor. This would help 
explain why the social life of our early ancestors was in these respects more bonobo-like 
than chimpanzee-like and, consequently, why these two species are so different. But 
although I think convergent, parallel evolution is possible, I am skeptical that all the 
comparative claims of the model could be explained by this process alone. As a result, 
there are reasons to think that at least some aspects of the proposed model are real 
homologies inherited from the Pan/Homo LCA. To be clear, this debate should not 
affect the overall picture of the thesis. For both sides in the debate only differ in terms of 
the timing and the underlying evolutionary processes that account for the baseline of my 
lineage explanation, rather than in terms of the baseline itself. But the same kind of 
processes behind scenarios of parallel evolution could have also played an important 
role much later in the evolution of the genus Homo—in particular, when our ancestors 
became cooperative breeders (Hawkes, 2014; Hrdy, 2016; Tomasello & Gonzalez-
Cabrera, 2017). 
The best case for parallel evolution comes from the so-called ‘self-domestication 
hypothesis’ (Hare et al., 2012; Henrich, 2016; Wrangham, 2011; for a precursor of this 
theory, see Lorenz, 1940). On this view, the differences seen between chimpanzees and 
bonobos are a consequence of selection against aggression that led to a syndrome of 
changes observed in domestic animals, including the retention of juvenile traits. 
Domesticated animals show a number of morphological, physiological, behavioral, and 
cognitive modifications that seem to be correlated, e.g., variations in body coloration, 
cranial shape, dentition, brain size, activation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis, 
and problem-solving abilities. These changes are thought to resemble the ones 
undergone by bonobos since their split from the chimpanzee lineage. As a result, it has 
been argued that the alleged similarities between bonobos and humans might be 
18 I understand parallel evolution as a special case of convergent evolution, where similar traits have 
appeared independently in different closely related taxa such that the traits in question evolved from the 
same ancestral character (McGhee, 2011, p. 3). 
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analogous traits due to a parallel process of selection against aggression, rather than 
common ancestry. 
The key evidence in favor of this scenario relies on the developmental trajectory 
of the skull in chimpanzees and bonobos. It is sometimes argued that the cranial 
development of the chimpanzee closely resembles the ontogenetic pattern of the gorilla 
(Shea, 1983, 1989), while the bonobo skull remains small and juvenilized when 
compared to chimpanzees, other great apes, and australopithecines (Kappelman, 1996; 
Lieberman, Carlo, de Leon, & Zollikofer, 2007; Schultz, 1941). For this reason, a 
chimpanzee-like trajectory of cranial ontogeny is sometimes considered the most 
parsimonious reconstruction of the ancestral pattern, while the bonobo developmental 
trajectory is taken to be derived (Wrangham & Pilbeam, 2001). In this line of argument, 
Hare and colleagues (2012) have suggested that the non-aggressive behavior seen in 
bonobos would be also derived because brain development is known to be correlated to 
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Figure 3.4. Model of bonobo evolution due to self-domestication. Selection against 
male aggression leads to a process of juvenilization that is correlated with 
morphological, behavioral, and neurobiological changes. If the developmental trajectory 
of the bonobo skull proof to be derived in this way, then this would support the idea that 




Juvenilization (paedomorphosis) may account only for few aspects of the 
bonobo cranium. If the differences at hand are just a matter of delayed development, we 
should expect overlapping ontogenetic trajectories that only differ in timing. But most of 
the differences in neurocranial shape between chimpanzees and bonobos are a result of 
divergent developmental trajectories, rather than just maturational delay (Lieberman, 
2011; Lieberman et al., 2007; Mitteroecker, Gunz, Bernhard, Schaefer, & Bookstein, 
2004; Mitteroecker, Gunz, & Bookstein, 2005; Williams, Godfrey, & Sutherland, 2002). 
This suggests that the bonobo skull follows a different developmental path, which 
partially contradicts scenarios such as the self-domestication hypothesis (Berge & Penin, 
2004; Mitteroecker et al., 2004; Penin, Berge, & Baylac, 2002; Ponce de Leon & 
Zollikofer, 2001; Williams, Godfrey, & Sutherland, 2003; Zelditch, Sheets, & Fink, 
2000). In other words, if differences in neurocranial shape between chimpanzees and 
bonobos are not just a matter of maturational delay, then at least some of the features of 
the proposed model could be due to common ancestry. 
Similarly, not all shape differences between chimpanzees and bonobos can be 
attributed to paedomorphosis. For example, in chimpanzees and bonobos, significant 
expansions of the areas corresponding to the frontal lobes of the cerebrum occur at two 
different ontogenetic stages, but they are not explained through maturational delay. 
These expansions seem to be associated with other changes in skull morphology, e.g., a 
rotation of the orbits toward the midline, which in turn is closely related to alterations in 
other endocranial regions (Durrleman, Pennec, Trouve, Ayache, & Braga, 2012). 
Pure developmental change in the timing of events (heterochrony) can explain 
neither human craniofacial morphology nor the differences among the African apes. The 
human skull is already markedly different at birth when compared to other great apes in 
shape space and size-shape space (Mitteroecker et al., 2004). This suggests that 
differences in craniofacial morphology between Homo and Pan are caused by small 
genetic differences affecting early ontogeny.19 This makes problematic to assume that 
human skull morphology is the result of global heterochrony. 
Subsequent multivariate analyses have rejected the hypothesis of global 
heterochrony in the cranium of Pan as well as regional heterochrony for the lower face, 
the upper face, and the neurocranium (Mitteroecker et al., 2005). Paedomorphosis can 
explain only a modest proportion of the variation between chimpanzees and bonobos 
19 In fact, Mitteroecker and colleagues’ (2004) study gives some support to the old idea that bonobos 
come closer in their overall ontogenetic pattern to the great ape ancestor (Ciochon, 1983; Zihlman, 1984; 
Zihlman et al., 1978; Zihlman & Lowenstein, 1983). 
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(Lieberman, 2011; Lieberman et al., 2007). One region of the bonobo skull may have 
evolved relative to its ancestral form through one pattern of heterochrony, while another 
component of the skull might have evolved via a different heterochronic pattern, or by a 
completely different mechanism (e.g., by the repositioning of regions, by evolutionary 
novelty, or by the addition of bone and other tissues). In humans, for instance, the 
braincase seem to be an example of peramorphosis (a heterochronic process in which 
individuals of a species mature past adulthood), whereas the face appears to be an 
example of paedomorphosis (Lieberman, 2011; Shea, 1989). Important modifications in 
the cranial base in the hominin lineage are also connected to the evolution of bipedalism 
rather than paedomorphosis (Kimbel, Suwa, Asfaw, Rak, & White, 2014). As a 
consequence, skull morphology in bonobos and humans is not explained in its entirety 
by paedomorphosis and, therefore, neither is the behavioral and neurobiological changes 
associated with domestication. 
To a large extent, this hypothesis depends on the idea that self-domestication 
leads to the retention of juvenile features of the skull. If paedomorphosis explains only 
some of the similarities between bonobos and humans, then this would bear on the 
hypothesis itself. It is still possible, though, that some important aspects of the behavior 
of bonobos and humans such as the retention of play behavior into adulthood might be 
explained through some version of the self-domestication hypothesis since this feature 
might be fundamentally mediated by hormonal mechanisms. However, domestication 
typically leads to a syndrome of morphological, behavioral, and neurobiological 
changes that crucially includes changes in cranial morphology (Wilkins, Wrangham, & 
Fitch, 2014). 
 
3.7. Normative guidance 
 
The model I have defended in this chapter has important philosophical consequences for 
descriptive theories of ethics. For it gives us a different picture of the evolution and 
nature of our capacity for normative guidance (Kitcher, 1998, 2006, 2011), i.e., our 
capacity to grasp norms and to make normative judgments. Kitcher is not the only one 
implicitly relying on some form of the demonic male view (see, for instance, Boehm, 
2012; Bowles, 2008, 2009; Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Dubreuil, 2010a; Prinz, 2007). 
However, he is a primary example of this view in the context of an evolutionary 
approach to normative cognition that is close to mine—his account, for instance, does 
not aim to unify human moral thinking as a natural kind in psychology, but rather to 
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provide an account of the cognitive capacities that enables our distinctive human norm 
psychology. 
In section 3.1, I suggested that Kitcher’s account of the emergence of the 
capacity for normative guidance is a particular form of the demonic male view. 
Kitcher’s evolutionary scenario relies on a chimpanzee-like social environment where 
dominance and aggression are the key driving forces behind human evolution. On 
Kitcher’s account, dominant alpha males punish anyone who disrupts the established 
social order, and this makes normative guidance, at least initially, psychologically 
grounded in fear. In addition, as in the demonic male view, the evolution of our capacity 
for normative guidance is in part the story of the gradual expansion of top-down 
mechanisms of control (in the form of some sensitivity to commands) over our less 
reliable emotional nature. If an agent is able to understand the normative structure of its 
chimpanzee-like social environment, that agent will be able to avoid the costs imposed 
by aggressive alpha males. The motivational force to obey these commands comes for 
free in this case since they help the agent to avoid situations in which the anticipated 
consequences are feared or disliked. 
The above model, then, bears important consequences for Kitcher’s view of 
normative guidance and its function. For, according to him, normative guidance has to 
be more explicit, more a matter of offline cognition. But the model of early hominins I 
presented in section 3.3 strongly suggests that neither the demonic male view nor 
Kitcher’s (2011) account of our capacity for normative guidance are plausible. On this 
model, the social world of our last common ancestor is not male-dominated (viii), their 
social organization is less hierarchical (vii) and social cohesion is less regulated by 
aggression and fear of punishment (vi). On the contrary, this ancestor is characterized by 
its enhanced emotional control (ii), increased aversion against aggression (iii), empathy 
and positive emotions (iv), and enhanced perspective taking capacities (v). If this is 
correct, normative guidance would not have been the result of selection for avoiding 
punishment by very aggressive and authoritative alpha males. Kitcher’s vindicating 
genealogy becomes murky. The tendencies of some individuals to monopolize resources 
and to impose social order through aggression would have been largely regulated in our 
lineage through more bottom-up affective processes—e.g., because perceived cues of 
distress would inhibit violent behavior. No sensitivity to commands is required. No 
norms are invoked. Another explanation would be necessary. 
Kitcher’s evolutionary account of normative guidance is not the only available 
explanation. It is also not the best. I think a better explanation of the shift toward 
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normative guidance could be framed in terms of shared intentionality (Tomasello, 2015; 
Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007; Tomasello et al., 2005). Shared intentionality seems to 
account for much of the distinctive features of human psychology. It has been argued, 
for instance, that such capacity is responsible for the appearance of joint attention, 
cooperative communication, imitative learning, and teaching, which are at the basis of 
cultural learning and the social norms and traditions we see in human culture (Call, 
2009; Tomasello, 2014). Although joint activities and behavioral traditions are common 
among great apes, humans substantially differ from other apes in their underlying 
psychological mechanisms. Chimpanzees and bonobos can attribute some psychological 
states such as perceptions and goals to others (Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 2003), but they 
are neither intrinsically motivated to share those psychological states nor are able to 
represent these mental states in a joint, collective fashion (Call, 2009). 
Shared intentionality helps us to explain much of our distinctive cooperative 
tendencies within the ape lineage (Tomasello, 2009b). In this view, ecological triggers 
forced a shift from a very individualistic lifestyle to more collaborative one, 
characterized by cooperative breeding and increasingly complex forms of collaborative 
foraging (Hawkes, 2014; Tomasello et al., 2012). But the expansion of our collaborative 
capacities was only possible by the emergence of the cognitive and motivational 
infrastructure for sharing intentional states such as attention, goals, beliefs, and desires. 
For example, by the time of the emergence of Homo, females have to forage, leaving 
their offspring to the care of other group members. Under the custody of strangers, 
children needed to engage the caregiver’s attention for its own sake (Hawkes, 2012; 
Tomasello & Gonzalez-Cabrera, 2017). This engagement required not only 
simultaneously attending to the same objects and events but also some visual 
referencing such as a quick look to the caregiver’s face or eyes to track the caregiver’s 
focus of attention (Carpenter & Call, 2013; see also Bakeman & Adamson, 1984). They 
would have needed to see whether the caregiver was also looking to them, and then to 
express affective contact with the adult (Hobson & Hobson, 2007). 
The phenomenon of shared intentionality is also known to be closely related to 
the emergence of normative thinking (see, for instance, Göckeritz et al., 2014; Rakoczy, 
2008; Rakoczy, Brosche, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2009; Rakoczy et al., 2008; Schmidt 
et al., 2011a; Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012; Tomasello, 2015). As we shall see in chapter 
5, developmental studies show that at a very young age children are able to understand 
social norms such as the ones that govern conventional games (Rakoczy, 2008; 
Rakoczy, Brosche, et al., 2009; Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012). Children strongly object 
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to transgressions of norms of conventional games by using normative language, e.g., 
“No! It does not go like this!”, or by intervening directly on the transgressor in order to 
correct him, e.g., “Take that one” or “Not this way!” (Rakoczy et al., 2008). 
As explained in the previous chapter, shared intentionality gives us a framework 
that allows singling out a particular class of normative judgments, which is 
characterized by a distinctive gradient of generalizability, intrinsic motivation, and 
punitive attitudes. The cognitive component of joint intentional states allows to 
represent judgments such as “We ought to do x” in ways that are increasingly general 
and abstract regarding their plural subject. The motivational component in turn allows 
us to entertain normative thoughts whose motivational component is shared, e.g., the 
motivation to comply with the normative judgment or to admonish those who do not. As 
we will see in chapter 4, this form of normative thinking required the interaction of a 
distinctively human line of development for sharing psychological states with an ancient 
developmental trajectory of increased social tolerance and enhanced mindreading skills. 
Other primates do form social expectations but they lack the capacity to form 
normative expectations that are socially shared (von Rohr, Burkart, & van Schaik, 
2011). Normative expectations depend for their emergence and maintenance on shared 
acceptance and commitment. Joint goals of the form “We intend to do x” have some 
normative weight. If we intend to drink water from the pond, we should go to the pond. 
These shared mental states require at least minimal commitment. For the mutual 
interlock of motivational states is one of the features that make these shared intentional 
states different from a mere accidental overlap of intentions—e.g., “I want to go drink 
water from the pond” and “You want to drink water from the pond”. Certainly, this 
normative weight becomes stronger and more evident the more is at stake for the parties 
involved. The reason why these states underwent this increase in normative force is 
evolutionary, for as I will argue in chapter 4 the increasing demands on cooperative 
activities such as foraging required commitment and social enforcement to guarantee 
their success. In modern humans, if someone unexpectedly abandons the joint activities 
that these states bring about, others may demand an explanation and censure their 
partner (see, for instance, Warneken et al., 2006; Warneken, Gräfenhain, & Tomasello, 
2012; Warneken, Hare, Melis, Hanus, & Tomasello, 2007). Even mostly prelinguistic 
children exhibit glimpses of this normative dimension when they try to reengage an 
unresponsive partner in a collaborative activity (Warneken et al., 2006; Warneken et al., 
2012; Warneken et al., 2007). The attempts of the child to reengage collaborative 
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partners seem to be attempts to restore a shared activity, and in this way, they could well 
be an incipient form enforcement. 
Given that much of the empirical work on this psychological phenomenon comes 
from the comparative literature, the theory of shared intentionality offers a helpful 
framework to put normative guidance within an evolutionary context. This capacity, for 
instance, is thought to be closely linked to the selective pressures resulting from 
cooperative activities such as cooperative breeding and collaborative foraging. The 
former is often considered a previous step for the full emergence of shared intentionality 
(Hawkes, 2012, 2014; Tomasello et al., 2012) because, although cooperative breeding 
leads to greater prosocial skills, it does not entail in itself higher cognition (Burkart et 
al., 2014; Burkart, Hrdy, & van Schaik, 2009; Burkart & van Schaik, 2010). For this 
reason, it has been argued that the selective pressures of collaborative foraging, which 
are more cognitively demanding in terms of coordination, would explain the emergence 
of the type of complex cognition underlying shared intentionality, starting with Homo 
erectus and continuing with Homo heidelbergensis (Tomasello et al., 2012). Since it is 
only with the emergence of collaborative foraging that we can fully explain the 
emergence of shared intentionality, it would be only until then that we could expect 
social norms to emerge—i.e., understanding them as mutually known expectations 
bearing social force and enforced by third parties. 
In sum, following the suggestion put forward in chapter 2, I think that social 
normative thinking can be understood as a special case of shared intentionality. In the 
next chapter, I will explain in more detail the connection between these two aspects of 
human cognition by arguing that our capacity for normative guidance was selected to 
avoid disappointing a relationship partner’s expectations in a more tolerant social 
environment when hominins became more interdependent foragers (Tomasello et al., 
2012). Norms would then be represented by the agent as shared expectations about how 
individuals ought to behave in a given situation, i.e., they would be represented as joint 
intentional states. These expectations were necessary to carry out tasks that required 
complex coordination such as collaborative foraging and more so to build the kind of 







I have begun this chapter explaining the philosophical motivations behind debates about 
the reconstruction of early hominins, and the perils of reconstructing the social behavior 
of these ancestors. Then, I have argued that we are more justified in using an alternative 
model of the Pan/Homo LCA based on a mosaic hypothesis of human origins as we are 
in adopting the chimpanzee referential model. According to the model, our last common 
ancestor would have been a large mosaic of traits seen not only in both Pan species but 
also in other primate species. In order to support this model, I have gathered evidence 
from a wide range of disciplines, especially paleoanthropology and comparative 
psychology. I have particularly focused on comparative studies between humans and 
both Pan species, as well as discussed whether these similarities are homologies or 
analogies. I have argued that this alternative model does not support popular views of 
human evolution such as demonic male view (Wrangham & Peterson, 1996) or the killer 
ape hypothesis (Dart, 1953). Finally, I have argued that this alternative model suggests a 
different evolutionary account of our distinctive capacity for normative guidance 




Chapter 4. Big game hunting and the evolution of human social norm 
psychology20 
 
In chapter 3, I have argued that our capacity for normative guidance may be linked to 
the lineage of our shared intentional capacities. Now, in this chapter, I will argue that 
normative guidance evolved as a consequence of the selective pressures of collaborative 
hunting. This is a hypothesis I have not ruled out in chapter 3 since the model I 
proposed there was still compatible with the idea that early hominins used tools and 
hunt in groups—a model in line with views that decouple hominin hunting from 
aggression (see Pickering, 2013). The tamer picture of our early ancestors I offered in 
that chapter will play a crucial role here in two different ways. One is to provide a 
cognitive baseline for my lineage explanation of normative guidance. Another is 
facilitating the gradual expansion of early hominin cooperative capacities since 
collaborative foraging would be implausible in a very aggressive and dominant lineage. 
Wolves, hyenas, and lions are carnivores with dominance hierarchies, but their 
hunting strategies were not readily accessible to the hominin lineage since we lack the 
speed, the canines, the claws, and the physical advantage of these predatory mammals. 
They hunt in groups as some great apes do but their hunting behavior is not 
collaborative. Collaborative hunting as the one we see among hunter-gatherers requires 
shared intentionality, for it relies on joint goals and plans, task and role division, and 
shared commitment, which are psychological features much more readily accessible to 
the tamer model of early hominins I have put forward in chapter 3. It is sometimes 
informally argued that hunting behavior such as the one seen in social carnivores 
involves some of these capacities. However, these claims are based on anecdotic 
evidence rather than behavioral data collected under controlled conditions. No evidence 
today seems to indicate that non-human animals possess real shared intentional 
capacities. More importantly, great apes with whom we share a common lineage 
systematically fail tests of shared intentionality (Call, 2009; Carpenter & Call, 2013; 
Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007; Tomasello et al., 2005). There are phylogenetic reasons 
that make hunting in great apes much more relevant for comparative purposes. I will 
explain how a deficit in shared intentionality captures the difference between the 
hunting behavior of chimpanzees and that of hominin hunters. More generally, my aim 
20 Sections 4.4 and 4.5 of this chapter are based on worked published in Tomasello and Gonzalez-Cabrera 
(forthcoming) and has been modified to meet university guidelines. 
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in this chapter is to propose a lineage explanation whose starting point is an early 
hominin with high levels of social tolerance and basic mindreading skills, and as an 
endpoint, agents with human-like capacities for shared intentionality, including its 
subsidiary normative dimension, i.e., the distinctive punitive attitudes they engender and 
their consequences for partner choice. 
However, I think that collaborative hunting is only part of the story of the 
evolution of shared intentionality. For this capacity emerges early in ontogeny while 
collaborative hunting is typically an adult activity. This poses the nontrivial question of 
how shared intentionality was pushed down into early developmental stages. In some 
cases, once these collaborative capacities become central to the lives of adults, it is not 
too difficult to provide a story about how these skills could have been co-opted for 
secondary functions early in ontogeny. For example, Sterelny’s (2012a) apprentice 
learning model suggests that the demands of social learning integrate juveniles into the 
economic lives of adults as a key aspect of their education, i.e., they learn by supervised 
doing. But it is less obvious, for instance, how basic shared intentional capacities such 
as joint attention and pointing are learned skills or how they became so entrenched in 
early development. For this reason, I will argue in this chapter that the initial driving 
forces in the evolution of these basic forms of shared intentionality were the selective 
pressures derived from a cooperative breeding niche while its distinctive normative 
dimension emerged as a result of the selective pressures on collaborative hunting. 
The concept of shared intentionality has roots that are both philosophical 
(Bratman, 1992; Gilbert, 1989; Searle, 1990; Sellars, 1963) and psychological 
(Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007; Tomasello et al., 2005). Roughly speaking, shared 
intentional states are hybrid mental states. I understand these states as the systematic co-
occurrence of a cognitive and a motivational component. They have a cognitive 
component, e.g., the representation of shared goals, the awareness of other peoples’ 
intentional states, and the representation of others’ actions, as well as an intrinsic 
motivational component—i.e., these states possess motivational force which is partially 
explained by the shared nature of those goals and intentions.21 It is true that one of these 
21 Often, we are motivated to do something because other people are also motivated to do it. However, it 
is psychologically possible (and very likely indeed) to be motivated to do something for different reasons. 
If we intend to go to the pub, we genuinely share this intention only if you are intrinsically motivated to 
do it because I am also joining, and vice versa. Yet this does not mean that one may not have other 
reasons to go to the pub. Perhaps I also want to go to the pub to drink a beer. Thus, if you cancel our 
appointment for some reason, I may still go to the pub because I am still individually motivated to do so. 
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components may appear without the other, both in development and in evolution. But it 
is the regular co-occurrence and the role this co-occurrence plays in driving human 
behavior that is relevant for a mental state to be a shared intentional state. Since this is 
an essential feature of shared intentional states, this hybrid nature is also an essential 
feature of the normative judgments that our shared intentional capacities are able to 
engender as a special subclass. Depending on the specifics of this mixture of 
components, some normative states would appear more belief-like while others would 
seem more desire-like. 
On the view I propose, basic forms of shared intentionality such as joint 
attention and pointing behavior emerged as ontogenetic adaptations for early childhood 
in a cooperative breeding context. These capacities were subsequently extended in 
ontogeny into adulthood because they were co-opted for foraging, especially in the form 
of collective hunting. Collaborative foraging in early Homo required increased 
motivation and commitment to shared goals compared to cooperative breeding. 
Foraging is riskier. It requires more time and energy, is dangerous, and has a higher cost 
of opportunity. As a consequence, these shared intentional states were carefully 
monitored and enforced by all the group members. The coupling of these punitive 
attitudes with some other common features of shared intentional states was the origin of 
social normative thinking. Thus, shared intentionality helps us to identify a well-defined 
target for the psychological study of normative thinking. For at least some of these 
shared intentional states regulate collective activities in a way that is distinctively 
normative—they are mental states that are not only generalizable in scope and 
intrinsically motivational but also able to engender punitive attitudes, for they are 
enforced in oneself and others (for a similar proposal, see Sripada & Stich, 2007). 
Moreover, as I have suggested in chapter 2, within this broad category of 
normative thinking, we can isolate different kinds of prototypical moral judgments that 
latch onto particular psychological processes. For example, in virtue of the cognitive 
and motivational profile of these mental states, we can single out prototypical moral 
judgments about harm, justice, or rights, which possess the signature moral pattern 
described by social domain theorists (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Nucci et al., 1983; Turiel, 
1983, 1998). Similarly, we can account for a particular class of prototypical moral 
demands, which are seen by the agent as inescapable and authority independent (Joyce, 
2001; Mackie, 1977; Mameli, 2013), depending on how robust the motivations to 
comply and enforce compliance are across different counterfactual scenarios. I will 
develop this view in more detail in chapter 5. 
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follow. In section 4.1, I will briefly 
explain the relation between big game hunting and my lineage explanation of normative 
thinking. In section 4.2, I will introduce Tomasello and colleagues’ (2012) account of 
the origins of shared intentionality, which identifies collaborative foraging as the main 
driver in the evolution of our shared intentional capacities. I will argue that this 
explanation leaves open the question of why these capacities emerge so early in 
ontogeny. In section 4.3, I will defend a view according to which changes in our rearing 
environments rather than challenges in adult social interaction were the responsible for 
the early emergence of this capacity. In section 4.4, I will then explain what I think was 
the decisive contribution of collaborative hunting of big game. Finally, in section 4.5, I 
will put forward a model of the role of ontogeny in the evolution of human normative 
cognition that takes into account the tradeoffs that emerge from the selective pressures 
associated to collaborative foraging and those stemming from cooperative breeding 
environments. 
 
4.1. Big game hunting 
 
Part of the legacy of the killer ape hypothesis and the demonic male view I have 
discussed in the previous chapter is that hunting (in particular, big game hunting) played 
a crucial role in the evolution of human social cognition, including moral cognition (see, 
for instance, Boehm, 2008, 2012; Mameli, 2013; see also Gibbard 1990, pp. 66-67, 139-
140). Admittedly, hunting also plays a central role in Tomasello and colleagues’ (2012) 
‘interdependence hypothesis’ of the evolution of shared intentionality—a capacity that 
is central to my lineage explanation of normative cognition. But recent accounts of the 
evolution of hunting have begun to emphasize the role of impulse control in ambush 
hunting while others, focused on pursuit and endurance running, highlight the 
importance of collaboration in such forms of hunting (see, for instance, Bramble & 
Lieberman, 2004; Henrich, 2016; Lieberman, Bramble, Raichlen, & Shea, 2009). 
I also think that some version of this idea is correct. For I believe that the 
transition toward cooperative foraging contributed to the evolution of shared 
intentionality and, as a consequence, to the emergence of human normative thinking. 
But the evolutionary account I will propose here differs from the usual evolutionary 
account of shared intentionality in that it emphasizes the role of cooperative breeding in 
shaping the basic infrastructure of normative thinking. Moreover, the evolutionary 
account that I will offer focuses more on the early expansion of human cooperative 
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foraging in general rather than on big game hunting in particular. Although there are 
reasons to think that big game hunting indeed played a decisive role in shaping our 
human-unique capacities of normative thinking, I will argue in this chapter that its 
specific role can only be fully understood within a much broader framework of human 
cooperation and sociality. For the evolution of big game hunting needs to be framed in 
the context of an already quite tolerant lineage as the one offered in the previous 
chapter. Big game hunting was important. But in order to understand its emergence we 
need to decouple aggression and hostile propensities from human hunting prowess 
(Pickering, 2013). Moreover, although I will argue that cooperative breeding facilitated 
the early emergence of our shared intentionality capacities, their evolution was certainly 
much more gradual and complex than any model exclusively focused on cooperative 
breeding or collective foraging would predict. For the basic social capacities that 
emerged in the context of cooperative breeding were also co-opted to facilitate social 
and cooperative in low-risk contexts such as play. In this context of peer interaction, 
children could learn many of the social, cognitive, and coordination skills that facilitate 
obligate cooperative foraging. The stronger the demands of these skills among adult 
foragers, the more maturation and preparation they require, which could have led to the 
early developmental assimilation of more complex capacities for shared intentionality. 
In other accounts of human cognition, normative thinking emerged significantly 
later, e.g., after 100 kya as a consequence of a shift to a mixed economy (see, for 
instance, Sterelny, 2012b). But these accounts typically focus on the emergence of 
explicit social norms rather than the motivational and cognitive machinery that support 
our capacity of normative guidance. Although the first signs of behaviorally modern 
humans around 100 kya (Bar-Yosef Mayer, Vandermeersch, & Bar-Yosef, 2009; 
Henshilwood & d’Errico, 2011; Henshilwood, d’Errico, & Watts, 2009; Schwarcz et al., 
1988) suggest an expansion of norm-guided behavior, I will argue that the basic 
cognitive capacities for normative guidance appeared much earlier in our lineage—
resembling the relatively early emergence of cooperative communication with respect to 
later arrival and diversification of natural languages (for a discussion about the parallel 
between language and normative cognition, see chapter 5). 
The above discussion bears important consequences for the overall argument of 
this thesis. Since I shall argue that shared intentionality leads to a robust form of 
normative psychology, I will be in a position to explain the connection between 
distinctive, easily identifiable clusters of prototypical moral judgments and the 
psychological literature on shared intentionality. But the connection between moral 
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judgments and shared intentionality is likely just prototypical and fragmentary (see 
chapter 2). They are not explained by robust inheritance of biological mechanisms, as is 
so in the case of shared intentionality, but rather by ontogeny through channels of 
cultural transmission. 
The unifying features of moral psychology as I see them are local, historical, and 
culturally contingent rather than the result of robust and domain-specific internal mental 
processes. While there are reasons to think that shared intentionality and normative 
guidance are generatively entrenched since other aspects of human cognition depend on 
the reliable emergence of these capacities (see Wimsatt, 1999), there is no similar 
rationale in the case of moral judgments. For as we have seen in chapter 2, even though 
normative cognition might be a unified domain, people seem to make the 
moral/conventional distinction in different ways (see Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Nucci et al., 
1983; Turiel, 1983, 1998), depending on particular cultural, socioeconomic, and 
developmental factors. As a result, selection would favor plasticity and increased 
sensitivity to the relevant sociocultural variables instead of developmental entrenchment 
or genetic assimilation, i.e., when selection causes plastic phenotypes to lose their 
environmental sensitivity over evolutionary time (Levis & Pfennig, 2016).  
In this view, shared intentionality lead to a particular form of norm psychology 
that later ramifies in various types of prototypical moral judgments which depend on 
specific cultural contexts. Very likely, the kind of norm psychology I am defending in 
this dissertation has branches that extend into other subclasses of social norms such as 
religious norms, but I will specifically focus on in this thesis in the ramification of this 
account for moral cognition. In particular, I will argue that this form of normative 
psychology shares a common genealogy that stems from our capacity for shared 
intentionality. A lineage explanation of this shared intentional psychology provides a 
unified target for norm psychology due to the prominent role that shared intentionality 
played in the hominin expansion of our cooperative capacities. We not only can identify 
the distinctive motivational and cognitive mechanisms of shared intentionality but also 
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Figure 4.1. Sequence of stages in the lineage of shared intentionality. Cooperative 
breeding lead to basic forms of shared intentionality, which allows an incipient bird’s-
eye view of social interactions. These capacities are enhanced due to the selective 
pressures of collaborative hunting, generating ever more complex forms of shared 
intentionality—including our capacity to make shared intentional normative judgments. 
Finally, growing intergroup competition selects for increasingly agent-independent 





4.2. The interdependence hypothesis 
 
Evolutionary accounts of shared intentionality are important for my lineage explanation 
of normative thinking because they can incorporate both the motivational and cognitive 
components of this form of cognition. They not only provide an evolutionary 
explanation of the motivational mechanisms of norm compliance, but it also gives us an 
account of the distinctive mode of representation of these social standards. The 
evolutionary origins of shared intentionality, however, have also been traditionally 
linked to hominin hunting. Tomasello and colleagues (Tomasello, 2014; Tomasello et 
al., 2012; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013), for instance, have argued that the key step in the 
evolution of our distinctive shared intentional psychology was the emergence of obligate 
collaborative foraging, especially collective hunting. For in the context of collective 
hunting the scale and the cost of failure of joint activities escalated, which required not 
only adjustments in our motivational capacities but also changes in our cognitive 
machinery to represent more complex forms of social interactions. In this section, I will 
briefly explain the evolutionary trajectory of shared intentionality as seen by supporters 
of the interdependence hypothesis. Although somewhat differing in their assessment of 
the role of big game hunting in the evolution of our social-cognitive capacities, the 
evolutionary account of shared intentional normative thinking that I will offer in this 
chapter will heavily build upon this model. 
Tomasello and colleagues (2012) frame this idea in terms the interdependence 
hypothesis—the idea that throughout its evolutionary history the hominin lifestyle 
increasingly relied on mutualistic collaboration for survival and reproduction. In 
particular, the hypothesis postulates a two-step process in the evolution of human social 
cognition and cooperation: 
 
Step 1: Humans gradually turn more interdependent with one another in the context 
of foraging. Unlike any other primate, they become obligate collaborative 
foragers. In this context, they develop an increased interest in the well-being 
of their partners, but also new capacities for collaboration such as shared 
intentional capacities and cheating avoidance mechanisms not possessed by 
other great apes. As a result, humans start to display a form of normative 
cognition in discrete interactions with particular individuals, i.e., when we 




Step 2: As human groups became larger, our shared intentional capacities scaled as a 
function of competition with other human groups. At this stage, the 
understanding of our social environment extends to the groups themselves 
(instead of just particular individuals) and activities are represented in an 
agent-independent way. Shared intentionality transforms into collective 
intentionality. For example, joint goals in simple dyadic interactions scale up 
into collective group goals for large-scale activities among unfamiliar 
individuals, including warfare, the construction of ceremonial complexes, 
and trade. As a result, humans start creating, following, and enforcing group-
wide social norms, conventions, and institutions, which are used as ethnic 
markers. 
 
 Importantly, the timing of the shift between these two stages is not completely 
clear. Tomasello and others do not say much regarding this issue. But there is little 
evidence for an increase in focal band size much before the Holocene, but around 10 
kya, at the Pleistocene-Holocene transition there is evidence for increased meta-group 
complexity, increasingly close relations between groups, and the formation of 
ethnolinguistic complexes (Flannery & Marcus, 2012; Seabright, 2004; Sterelny, 2013). 
As a result, there are reasons to suspect that the transition from one evolutionary step to 
the other was relatively recent. 
Tomasello and colleagues (Tomasello, 2015; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013; Vaish & 
Tomasello, 2013) also apply these steps to the ontogeny and the phylogeny of moral 
thinking. However, most of the empirical work carried out by Tomasello and colleagues 
focus on social interactions that are normatively structured, rather than on morality 
itself. For example, studies about children’s awareness of the normative structure of 
conventional games and their understanding of social norms (Rakoczy, 2008; Rakoczy, 
Brosche, et al., 2009; Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012). Certainly, there are reasons to think 
that there is a substantial overlap between this type of normative cognition in general 
and moral thinking in particular since some other studies look at children’s normative 
understanding of collaboration, helping, sharing, or fairness, which are prototypical 
moral situations (Tomasello & Vaish, 2013; Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010; 
Vaish, Missana, & Tomasello, 2011). 
Comparative analysis of cooperation in both great apes and humans support the 
idea that these sequences of stages roughly describe the evolution of human cooperation 
and social cognition. This view is supported by comparative analysis between great apes 
and humans (see technical box 4.1). For example, human cooperation is notably 
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different from the type of cooperation we see in other great apes, for humans but not 
apes have the capacity to represent join intentions (Fletcher et al., 2012; Tomasello & 
Carpenter, 2005; Warneken et al., 2006) and cooperative communication (Duguid, 
Wyman, Bullinger, Herfurth-Majstorovic, & Tomasello, 2014; Melis et al., 2009; 
Warneken et al., 2006). Despite differences in sharing behavior between both Pan 
species (Hare & Kwetuenda, 2010; Hare et al., 2007; Tan & Hare, 2013), humans are 
the only great ape that reliably share the spoils of collaborative efforts (Bullinger, Melis, 
& Tomasello, 2011; Hamann, Warneken, Greenberg, & Tomasello, 2011; Melis, Hare, 
& Tomasello, 2006b; Rekers, Haun, & Tomasello, 2011; Warneken, Lohse, Melis, & 
Tomasello, 2011). Our species is also the only one that exerts extensive partner choice 
and partner control (Engelmann, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2012; Melis, Altrichter, & 
Tomasello, 2013; Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2008; Melis, Schneider, & Tomasello, 
2011; Warneken & Tomasello, 2013). Moreover, we are the only species that seems to 
coordinate action through joint commitments (Gräfenhain et al., 2009; Gräfenhain, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2013; Greenberg, Hamann, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2010; 
Hamann, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2012). 
 
Technical box 4.2. Comparative analysis of cooperation in great apes and 
humans 
Experimental evidence suggests that chimpanzees and bonobos are motivated to 
engage in triadic activities and social games if they require little coordination—even 
spontaneously with a human partner (MacLean & Hare, 2013; Pika & Zuberbühler, 
2008). Human children, however, go a step further by coordinating their plans of 
action to allow role reversal (Pika & Zuberbühler, 2008, p. 210). Unlike great apes, 
human children encourage their playmates through nonverbal communicative 
gestures even when their playmates are not necessary for achieving the goal of the 
game. They also distinguish between a partner who is unwilling to play and a partner 
who is unable to continue, even though the behavioral outcome of the partner is the 
same in both conditions (Warneken et al., 2012). By 3 years of age, human children 
seem to understand joint commitments and either make an effort to honor those 
commitments or apologize for breaking them (Gräfenhain et al., 2009). Although Tan 
and Hare (2013) found that bonobos voluntarily share food with a recipient even 
when they could have monopolized it, only human children are more likely to divide 
up their rewards equally if they obtained these rewards by working collaboratively 
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than by working individually (Hamann et al., 2011). For example, Schmidt & 
Sommerville (2011) showed that 15-month-old infants expect resources to be 
distributed equally among recipients, and Geraci and Surian (2011) further showed 
that when 16-month-olds see one distributor being fair toward a recipient and another 
distributor being unfair toward the same recipient, they expect the recipient to 
approach the equal distributor. In addition, at around 5 and 6 years of age children 
are able to anticipate being judged and then behave in a way that increases positive 
evaluations of themselves. Engelmann et al. (2012) found that, unlike chimpanzees, 
human children steal less from an imaginary peer recipient, and tended to help that 
recipient more, if a peer was observing them. In other words, only humans seem to 
have a basic concern for their own reputation such that they manage the impression 
they are making on others by avoiding having norms applied to them. 
 
On Tomasello and colleagues’ view (Tomasello, 2014, 2015; Tomasello et al., 
2012; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013), these differences in cooperation likely evolved in the 
context of collaborative foraging due to the heavy cognitive demands it imposes in 
terms of coordination, distribution of resources, and commitment. Great apes do not 
forage collectively in the sense of Tomasello and colleagues since they do not need it to 
survive and, consequently, they never evolved the appropriate motivational and 
cognitive machinery to do so. This can be well exemplified by stag hunt situations. In a 
simple stag hunt interaction with free partner choice, two individuals each have the 
option of pursuing either a hare or a stag. The former is a low-risk but low-quality 
resource while the latter is a riskier but highly valuable one. If one chooses to hunt a 
valuable stag, then one must have the cooperation of the partner in order to succeed 
when one could have got a hare by oneself. But chimpanzees do not rely on hunting to 
survive. They go after the valuable stag only if the risks are low and manageable 
without complex coordination. It has been shown, for instance, that hunting rates decline 
as prey encounter rates decline and the chimpanzees have to spend more time and 
energy finding situations where the prospects of success are good (Watts, 2012). 
Moreover, comparative studies have shown that in a stag hunt game situation, when 
risks are low (e.g., because the hare is of low value) and information is cheap (e.g., 
because the partner’s behavior is observable), both chimpanzees and human children are 
able to successfully coordinate on the higher value stag around 90% of the time. If the 
risks increase and observing the partner is more difficult, in contrast, chimpanzees are 
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less successful, whereas children compensate through communication (Duguid et al., 
2014). 
According to the interdependence hypothesis, the expansion of grassland 
ecosystems in Africa due to global climatic change and the resulting fragmentation of 
forest at the end of the Pliocene (Bobe & Behrensmeyer, 2004) might have led to a 
significant radiation of terrestrial monkeys (Jablonski & Leakey, 2008), who would 
have competed with humans over terrestrial resources. As a consequence, it is argued 
that humans began to rely on food resources that required complex collaboration and 
coordination for their procurement—e.g., collaborative hunting of large game and 
collaborative gathering of embedded plants. This type of foraging required the 
coordinated efforts of multiple individuals and their special knowledge and skills (Hill, 
2002; Kaplan, Hill, Lancaster, & Hurtado, 2000). Under those conditions, individuals 
with increased skills for collaborative foraging would have had an adaptive advantage. 
Thus, humans gradually became obligate cooperative foragers. 
Chimpanzees do hunt in groups (Boesch, 1994; Boesch & Boesch, 1989), and 
even bonobos have been reported to hunt monkeys in the wild (Surbeck et al., 2009; 
Surbeck & Hohmann, 2008). But collaborative hunting of the type that Tomasello and 
colleagues have in mind requires planned coordination, rather than just emergent 
coordination (Knoblich, Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011). Planned coordination requires 
agents to share goals, and to be committed to them. Although it is difficult to know 
when ancestral hominin foragers began to exhibit this capacity, representing one’s and 
one partner’s role, often in interchangeable ways, should have been also critical at some 
point. We know, for instance, that extant hunter-gatherers have a capacity for 
complementary role taking and role reversal. If targeted hunting emerged around 1.7 
mya as some researchers have argued (Bunn, 2007; Bunn & Pickering, 2010), this 
would mean that hunting would have been a planned rather than a mere opportunistic 
activity. Emergent coordination, in contrast, is fundamentally a consequence of 
perception-action couplings that make individuals act in similar ways and be responsive 
to each other, regardless of joint plans. 
Paleoanthropological evidence also indicates that facultative bipedalism, which 
allowed our ancestor to walk for long distances but not to run, emerged very early in our 
lineage (Lovejoy, Latimer, et al., 2009; White, Asfaw, et al., 2009). In fact, our early 
ancestors had none of the adaptations to vertical climbing, forelimb suspension, and 
knuckle-walking (Lovejoy, Latimer, et al., 2009; Lovejoy, Simpson, White, Asfaw, & 
Suwa, 2009). This would have precluded both looking for protection by quickly 
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climbing to the trees or the type of hunting that we sometimes see in chimpanzees. Thus, 
given the local predatory fauna (Hart & Sussman, 2005; White, Ambrose, et al., 2009), 
foraging alone would have been a very dangerous task. So foraging and scavenging in a 
group for safety likely came first, creating the conditions for the gradual evolution of 
more planned and coordinated foraging. Collaborative foraging would have been not 
only necessary in our lineage but also a much more complex form of planned 
coordination that went beyond mere emergent coordination (Knoblich et al., 2011). 
When our ancestors had to forage collaboratively with others or starve, they have 
to face new cognitive challenges, at the same time that old selective pressures in the 
social domain increased. As these foragers have to rely more on foraging stag-like 
resources for sustenance, they not only had to deal with coordinating collective action at 
a larger scale but also they had to develop a bulletproof commitment with the hunting 
group. Hunting is risky and sometimes deadly. But it was likely necessary for 
sustenance. Consequently, our hominin ancestors would have had to be focused and 
committed to their collective deeds, even under adverse or detrimental conditions, or at 
the risk of having joined a potentially untrustworthy or mistrustful partner. They have 
had to choose partners wisely and being noted as a good potential partner too. They 
would have had also to share the resources in a way that minimizes conflicts and 
stabilizes cooperation over time—not only provisioning mating partners and offspring 
but also sharing with the unrelated group members involved in the hunt. Certainly, 
historically known foragers are not groups of close relatives and chimpanzee and 
bonobo groups are not groups of close kin either, but collaborative foraging might have 
begun in extended family groups of early hominins. Reproductive cooperation, which I 
will discuss in section 4.7, could have been important in this process. For once fathers 
are able to recognize their offspring, there is more scope for kin-mediated cooperation 
as a partial scaffold for early cooperation. 
This type of environment favored the evolution of particular adaptations for 
social cognition such as sharing the goal of the activity among several individuals and 
representing interchangeable roles in that context (Tomasello, 2014). It would have also 
strengthened other capacities already existing in our lineage, e.g., skills for partner 
choice and control (Darwall, 2006). Moreover, collective hunting would have amplified 
our sharing tendencies in order to motivate and stabilize cooperation. This form of 
foraging, then, should have significantly enhanced our empathic capacities and 
highlighted our capacity to care about the well-being of our partners. For when 
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collective hunting turned obligate, individuals became increasingly interdependent with 
one another. 
Sometimes, advocates of the interdependence hypothesis frame the first step of 
their model in terms of dyadic interactions. But there is no reason to assume that all 
social interactions were indeed dyadic. For example, according to the interdependence 
hypothesis, shared intentionality evolved in the context of collaborative foraging, but 
there is no reason to think that collaborative foraging was actually dyadic. There is an 
important difference between the number of people engaged in a task and the type of 
psychology that they deploy to carry out that task. As I understand their proposal here, 
advocates of this view think that the psychology of collaborative foraging was adapted 
to dyadic interactions, rather than arguing that those interactions were carried out by 
actual dyads. As I will argue in the following section, even if this interpretation is 
incorrect, foraging activities such as big game hunting would have needed a form of 
shared intentional psychology adapted to more collective social interactions. They 
require a we-mode of representation that enables us to see collective interactions in an 
increasingly agent-independent way as explained in chapter 2. They were not conceived 
as interactions about you and me but instead as interactions about a more abstract plural 
subject, which is typically verbalized using the plural pronoun ‘we’. 
The interdependence hypothesis gives us few details about the transition from 
the first to the second step of the model. But the basic dynamic of the transition is 
relatively simple and explanatorily valuable. In the view of Tomasello and others (2012; 
see also Sterelny, 2014), the capacity for joint action through shared intentionally 
increased as groups become larger than the relatively modest groups of early hunter-
gatherers. As human groups became larger and more frequent in their encounters with 
other groups, they also started to face increased intergroup competition. Certainly, it is 
difficult to determine when groups began to grow in size or when conflicts between 
them started to increase, but they did over time. As a result, selective pressures derived 
from intergroup competition could have made humans increasingly interdependent 
across a wide range of collaborative activities—a process that perhaps took place very 
late during the early Holocene transition to complex hierarchical societies (Sterelny, 
2016). But as social groups became larger, the challenges also became greater. 
Individuals had greater chances to free ride in those groups. Encounters with strangers 
and one-shot interactions became more common, so keeping track of previous 
interactions with a number of partners also became more difficult. 
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In this type of highly cooperative societies with a tribal structure comprising 
smaller bands, interdependence was crucial but much less face-to-face. The emergence 
of more complex forms of division of labor made the grounds of our practical demands 
more complicated to understand. If, say, two partners are hunting a stag, roles are more 
interchangeable and easy to grasp to each other. But division of labor as the one we see, 
for instance, in the late Pleistocene (and even more in the Holocene) requires a more 
abstract understanding of what is normatively required and of the reasons for those 
obligations. If in the past our ancestors were interdependent with particular others for 
foraging, well into the Holocene they became interdependent with everyone within the 
group as a whole—even though we probably do not know most of the people of the 
group and we do not understand their role in the group. In these larger groups, social 
interactions relied more on some form of group membership dynamic structured by 
social norms, rather than on our personal histories of past interactions with particular 
others. Increasing intergroup competition would have made also crucial to recognize 
one’s group members. In those contexts, one needs to know who is a trustworthy ally as 
much as one need to be recognized as one. This made it essential to conform to the ways 
of the group in different social dimensions such as behavior, speech, and appearance. 
They signal relevant social information such as ethnic identity and status that is costly 
and difficult to acquire. Learning to speak Māori as a native is hard to fake for someone 
who has not been born into the culture. It signals to insiders that I am one of them at the 
same time that it makes me an outsider to those coming from a different ethnolinguistic 
background. Therefore, in larger groups, when cooperation with strangers became more 
frequent and intergroup conflict more common, social norms could have helped to 
identify reliable social partners. 
Social norms also helped to foster coordination in larger groups by making the 
group ways part of the agents’ common ground, i.e., the knowledge, beliefs, and 
assumptions that agents share at a certain point which facilitate collective action because 
they take them for granted and not subject to (further) discussion. Coordinating complex 
tasks and distributing the social benefit produced by those activities was a far more 
complex problem than distributing the meat within a group of hunter-gatherers. 
Moreover, to the extent that normative thinking is a form of shared intentionality, people 
would have been not only motivated to follow social norms. They would have been also 
very stable cooperators, relatively resilient to free-riding. Social norms would have been 
enforced on all the group members, including oneself, through negative emotions such 
as feelings of guilt and shame (see Boehm, 2012; Mameli, 2013). 
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I think human psychology was indeed transformed by this transition but changes 
in normative cognition were differences of degree rather than kind. Norms became more 
explicit and more agent-independent but they exploited an ancient sensitivity to (less 
explicit and less agent-independent) norms. This likely facilitated social changes of 
doubtful moral standing, e.g., the rise of slavery and ideologically-driven inequality 
(Sterelny, 2012b). This phenomenon could have occurred well after the Pleistocene-
Holocene transition. Kim Hill, for instance, has suggested that in extant forager 
metapopulations, members of those groups do all know one another, perhaps as a 
consequence of the fluidity of band membership. He reports that foragers have extensive 
knowledge of their immediate band as well as those in their local groups. Members of 
the Ache metaband community seem not to have problems tracking group members of 
an around thousand members, despite considerable spatial dispersion (Hill, 2012). 
As a result, it might be that the history of human normative cognition is mostly 
described by the type of simple normative cognition described in the first step in 
Tomasello and colleagues’ model, or perhaps through some transitional form between 
the two stages (see technical box 4.2). Some of these social standards would have been 
at least initially local, tribal norms and customs, but the type of normative cognition in 
place during the Holocene was much more collective and abstract—a distant relative of 
the type of normative cognition we would expect to see in ancestral hunter-gatherers. 
One could speculate, for instance, that once collective hunting was complex enough to 
require norms about the roles of the activity and the fair distribution of the social 
product emerged, they could have extended toward more complex forms of social 
organization as the one seen in forager metapopulations, and then even more toward 
more institutionalized forms of cooperation. Sex and reproduction would be a case in 
point. Once groups became interdependent, managing conflict became even more 
important, and sex is an obvious conflict flashpoint. Practices such as bride-price and 
other forms of regulated mate exchange, including institutionalized marriage, would 
have been very important. Overall, as the groups grew larger in size due to an influx of 
people from nearby locations, and their boundaries became more abstract, and social 
interactions more complex and ill-defined, normative thinking became much more 
abstract, universal, and agent-independent.22 
22 It might be important to point out here that making judgments from an agent-independent point of view 
is not the same as using those judgments to set ourselves apart from others. A common reaction to 
encounters with diversity is that human groups become more insular, reinforcing group boundaries and 
seeking to preserve their own cultural identity while demonizing others. However, even when a person 
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 Technical box 4.3. Group-mindedness and the Pleistocene-Holocene transition 
The second step in Tomasello and colleagues’ (2012) might be much more complex 
than assumed by the model. On the one hand, the kind of group-mindedness that it 
presupposes seems to be closely related to the emergence of symbolic material 
culture as witnessed in the archaeological record, perhaps around 75 kya 
(Henshilwood & Dubreuil, 2011). One reason is that evidence of symbolic behavior 
is usually interpreted as a form of signaling one’s group membership or individual 
status. On the other hand, the later emergence of farming and sedentary life at the 
Pleistocene-Holocene transition seems to be more closely connected to the social and 
demographic changes stressed by the model, for only then competition between 
groups intensifies and cooperating with strangers becomes a real issue (Seabright, 
2004; but see Bowles, 2009; Kelly, 2005). I take these steps to be idealized 
transitions built upon the motivational and cognitive machinery of the first step, 
which scale up with demographic and social complexity. On this view, although less 
abstract and stable, the basic machinery for group-mindedness was already present in 
place with the emergence of shared intentional states such as shared goals and 
intentions, which gradually extended to ever larger groups. 
 
In particular, the challenges of a cooperative life in larger groups required a 
capacity to understand and represent abstract social norms, e.g., norms that apply to 
everyone in the group regardless of their role or identity. It would have required a 
motivation to comply even at the cost of one’s personal interests, and a capacity to 
enforce those standards. In other words, this later step would have led to some form of 
agent-independent normative cognition insofar as humans start to follow and enforce 
abstract, group-wide social norms that apply to everyone more or less equally. Of 
course, these capacities are fallible, which is compatible with the levels of squabbling 
and conflict documented in the archeological and ethnographic record (Allen & Jones, 
2014; Bowles, 2008, 2009; Fry & Soderberg, 2013; Lahr et al., 2016). Yet they would 
have kept conflict sufficiently under control for cooperation to occur in increasingly 
larger groups. 
thinks that the people from the neighboring village are barbarians because they eat a certain taboo food, 
for instance, that person is still making an abstract and agent-independent judgment, namely that it does 
not matter whether one is a member of the relevant social group or not, eating that taboo food is wrong. 
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 4.3. Did meat make us moral? 
 
I will focus in this section on the first step of Tomasello and colleagues’ (2012) 
evolutionary scenario since I think the distinctive normative dimension of some special 
class of shared intentional states emerged as a consequence of the selective pressures on 
collaborative hunting. On the view I am defending, collaborative foraging and hunting 
made us able to entertain joint mental states that are characterized by a distinctive 
gradient of generalizability, intrinsic motivation, and punitive attitudes. I take these 
mental states to be normative because they give rise to a certain form of social 
rationality. This form of rationality generates social expectations about what one should 
do in a given situation as well as expectations about what others should do to achieve a 
shared goal (e.g., when collaborating in hunting) and because we enforce them in 
ourselves and others (e.g., when excluding partners who do not meet these 
expectations). 
This is not a minor feature of Tomasello and colleagues’ evolutionary account. 
For example, another prominent view about the role of hunting in normative cognition 
such as Christopher Boehm’s ‘conscience-evolution hypothesis’ (Boehm, 2008, 2012; 
Mameli, 2013; see also Gibbard 1990, pp. 66-67, 139-140) focuses on the affective and 
motivational mechanisms underlying norm compliance. However, his account does not 
explain the type of social expectations that these mechanisms are supposed to regulate. 
For him, other species such as domestic dogs and chimpanzees can be good learners of 
rules, though they lack the appropriate affective machinery that characterizes human 
conscience (see, for instance, Boehm, 2012, pp. 20-23). In contrast, I think that there are 
important differences in the way we represent norms and social standards, for we 
represent them as joint mental states. 
It can be argued that social expectations may trigger punitive attitudes towards 
those who do not meet those expectations without these social expectations being truly 
normative. For it seems possible for an agent to have this kind of social expectations 
without thinking that others have an obligation to meet them. But not all normative 
mental states are judgments about normative obligations, just as not all moral judgments 
concern demands (see chapter 2). Moreover, there is a sense in which collective hunting 
made us agents who can entertain interpersonal normative obligations. As I will explain 
in the next few sections, hominin hunters equipped with short-range weapons were 
likely able to understand what they were rationally required to do in order to achieve 
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their individual goals. The crucial contribution of shared intentionality to normative 
cognition was not to insufflate mental states with some primitive virtus normativa but to 
provide the cognitive and motivational infrastructure to understand what they were 
collectively required to do in order to achieve joint goals in the context of collective 
hunting.23 
This is not only a view about normative guidance within a cohesive small group 
of people, where everybody takes one another to share the same expectations of 
themselves and others. It can also give us an account of the role of norms in intergroup 
interactions by helping us to draw and bridge the social boundaries between groups. For 
social norms can vary in their scope. When a norm applies to a particular group of 
agents, one has to represent the norm in a way that is less agent-independent and more 
closely linked to the particulars of individuals, their social roles, and the groups they 
live in. If one knows the rules of Pitz (a traditional Mesoamerican ballgame often held 
as a ritual event featuring human sacrifice), one applies its rules only to those who play 
Pitz. A thought like “We all think that those who are playing Pitz should do thus and 
so”, for instance, could restrict the scope of the plural subject to those who are 
acquainted with the game. Another role is to bridge the social boundaries by enabling 
normative judgments that one applies across groups. For example, when one thinks that 
human sacrifice is morally reprehensible no matter one’s cultural identity or fondness 
for pre-Columbian sports. Importantly, the shared intentionality framework is able to 
capture these negative judgments since they explain why we tend to share these 
normative expectations with others aiming them to join our normative standards. Of 
course, this does not mean that those normative mental states are always successfully 
shared, but rather that these are mental states that one is intrinsically motivated to share 
with others. Successful or not, the cognitive and motivational mechanisms deployed are 
the same—i.e., the mechanisms that support sharing intentional states.24 
As we will see in the next sections, this account of the representation of social 
norms allows explaining different motivational and cognitive aspects of normative 
judgments. For example, the fact that some of these normative judgments are 
represented as being objective demands because they are represented as shared beliefs 
23 I am grateful to Philip Pettit for pointing me to this Molieresque metaphor, which I use here in a 
different sense than originally intended (Pettit, 1990). 
24 Notice that this claim is weaker than saying that normative judgments just are shared intentional states. 
As explained in chapter 1, shared intentional normative thoughts are a special subclass of normative 
thoughts, which means that not all normative thoughts are shared intentional normative thoughts. 
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about aspects of the social world that any agent can mutually attend and could agree to. 
However, as I will develop in more detail in chapter 5, much of this account of 
normative judgments will not focus on the perceived objectivity of normative demands, 
but rather on a different set of features such as their perceived inescapability and 
authority independence—features that only partially overlap with the idea of objective 
demands. 
 
4.3.1. Social expectations 
 
Hunting in great apes usually lacks visible organization or coordination, but there seem 
to be some exceptions. For example, in the Taï Forest, monkeys are extremely agile and 
the canopy is continuous (Boesch & Boesch-Achermann, 2000; Boesch & Boesch, 
1989). As a consequence, the chances of a successful hunting are very small without any 
coordinated behavior. However, even in those cases, coordination is emergent rather 
than planned (Knoblich et al., 2011). Chimpanzees surround the prey by taking the most 
opportune spatial position in order to maximize their chances at catching the monkey. 
They are mutually responsive to one another’s spatial position, similar to the hunting 
behavior we see in wolves and lions, but there is no agreement on a joint goal or real 
division of labor involved (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; Tomasello & Call, 1997). There is 
joint action but no shared intention. 
Generally speaking, joint actions can be defined as any form of social interaction 
where two or more individuals coordinate their actions to bring about a certain change 
in the environment (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). Carrying a table, playing a 
piano duet, creating and maintaining social institutions are typical examples of joint and 
collective actions in culturally modern humans. Individual actions are cognitively 
different from joint actions when sharing goals and intentional states are essential for 
understanding coordinate behavior. Coordinated behavior in the context of joint actions 
can be either emergent, as I take hunting in chimpanzees from the Taï Forest to be, or 
planned, as an in modern humans (Knoblich et al., 2011). 
In emergent coordination, joint action emerges through rather automatic 
mechanisms that couple perception and action, such that they cause individuals to act 
congruently. For example, a group of people lying on the grass in a park may quickly 
start running to the nearest bandstand when it suddenly starts to rain (Searle, 1990). 
Each person has the intention of running to the bandstand looking for shelter, but these 
intentions are individual rather than joint—similar to the type of collective behavior that 
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is triggered when chimpanzees chase monkeys in the Taï Forest. Coordination would be 
emergent, i.e., it would arise from similar motor routines and cues (Marsh, Richardson, 
& Schmidt, 2009; Spivey, 2007) and it would not require any joint goal or plan.25 
However, coordinated behavior may also be driven by shared representations of 
goals and tasks. A group of actors in a play could perform exactly the same action as in 
the above example, but the cognitive mechanisms necessary to perform the action would 
be significantly different. In the play, the actors would have a shared or joint goal of the 
form “We intend to do x”, but in the former case, each person would have an individual 
intention of the form “I intend to do x”. This is why they are shared intentional states 
(Searle, 1995, 1998; Tuomela, 2003). These intentions require some representation of 
other agents’ mental states—although the extent to which other agents’ mental states are 
co-represented may vary from case to case (Vesper, Butterfill, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 
2010). Full-blown joint actions, as described here, require a joint goal. But not all 
planned coordination is a real joint action because planned coordination does not require 
a joint goal of the form “We intend to do x”. 
In a minimal sense, planned coordination requires specifying the outcome of a 
coordinated action, one’s role in the activity, and some awareness that the outcome can 
only be brought about with the support of another agent (Knoblich et al., 2011). 
However, representing the outcome of a coordinated action is not the same as 
representing that outcome as a joint goal. The individual goals of two agents may 
overlap, the agents may coordinate their actions through a careful representation of the 
partner’s role in the activity, but the action would not be truly joint. Since both agents 
have individual goals, once the goal of one of them is achieved, the activity stops 
regardless of the other agent’s intentions. Partners want to achieve their individual 
goals. Perhaps these goals can only be achieved with other peoples’ help. But the fact 
that those others were able to achieve their goals is not part of the agent’s own goal— 
the fact that my choice of action is counterfactually sensitive to the actions of others 
does not make it a joint goal. 
In this line of thought, for instance, Warneken, Gräfenhain, and Tomasello 
(2012) have argued that, in order to test whether social activities are structured by joint 
goals, non-human apes must encourage their partners when they stop playing their role 
in the activity even when those partners are not necessary for achieving the individual 
25 This does not mean, however, that mechanisms of emergent coordination are not important to planned 
coordination. Various sources of emergent coordination identified in the literature have proven to be key 
facilitators of joint action (Knoblich et al., 2011). 
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goal of the activity. Subjects also have to be able to distinguish between partners who 
are unwilling to play from partners who are unable to do it, even if the partner’s 
behavioral outcome is the same—otherwise, subjects may be just viewing their 
collaborative partners as mindless social tools. Certainly, chimpanzees and bonobos 
have been shown to be motivated to spontaneously participate in joint activities with 
humans (see MacLean & Hare, 2013), but it is still not clear whether they coordinate 
their actions through joint goals. 
In addition, there is also no evidence that any other non-human ape coordinates 
their actions via shared task representations. These representations are control structures 
that allow agents to engage flexibly in joint actions by specifying in advance the 
individual roles in the activity. They govern key cognitive processes that enable 
coordination such as monitoring and predicting (Knoblich & Jordan, 2003; Pacherie & 
Dokic, 2006). But as Melis and her colleagues (Melis et al., 2006b) have shown, 
although chimpanzees seem to understand the instrumental value of others to achieve 
certain goal (since they tend to select those partners who are more useful in 
experimental settings), they do not need to have detailed representations of the 
conspecific’s actions. For example, they may understand that they can only get the food 
with the help of a conspecific, and they may also represent the goal of obtaining food by 
pulling a rope in an experimental apparatus. But they do not need any complex shared 
task representations. In this case, chimpanzees only show a capacity for minimally 
planned coordination. Similarly, for instance, experiments involving social games in 
chimpanzees and bonobos (MacLean & Hare, 2013; Pika & Zuberbühler, 2008) have 
shown that neither chimpanzees nor bonobos seem to able to coordinate their plans of 
action to allow role reversal (Pika & Zuberbühler, 2008). If they were able to do so, this 
would be evidence of shared task representations in Pan. 
Thus, the central idea here is that shared intentional states provide the kind of 
cognitive sophistication that allow humans to represent social expectations that apply 
reciprocally to other individuals or the group as a whole. This is not a simple predictive 
expectation such as the one we may have when we expect rain on a cloudy day. Great 
apes may have expectations about their physical environment or expectations about 
what other agents could do in a given situation (Krupenye, Kano, Hirata, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2016). When we share the goal of a collective activity, this generates 
expectations about what we and other group members should do in order to achieve that 
goal. The idea that these expectations are normative is not new. The semantics of 
deontic modals has been linked, for instance, to the Bayesian notion of expectation 
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(Cariani, 2016). If we have a shared goal, it might be crucial for us to share those 
expectations too—especially, when those activities are complex or risky. Real collective 
activities such as the type of interactions involved in collective defense, scavenging, or 
collective hunting very likely required representing social expectations about what other 
individuals could do in a given situation in order to achieve a joint goal. Hominin 
hunting was more complex than chimpanzee hunting. Hominins are only able to 
coordinate the kind of collective action that leads to reliable and safe hunting success, 
including the distribution of the social product, if they are able to share their shared 
goals and to form stable normative expectations regarding the actions of their partners. 
Hominin cooperation required shared intentionality because agents had to be able to 
count on each other, as opposed to merely calculate with each other. 
But even significantly less complex activities might have also contributed to the 
emergence of the shared intentionality syndrome. In simple cases of joint attention, for 
instance, expectations about what a partner can see or is not able to see are formed. 
These expectations are monitored in order to reestablish common ground between both 
individuals when those expectations are broken. Importantly, the motivational 
component of these mental states behaves like a gradient. For example, in simple cases 
of joint attentional engagement common ground is built but the motivation to maintain it 
might not be robust, e.g., one of the partners can easily lose interest in the shared scene. 
In other cases, however, both components should have to be stable enough to go hand in 
hand. This could have been so in many socioecological scenarios such as collective 
defense and scavenging, but I will try to argue that this was clearly the case at least in 
the context of collective hunting of big game. For hunting in forager social worlds 
seems to be a source of pride and achievement of prestige (Hawkes, O’Connell, & 
Jones, 2001), which ameliorates defection problems. Hunters like hunting, even though 
this activity may be risky. 
In sum, collective hunting of big game arguably scaled up the cognitive demands 
on our shared intentional capacities since at some point it likely required more planning 
and division of labor. This generated complex expectations about others that required 
extensive monitoring in order to adjust behavior efficiently to meet the group’s shared 
expectations. At the same time, collective hunting of big game very likely imposed 
significant failure costs when others did not act as expected. In those cases, losing 
motivation for the activity and distraction were costly. Thus, as we will see in sections 
4.3.2 and 4.3.3, agents likely had to couple those expectations with a robust motivation 
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to participate in the activity and to correct and punish others when they did not do their 
part. Collective hunting was also motivationally demanding. 
 
4.3.2. Social rationality 
 
Even more important, shared intentionality gives rise to a form of social normative 
thinking. Purely egocentric I-intentions involve a form of instrumental rationality, which 
may be considered normative. Instrumental rationality is linked to basic normative 
mental states to the extent that this form of rationality is an important component of 
practical rationality. The former requires from the agent a capacity to deliberate and 
adopt suitable means to his/her ends, while the latter requires from the agent a capacity 
to deliberate about what the agent ought to do given the agent’s circumstances, goals, 
and available information. For this reason, the relation between practical rationality and 
deontic modality has received increasing attention in fields such as formal semantics 
(Cariani, 2016; Charlow, 2016; Lassiter, 2016). These I-intentions can even support 
certain forms of cooperation when cooperation is prudential. But shared intentionality is 
not quite like instrumental or prudential rationality. They are not just about my own 
ends as an agent. Their normative demands are not exactly about the instrumental 
relation between an agent and his or her goals. They have a collective, social flavor. 
They are not instrumentally normative in that sense, but rather socially normative. 
Actions are required not because I intend to get meat for myself, but rather because we 
are intending to hunt. 
As we have seen in section 4.2, chimpanzees cooperate to hunt monkeys in the 
Taï Forest, although the best interpretation of that cooperative activity is that each 
individual is trying to get the prey by himself. For they are more successful together 
than they would be trying to get the prey alone. The result is a collective activity. But 
there are reasons to question whether chimpanzees have an intrinsic motivation to 
cooperate. Chimpanzee hunting behavior is opportunistic rather than intrinsically 
motivated—they participate in the hunt if the prospects are good and only because they 
do not rely on it for survival. For example, cooperative hunting is much less prominent 
than individual hunting in habitats with fragmented forests where hunting is more 
difficult (Stanford, 1998a) and experimental evidence consistently suggests that in 
foraging collaborative tasks they treat partners primarily as social tools (Call, 2009). 
It is true that humans do not always cooperate. But we engage in relatively 
complex cooperative activities for their own sake even if an individual effort would 
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have sufficed in other cases. For example, Gräfenhain and colleagues (2009) have 
shown that at a very young age, children not only act jointly with others in pursuit of an 
instrumental goal but also seem to be highly motivated to engage in joint activities just 
for the sake of acting together with another person. In play situations that could be 
played either alone or jointly with a partner, children as young as two years of age often 
reengage their adult partners even if they could easily achieve the desired outcome (e.g., 
getting access to an enclosed toy) by themselves. Moreover, around the third year of 
age, children begin to reengage their partner more often when the partner expresses 
his/her intention to share the activity by inviting the child to play the game together with 
the experimenter. 
If the model of the baseline of social-cognitive capacities of early hominins I 
have offered in the previous chapter is correct, much of the motivational prerequisites of 
shared intentionality would have been at least readily evolvable from the genetic and 
development package inherited by the Pan/Homo LCA. But shared intentional states are 
not only intrinsically motivational since they also involve a degree of generalization and 
abstraction that they go beyond the egocentric representation of the agent’s goals and 
desires. Minimally, they require a significant other and to merge (metaphorically 
speaking) our own intentional states with those of our partner. As we will soon see, 
social interactions between infants and caregivers in the context of cooperative breeding 
were like that in a rather incipient way. Interactions between partners for collective 
hunting required a much broader social perspective. 
I think joint intentions inherited this form of instrumental normativity and made 
it social. Collective big game hunting operates under this logic. It is a form of social or 
collective rationality (Tomasello, 2015). Likely, this source of normativity required a 
capacity for metacognition that enabled the monitoring of our own mental states—in 
particular, the representation of goals and beliefs about the potential transitions between 
different states of the environment that could lead to the desirable outcomes. It required, 
say, assessing my beliefs and desires to make instrumental decisions about what is the 
best course of action to achieve a certain goal and quickly updating those states when 
something does not go as planned. Just updating one’s beliefs and acting on them would 
not be enough since we would also need to monitor one’s states of certainty and 
uncertainty, seek new information in conditions of uncertainty, and recognize whether 
one has access to the information needed to solve the problem at hand. But by the time 
hominins were able to hunt big game and making stone tools, this is a plausible 
assumption. It might be true that metacognition is not present in all the primate order 
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(Basile, Hampton, Suomi, & Murray, 2009; Beran, Smith, Coutinho, Couchman, & 
Boomer, 2009; Fujita, 2009; Paukner, Anderson, & Fujita, 2006), but macaques and 
apes seem to have some metacognitive capacities (Call, 2010; Call & Carpenter, 2001; 
Couchman, Coutinho, Beran, & Smith, 2010; Hampton, 2001; Washburn, Gulledge, 
Beran, & Smith, 2010). If this is true, the crucial difference between humans and other 
non-human species regarding metacognitive capacities is not just a matter degree but 
also of kind, for we would be the only species able to track our own shared, we-mode 
intentional states. 
A capacity for shared intentionality also significantly changed the affective 
dispositions that boost motivation and commitment to cooperative endeavors. In the 
model of early hominin social cognition offered in chapter 3 much of these dispositions 
were readily evolvable from the Pan/Homo LCA. But this baseline of social-cognitive 
capacities significantly changed with the emergence of shared intentionality. Joint 
intentions took the empathy-related infrastructure of our lineage and catalyzed 
sympathy. Sympathy is a concern for the well-being of others. It requires perspective-
taking. But if perspective-taking were just a matter of great ape mindreading, it would 
be just paternalism. A mother, for instance, may assume that is up to her what is good 
for the younger because she takes herself to a have an influence on the youngster. If I 
genuinely join your intention to do something, my motives to help involve recognizing 
your perspective on your needs. When I join your intention to perform a certain action, 
my helping is at least in part a consequence of the fact that you are intending to perform 
that action, you struggle to succeed alone, and we can make of it a rewarding 
collaborative effort. 
Joint intentions can also involve trust and commitment. Even in very simple 
joint tasks, 14- and 18-month-old infants try to reengage the partner through 
communicative gestures (Warneken et al., 2006; Warneken et al., 2007). 3-year-old 
children are more likely to attempt to reengage partners when they have explicitly 
accepted the invitation of an adult to play than when the adult just follows the child 
activity (Gräfenhain et al., 2009). Children’s understanding of joint commitments is 
complex, e.g., they are more likely to wait for their partners when they are unable to 
continue, more likely to spontaneously help them when needed, or to take over their 
roles if necessary (Gräfenhain et al., 2013). This type of commitment should have been 
especially important when joining these activities was costly and risky like in big game 
hunting, as we have seen in section 4.2 (Duguid et al., 2014). 
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Arguably, collective hunting and defense against predation relied on relatively 
sophisticated forms of communication due to the heavy demands on coordination of 
these activities. Big game hunters have to think ahead how to target potentially 
dangerous prey. It requires mastering a number of complementary tasks and, in some 
cases, task specialization. Hunting partners have to be committed to these plans and 
tasks. Often, though, they would have had to take high-stakes decisions under time 
pressure and partial information. Under these circumstances, communication would 
have been difficult, and the capacity to understand and meet partners’ expectations 
would have been increasingly important. Successful hunting requires meeting the 
demands of these practical commitments. This does not mean that joint commitments 
create unbreakable bonds between agents, but rather that cooperation becomes more 
stable and, consequently, more likely to be successful, because the commitment to the 
task goes now both ways. Early hunters likely understood their mutual dependence in a 
cognitive way. They were able to think not only about what they needed to do to 
succeed but also about what they, as a group, had to do in order to pull off collective 
enterprises.26 
Sharing the goal of hunting also put individuals on a roughly equal footing, i.e., 
they came to value their partners differently. For example, activities structured around 
joint goals require from the individuals involved staying engaged in the activity until 
partners get their share from the activity. If goals are shared and the goal is getting the 
meat, we should share the spoils at the end. Of course, successful collaboration and 
successful establishment and respect for regularities of division of the product will 
coexist with failures to coordinate and squabbles about division. Even lethal conflict is 
frequent in forager societies. However, although noisy and partially successful, our 
shared intentional psychology should have made collaboration much more robust and 
stable under these noisy conditions than mere rational deliberation about individual 
intentions. 
26 One reason why coercive scavenging preceded large game hunting is that it required a basic form of 
collective action—a halfway house between the demands of chimpanzee group hunting and those of 
planned ambush hunting. This form of scavenging does not require much role division or teamwork. 
When compared to hunting in chimpanzees, it requires only a bit more planning, e.g., deliberately 
carrying weapons and stones, as well as more commitment since it was potentially more dangerous. 
However, in this situation, agents primarily need to react on the fly, so mutual adjustment through 
mechanisms of emergent coordination as the ones seen in chimpanzees would have been good enough. 
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Sharing the meat was at least in part a matter of sympathy or concern for the 
partners’ needs, and the increasing pattern in social tolerance that characterized our 
lineage, as explained in the model of the hominin baseline of social-cognitive capacities 
introduced in chapter 3. In this model, early hominins were characterized by increased 
cooperative and sharing tendencies beyond the hypothesized levels of a chimpanzee-like 
model of that ancestor. Nonetheless, sharing was also a matter of social rationality. 
Hunters could have operated to a certain degree under the logic of “I want meat”, but 
reliable cooperation and coordination would have required from them to act under the 
plural logic of “We want meat”. This shift would have been facilitated not only by the 
fact that successful hunting delivers meat in large packages so the costs of sharing were 
likely low but also by the early adaptations for peaceful sociality seen in early hominins 
which reduce conflict when distributing the spoils and consequently incentivizes 
cooperation. This plural logic would have meant that collaborative partners were not 
seen just as mere instruments to achieve our individual goals. Because it is also part of 
the joint goal that hunting partners will get some of the food, and all of them should be 
committed to precisely that goal. Chimpanzees usually abandon collaborative activities 
once they get their reward (Greenberg et al., 2010). But children often assist unlucky 
partners so that both get the reward in collaborative situations, even when there is 
nothing left to gain for them (Hamann et al., 2012). 
Yet, away from the heat of the hunt, collaboration and sharing were likely also a 
matter of individual rationality. Hunters, and especially big game hunters, should have 
realized the instrumental importance of others in the activity. They would have had a 
clear idea of the negative social consequences of monopolizing the meat all for 
themselves; they should be aware that, in small groups, they rely on a few potential 
partners. Not sharing the spoils, would undermine cooperative partnerships that are 
essential. This was probably explicit rather than implicit knowledge—behavior 
mediated by prudential reasons that are related to the agent’s interests. Cooperative 
ventures of this kind are fragile and often give no time for doubts and regrets, so there 
was likely a very narrow window of opportunity to learn these behaviors through, say, 
associative learning.27 On top of that, shared intentional capacities would have allowed 
27 As we will see in section 4.4, cooperative breeding and its consequences for human life history would 
have played an important role in easing the learning trajectory of many essential cooperative skills. For 
children and juveniles would have had lots of practice in cooperation and cooperation failure. In 
particular, peer interaction during middle childhood could have played the role of preparatory step for 
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hunters to share mutual perspectives about the activity. They would have known that in 
order to maintain those relationships, cooperative partners have to be nourished and 
highly motivated. Otherwise, for everyone, the costs are high and the dangers are real. 
However, even if hunting partners were able to understand sharing as a 
prudential course of action, it would have been an open problem to determine what type 
of distribution will keep partners cooperating. Rational maximization of returns is 
cognitively demanding since variables such as differential contributions to success and 
issues related to temporal discounting would be hugely important but difficult to assess. 
These complexities increase if interactions are repeated over time and the number of 
hunting partners is large. Also, even if distributing the meat was a computationally 
tractable problem, e.g., through the use of heuristics, the process would have been 
socially disruptive, unless the other group members would be expecting the same result. 
Heuristics about distributing the meat work well when they are common ground. Thus, 
these representations about how to distribute the social product should have been shared 
intentional states, i.e., common expectations that we share with others so that any group 
member can quickly update them according to circumstances. 
 
4.3.3. Punitive attitudes 
 
The account of the representation of social norms via our shared intentional 
infrastructure also helps to understand certain peculiar motivational aspects that are 
typically linked to normative judgments about the transgression of social norms. In 
section 4.3.1, I have explained that sharing mental states such as goals and plans 
generate shared expectations. In section 4.3.2, I have argued that sharing these 
expectations took the kind of instrumental normative thinking characteristic of great 
apes and transformed it into a form of social normative thinking about what one think 
we should do in the context of collective activities. In this section, I will show how 
failing to meet these shared expectations may trigger some form of punitive and 
corrective attitudes as the ones introduced in chapter 2. 
I agree that, in the context of ancestral big game hunting, what counted as a fair 
distribution was a matter of joint regulation of meat distribution (Boehm, 1999, 2012). 
Protests about undeserved shares would be social feedback to tune standards of 
more serious collaboration during adulthood since in this developmental period children can still rely on 
parents and other adults for protection and subsistence. 
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distribution when individuals are jointly motivated to share the meat in ways that 
encourage cooperation. With shared intentionality comes a way to understand the group 
standards of food distribution as a we-mode social expectation. Expectations about the 
division of spoils need to be congruent to make cooperation stable and to minimize 
conflict, but they are not just private expectations that turn out to overlap and coincide 
with those of others. These expectations have to be shared in terms of both their 
cognitive content and their associated motivational component. 
When a group member feels mistreated, others have to be sensitive to this fact 
such that they can quickly keep conflict within bounds. Although certainly possible, it is 
not clear that once I got my expected share I will care for other agents’ violated 
expectations for mere instrumental reasons—for that, agents would need to be cool-
headed rational maximizers in typically heated situations that demand from them to 
react with anger or, at least, contempt. In contrast, if they shared those standards, they 
would be mutually committed to making others comply with them. A group member 
that does not share meat with another not only would be the target of the punitive 
attitudes of the excluded individual but the group as a whole—since they would be in a 
joint mental state of the form “We are sharing the meat”. Not sharing the meat with 
someone is now everybody’s business. This would have led not only to some cognitive 
representation about what would have counted as a fair distribution within the group but 
also to forms of mutual vigilance and regulation of the joint commitment to those 
standards. 
Individuals would have also chosen their partners more carefully. Some models 
of the evolution of impartiality and fairness, for instance, see these traits as adaptations 
to environments in which individuals compete to be chosen and recruited in mutually 
advantageous cooperative interactions (Baumard, 2016; Baumard, André, & Sperber, 
2013). This is very plausible in cases where hunting was supported by the use of 
projectile weaponry and perhaps even in relatively large groups of ambush hunters using 
short-range weapons. With the increased communicational skills that big game hunting 
presupposes, foraging partners would have cared about their reputation. Partners would 
react angrily against unresponsive partners, signaling what they perceive as an unfair 
treatment or as an intolerable mistake. These angry reactions would have engendered 
punitive attitudes that, in extreme cases, would have triggered direct physical 
aggressions. A group of hunters should have been sensible to these signals and reacted 
with guilt, shame, or remorse. Social selection in favor of angry-types would be 
expected in this situation since the willingness to punish others even in a one-shot 
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games appears to maintain high levels of cooperation. If the members of a group are 
able to identify angry-type punishers, then angry punishment would have likely 
coevolved with cooperative preferences (Bruner, n.d.). 
Guilt would have brought also individual fitness benefits. This could have been 
so by preventing transgression and by leading to reparative behaviors as some models 
on the evolution of apology seem to indicate (O’Connor, n.d.). This is a plausible 
conjecture. Although it is difficult to project the behavior of extant humans into earlier 
human evolution, there are reasons to think that guilt affects prosocial behavior in 
ourselves and others. Anticipated guilt in humans reduces the likelihood of social 
transgression (Svensson, Weerman, Pauwels, Bruinsma, & Bernasco, 2013), and 
increases prosocial behavior (Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Malti & Krettenauer, 2013; Regan, 
1971), e.g., cooperation in social bargaining games (de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & 
Breugelmans, 2007; Nelissen, Dijker, & deVries, 2007). Guilt also leads to reparation, 
acceptance of punishment, and self-punishment (Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Ohtsubo 
& Watanabe, 2009; Silfver, 2007). Moreover, expressing guilt and remorse also reliably 
lead to a reduction of punishment (Eisenberg, Garvey, & Wells; Fischbacher & Utikal, 
2013; Gold & Weiner, 2000). 
As a result, affective reactions like anger and guilt would have been sensitive to 
the mode in which social expectations are represented. We-mode representations of 
these expectations are socially normative and increasingly more agent-independent—
they are not just expectation about what a particular individual should do in a given 
situation, but about what anyone should do in a similar situation. These affective 
reactions would become then normative emotions, i.e., emotions that support social 
normative standards of behavior. Briefly, there would be joint representations of these 
standards, which in turn would be supported by affective processes that work as joint 
commitment devices. 
 
4.4. Cooperative breeding 
 
One problem with the traditional evolutionary account of shared intentionality is that it 
does not explain why many of these capacities emerge so early in ontogeny. This is 
somewhat paradoxical since much of the research on shared intentionality is 
developmental (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007; Tomasello et al., 2005; Tomasello, 
Carpenter, & Liszkowski, 2007; Tomasello & Hamann, 2012; Warneken et al., 2006). 
Tomasello and colleagues (2012), for instance, point out that these traits went down in 
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ontogeny because they require time for maturation, though they do not provide a 
systematic phylogenic rationale for the plausibility of this view. If developmental timing 
is any guide, though, the early emergence of human proclivities for mutual orientation 
and joint activities would point to selective pressures on infant sociality. For the early 
emergence of these capacities would suggest that they are adaptations to challenges 
faced at those early ages—or at least, they became so (see Hawkes, 2012, 2014; Hrdy, 
2009b). 
Following Hawkes (2012), I think that the key selective pressures that originated 
shared intentionality were linked to changes in our rearing environment. The extent to 
which cooperative breeding took place prior to Homo erectus is difficult to determine. 
But is likely that this trait was already a distinctive feature of H. erectus, around 1.9 
mya. Moreover, although H. erectus had the use of stone tools and weapons, and likely 
the control of fire (Gowlett, 2016), it seems extremely unlikely that they could have 
survived in the open, dangerous environment of Africa during the Pleistocene unless 
they lived in cooperative multifamily bands. The evolution of obligate bipedalism, for 
instance, would have made us quite vulnerable when resting. H. erectus females, in 
particular, would have had a hard time supplying the nutritional requirements of their 
offspring and defending them from predation without the assistance of other family 
members—though this might depend on when we lost our hair and whether the 
thermoregulatory capabilities that came with bipedalism were enough to enable foraging 
in the hottest times of the day, reducing contact with potential predators.28 
As Susan Hrdy (2009b) has argued, much of our empathetic skills could well 
have been a consequence of the peculiar way that children were reared in the genus 
Homo. At an early stage in the evolution of our lineage, our bipedal ancestors were 
increasingly cared and provisioned not just by their mothers but also by alloparents, i.e., 
any conspecific involved in parent-like behavior towards an individual that is not his or 
her offspring. According to her, this form of cooperative breeding first emerged among 
our upright primate ancestors, and further evolved during the Pleistocene in African H. 
erectus. This shift is believed to have brought about important social cognitive 
consequences. For receiving help from others alters maternal trade-offs and imposes 
28 Species better adapted to arboreality do not face those challenges since tree nesting and adaptations for 
tree climbing offer more safety from potential predators. In addition, great apes such as chimpanzees and 




                                                          
new selection pressures on infants and young children to engage actively their 
caretakers’ attention and commitment. 
By the time that the first evidence of power-scavenging of big game start to 
appear, around 1.7 mya, H. erectus had new ways of finding, processing, and digesting 
food needed to support larger bodies and brains. Meat was indeed increasingly 
important, but its availability was unpredictable. Long-term trends toward a cooler, drier 
climate leading up to the Pleistocene pressured H. erectus ancestors to supplement a diet 
with reliable but hard-to-procure underground tubers that plants in dry areas use to 
stockpile carbohydrates (Hawkes, 2014; Hawkes, O’Connell, Jones, Alvarez, & 
Charnov, 1998; O’Connell, Hawkes, & Blurton Jones, 1999). Savanna baboons are 
known to dig up corms, bulbs, rhizomes, and tubers that require significant strength and 
manual dexterity (Altmann & Altmann, 1970; Hall, 1962; Hamilton, Buskirk, & 
Buskirk, 1978; Post, 1982; Whiten, Byrne, Barton, Waterman, & Henzi, 1991; Whiten, 
Byrne, & Henzi, 1987). Also, some savanna chimpanzees are known to use sticks to dig 
out shallow tubers (Hernandez-Aguilar, Moore, & Travis, 2007; Lanjouw, 2002). 
Therefore, in such ecological context, it would not be hard to believe that early 
hominins may have done so as well. 
There is evidence that starchy tubers were an important fallback food for early 
African hunter-gatherers. For example, hunter-gatherers such as the Hadza in Tanzania, 
rely on roots and tubers as an important part of their diet and, consequently, they have 
accumulated extra copies of the salivary amylase gene (AMY1) that is correlated with 
salivary amylase protein levels—an important enzyme in the digestion of starchy foods 
(Perry et al., 2007). Similarly, recent analyses of molar surface texture also suggest that 
early Homo adopted a diet that included underground roots (Ungar, Grine, Teaford, & 
El Zaatari, 2006; Ungar, Krueger, Blumenschine, Njau, & Scott, 2012; Ungar, Scott, 
Grine, & Teaford, 2010). On top of that, the use of fire, perhaps around 800 kya 
(Wrangham, 2009), would have made tubers and roots gathered by females even more 
digestible and nutritionally valuable and, therefore, still more useful and relevant for 
survival (Hrdy, 2009a). 
As a consequence, plant foods gathered and processed by females would have 
provided incentives for food sharing as well as new opportunities for post-reproductive 
females to help their kin by sharing those resources. According to the grandmother 
hypothesis (O’Connell et al., 1999), for instance, unlike other primates, natural selection 
would have favored females who live long after menopause to help provision younger 
kin. Grandmothers exemplify well the fitness benefits of cooperative breeding for the 
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adult since several studies have shown that help provided by grandmothers produces 
positive effects on grandchild survival and growth, which leads to greater inclusive 
fitness (Fox et al., 2009; Jamison, Cornell, Jamison, & Nakazato, 2002; Sear, Mace, & 
McGregor, 2000; Voland & Jan, 2002). This hypothesis accounts for the distinctive 
human postmenopausal longevity, later maturity, and shorter birth intervals seen in our 
lineage (Blurton-Jones, Hawkes, & O’Connell, 1999; Hawkes, 2003; Hawkes et al., 
1998; O’Connell et al., 1999). Moreover, it would have also stressed the selective 
pressures for increased social learning, as many of these tubers require significant 
processing to detoxify them. 
More importantly, this new rearing environment allowed humans to wean infants 
relatively early and reduce the time-periods between pregnancies. Unlike any other ape 
mother, human mothers can bear a new baby before the previous child is independent 
because they receive help (Hrdy, 1999, 2005, 2009b). Cooperative breeding would have 
dramatically shortened those intervals in a way that would have facilitated longer 
periods of maturation and larger brains. It is now known that H. erectus possessed short 
growth periods that were more similar to chimpanzees than living humans, but 
childhood was already fully extended around 200 kya with the appearance of H. sapiens, 
as some studies of tooth growth in early hominins show (Smith et al., 2015; Smith et al., 
2007). Cooperative breeding, so the argument goes, would have allowed the offspring to 
grow up slowly and remain dependent on parents and other caregivers for more time. As 
a result, retention of childlike features could be favored as well as an extended period of 
learning and brain growth. 
However, more offspring at a time would have meant increasing competition 
between young offspring for attention from caregivers, who must then monitor the 
whereabouts and intentions of their caregivers (Hrdy, 2005, 2009b). This part of the 
story is essential for my account of the early ontogenetic emergence of shared 
intentional capacities (for a similar suggestion, see Burkart et al., 2009; Hawkes, 2012; 
Hawkes & Coxworth, 2013). The ontogenetic niche of early Homo would have been 
different from the one we see in other great apes. In great apes, mothers rear infants one 
at a time without help. In these species, maternal care is continuous. All great ape 
mothers are in constant contact with her infant during its first six months of life. They 
nurse long and wean late. Chimpanzees wean on average after 5 years (Clark, 1977), 
while orangutans at 7.7 years (Galdikas & Wood, 1990). This strategy is believed to 
increase the survival of juveniles by, for instance, reducing the risk of infanticide, at the 
cost of slow future population growth (see Kennedy, 2005; Lovejoy, 1981).  
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Unlike great apes, human infants do not have their mother’s undivided attention 
(Hawkes, 2012). This likely led to an increase in the risk of mortality of infants and 
youngsters. Humans living in natural fertility societies, including hunter-gatherers, wean 
on average around 2.5 years (Kennedy, 2005; Marlowe, 2005), increasing the risks to 
the child (Arifeen et al., 2001; Clemens et al., 1990; Rowland, Barrell, & Whitehead, 
1978) but boosting population growth. In these rearing environments, children survival 
would depend on their differential capacity to engage and create commitment with 
potential caregivers. They would have been selected for developing specialized 
adaptations for eliciting parental attention, soliciting more food, or being held or carried. 
Thus, selection for increasing social skills to engage mothers and others in caregiving 
activities would have been strong. 
At first, this new evolutionarily context would have led to some new social 
adaptations for emotional sharing and engagement in early human infants. Unlike other 
great apes, human neonates smile. It is well known that around six weeks of age they 
begin smiling to others as a form of emotional engagement, followed some weeks later 
by laughing. Great apes such as chimpanzees and bonobos only smile and laugh when 
they are tickled (Bard, 2012; Davila-Ross, Allcock, Thomas, & Bard, 2011). Around 2 
months of age, human infants begin to engage in turn-taking sequences involving 
sounds and gestures that some people call ‘protoconversations’ (Reddy, 2015; Rochat, 
2009; Trevarthen, 1979). Human children seem highly sensitive to this form of 
emotional feedback. In still-face experiments, for instance, when toddlers try to interact 
with a nonresponsive expressionless adult, they repeatedly attempt to get the reciprocal 
interaction back by smiling briefly at the adult. But when these attempts fail, infants 
usually withdraw, orienting face and body away from their adult partners (Tronick, Als, 
Adamson, Wise, & Brazelton, 1978). Experiments on gestural communication also 
show that when adults suddenly stop communicating with infants, they react in a similar 
way (Tomasello, 2008; Tomasello, Carpenter, et al., 2007). 
Along with emotional sharing and engagement, human infants also develop a 
capacity to coordinate mutual gaze with caretakers. This capacity is not evident in wild 
infant chimpanzees (Plooij, 1984), although parallel attention has been reported in 
captivity (Tomonaga et al., 2004). This phenomenon has been sometimes attributed to 
the fact that the attention of multiple caretakers in captivity, including human ones, 
resembles the ancestral environments where grandmothers and other alloparents started 
to provide independent mothering (Hawkes & Coxworth, 2013; Hrdy, 2014). It appears 
then that some important precursor of this trait was already present in our ancestors, but 
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it was later on that this infrastructure became richer and more complex via adult social 
selection due to a change in rearing environments (Hrdy, 2009b). 
These traits are sometimes understood merely as adaptations for bonding, but 
there are reasons to think that they also extend in development as adaptations for basic 
communication and social learning. For example, at around 9 months of age, human 
infants also begin to understand others as intentional agents (Tomasello et al., 2005), 
i.e., agents with goals and perceptions that guide their behavior—similar perhaps to 
other great apes but at a much younger age (Wobber et al., 2014). When a system geared 
to a particular developmental period meet new systems geared to a different 
developmental stage, this produces novelty. Then, along with the emergence of basic 
mindreading capacities, the sharing of emotions extends to the sharing of attention to 
external events. Joint attention is perhaps the most basic form of shared intentional 
states. It requires not only active tracking of the gaze direction of other individuals but 
also active triadic engagement by, for instance, showing and offering objects to one’s 
partner with an expectation that this will lead to a positive sharing of emotions about 
these objects. These behaviors are not present in great apes (Tomasello & Carpenter, 
2005; Tomonaga et al., 2004). 
Joint attention could have emerged out of basic capacities to track other 
individuals’ targets of attention by means of some recursive structure of the form “I 
know that you know that I know that p”. Although this interpretation is likely far-
fetched and over-intellectualized if understood in terms of explicit mindreading, current 
theories of mindreading often distinguish implicit forms of mindreading which do not 
make demands on executive function (Heyes & Frith, 2014). This form of mindreading 
could then be present in early childhood (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), but also in great 
apes (Krupenye et al., 2016). This suggests that the mechanisms that mediate explicit 
mind reading are different from those controlling implicit mind reading, which are 
phylogenetically ancient and perhaps genetically inherited. However, studies of twins 
(Hughes et al., 2005), people with hearing impairments (de Villiers & de Villiers, 2012; 
Meristo, Hjelmquist, & Morgan, 2012; Pyers & Senghas, 2009), and children from 
Western (Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003) and non-Western societies (Seeger, 1981) 
suggests that many aspects of explicit mindreading might well be a culturally inherited 
skill. As a result, infants might well be equipped with neurocognitive mechanisms that 
yield accurate expectations about behavior in the form of automatic or implicit 
mindreading, whereas explicit mindreading is a culturally inherited skill transmitted by 
verbal instruction (Heyes & Frith, 2014). 
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Yet basic capacities for shared intentionality may not necessarily be a 
consequence of recursive forms of implicit mindreading. These capacities could have 
also emerge as a new cognitive phenotype to form we-mode representations of the form 
“We know that p”, i.e., knowledge states that are represented as shared by a certain 
group of individuals, but which cannot be reduced to recursive mindreading. In this 
latter view, joint, collective mental states are ascribed to single individuals rather than 
groups—i.e., they are intentional states held by individuals but which make fundamental 
reference to a collective formed in conjunction with the other individuals (Searle, 1990). 
In fact, it is possible that the capacity for shared intentionality in modern humans relies 
on the coexistence of alternative paths that lead to the formation of these two varieties of 
shared intentional states. One of these paths can be recursive, while the other is 
irreducible to a plural mode of representation. 
As a conjecture, it is possible that joint attention in early Homo infants could 
have relied initially on some form of implicit, but recursive form of mindreading, even 
if humans were able to evolve at some point a capacity to form irreducible we-mode 
representations. One reason to prefer this explanation is that populations usually contain 
selectable quantitative variation in existing traits—e.g., infant chimpanzees have basic 
capacities for gaze following and parallel attention (Okamoto, Tanaka, & Tomonaga, 
2004; Okamoto et al., 2002; Tomonaga et al., 2004). In this line of argument, 
evolutionary change would work more easily by modifying existing traits rather than 
creating new ones from scratch.29 
Real joint attention, which occurs in all sensory modalities, requires from infants 
to be aware that caregivers are attending to the same state of the environment as they 
are. Joint attention is in this sense a special form of mindreading. It requires sharing 
attention to goal-directed, intentional actions. For attentional states are intentional states, 
i.e., the agent’s focus of attention is directed to a target As in the case of parallel 
attention, infant’s and caregiver’s focus of attention should be directed to the same 
29 It is increasingly clear that chimpanzees and bonobos possess some form of mindreading (Call & 
Tomasello, 2008; Karg, Schmelz, Call, & Tomasello, 2015), including a capacity to track other 
individual’s target of attention. However, the above explanation also relies on the assumption that 
mindreading capacities regarding other individual’s focus of attention were present in early Homo infants. 
The existence of basic capacities for gaze following and parallel attention in infant chimpanzees might be 
too meager evidence for the existence of mindreading capacities, i.e., whether chimpanzees attribute 
referential intent and visual experience to their partners or merely follow gaze direction to specific 
locations (see, for instance, Okamoto et al., 2004, p. 243). 
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object. The crucial difference is that in cases of joint attention not only both individuals 
are aware of their own attentional states but also they are able to track their partners’ 
focus of attention, such that both understand they are attending the same target, giving 
them an incipient form of bird’s-eye view. This could have been achieved through some 
form of recursive mindreading of the form “I know that you know that I am attending to 
object x”. Or perhaps in a more implicit and perceptual way such as “I see that you see 
that I am attending to x”, for shared attention does not need to be an abstract and amodal 
form of representation. In both cases, this would allow the child to make a mental 
comparison, so to speak, between his/her own perceived targets and the targets of the 
partner’s focus of attention. 
Truly joint attention would have also required the infant to engage caregivers 
just for the sake of sharing with them that attentional state. Without parents by their 
side, infants would need to engage other adults in order to receive alloparental care from 
them. Initially, they could have used joint attentional skills to take advantage of already 
existing adult bonding and affective mechanisms for their own ends. But potential 
alloparents would be more conditional, less responsive, and less motivated caregivers, 
even between individuals from an extremely socially tolerant lineage (see chapter 3). 
They could just ignore their demands or provide attention to other infants. Under those 
conditions, children would have needed to engage the caregiver’s attention for the sake 
of the engagement, instead of just monitoring the adults’ actions. This engagement 
probably involved not only simultaneously attending to the same object but also likely 
some form of visual referencing of the partner by the infant, i.e., a look to a caregiver’s 
face or eyes about an object or event in the infant’s and caregiver’s mutual focus of 
attention (Carpenter & Call, 2013; see also Bakeman & Adamson, 1984). They would 
have needed to register that the caregiver was also looking to them, and then to manifest 
some sort of affective contact with the adult (Hobson & Hobson, 2007).30 
Initiating episodes of joint attention would be very important for the infant. 
Cooperative breeding would have forced infants to create as much attachment as 
possible with others because alloparental care is more conditional and distributed across 
many infants in the group. Gestures and eye contact would be important under those 
conditions to direct others’ attention to objects, to events, and to themselves, just for the 
sake of sharing with them interests and pleasurable experiences that foster attachment 
30 It is also very likely that once selective pressures for cooperative breeding took place, adult individuals 




                                                          
and care. Chimpanzees, for instance, can follow a human’s gaze to an out-of-sight 
location behind a barrier and use gestures to beg from a human most often when the 
human can see them. But there is no evidence that they can spontaneously share 
attention and other experiences with members of their own species (Tomasello & 
Carpenter, 2005). 
There seem to be markers of this process in our anatomy. The human eye has 
unique features, such as a high contrasting sclera. This trait could have evolved to 
provide information about other people’s attention and boosting social cognitive 
development (see, for instance, Baron-Cohen, 1995; Kobayashi & Kohshima, 2001; 
Tomasello, Hare, Lehmann, & Call, 2007). In particular, these features of the eye would 
allow the infants’ saccades to be easily observed by caregivers and, therefore, act as 
elicitors of contingent social feedback (Mundy & Jarrold, 2010). For example, shifting 
visual attention would enable infants not only to actively select information from their 
environments but also to elicit social-behavioral responses from others, e.g., parental 
smiles, vocalizations, or gaze shifts. Given the appropriate motivational machinery, 
parents and caregivers could pick-up and show an out-of-reach object to the child, when 
the infant shifts attention to the object. Similarly, if a child shifts attention to the 
caregiver’s eyes, the infant could receive a vocal or physical response. 
Similarly, basic forms of cooperative communication could have also been a 
consequence of the early emergence of these shared intentional skills, for they could 
have emerged prelinguistically in the form of pointing and pantomiming. Great apes will 
sometimes point for humans in an imperative way, e.g., when they want an out-of-reach 
object (Leavens & Hopkins, 1998). But human infants across different cultures point 
declaratively from around their first birthday (Callaghan et al., 2011; Salomo & 
Liszkowski, 2013; Tomasello, Hare, et al., 2007). At that crucial developmental stage, 
human infants become highly motivated to share attention and interest to different 
objects and events by offering, showing, and pointing referentially to external objects 
and events. 
To sum up, all these uniquely human infant behaviors would have evolved in the 
context of sibling and peer competition (Hrdy, 2006, 2009b). For in a cooperative 
breeding context, adults are rewarded by sharing emotions, interest, and attention to 
objects and events with infants. As a result, infants compete to provide adults with this 
positive affective feedback to secure care and attention. This creates a process of social 
selection on infants for increasing shared intentional skills (Crook, 1972; West-
Eberhard, 1979). In this view, shared intentionality started as an ontogenetic adaptation 
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(Alberts & Gubernick, 1984), i.e., as part of a sequence of specialized changes that 
enabled infants to survive the ontogenetic niche created by their parents. However, as 
we will see in the next section, these early mechanisms of joint attention and basic 
communication very likely also coevolved as mechanisms to facilitate social learning, 
and perhaps even teaching, when adult activities required skill that demanded prolonged 
periods of preparation and maturation. 
 
4.5. Evolutionary development 
 
Recent models of the role of ontogeny in the evolution of human cooperation take into 
account the tradeoffs that emerge during the transition from childhood to adulthood 
(Tomasello & Gonzalez-Cabrera, 2017). As I have argued above, shared intentional 
states were initially geared to dyadic interactions between infants and caregivers. But 
once they emerged, they were likely retained in adulthood because they would transform 
social interactions in a species characterized by its prosocial behavior. A heterochronic 
process of juvenilization could have played an important role here, along similar lines of 
the self-domestication hypothesis introduced in chapter 3 (see also Hare et al., 2012). 
There is a good evolutionary scenario to argue in favor of such a process here, for 
cooperative breeding facilitates prolonged periods of maturation and collaborative 
activities themselves would have benefited from those shared intentional skills that first 
emerged as ontogenetic adaptations. 
These changes would have been deep and complex, with important downstream 
consequences for human development. Konner’s (2010) detailed comparison of apes 
and humans developmental trajectories, for instance, documents a series of changes in 
developmental timing that are similar to those described by Hrdy (2009b) and Hawkes 
(2003, 2014), e.g., increased life span and time to sexual maturity, longer gestation, 
rapid brain growth, and juvenilization of some anatomical and behavioral features. But 
he also includes the appearance of middle childhood as a new developmental period 
between infancy and puberty. 
Cooperative ventures such as pair bonding, cooperative breeding, collective 
defense, and more cognitively taxing activities such as collective hunting and foraging 
would have been transformed by extending these basic shared intentional capacities into 
adulthood. On my view, cooperative breeding came first. These rearing environments 
selected for very basic capacities of shared intentionality. For example, infants and 
alloparents could mutually engage in episodes of shared attention and shared 
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communication through pointing and perhaps pantomiming in situations in which 
initially only the infant would be motivated to join the adult’s intentional states and 
share their own mental states. Once these basic capacities for shared intentionality were 
exploited in these social contexts, they triggered a positive feedback loop for 
increasingly joint, collective intentional states. I think that collective hunting was the 
decisive step in this direction. If very basic forms of shared intentional states based only 
on recursive forms of mindreading were ecologically viable in less motivationally and 
cognitively demanding dyadic contexts, they would have required a particular mode of 
representation that would allow them to form shared intentional states automatically and 
effortlessly in high-stake contexts such as collective defense, scavenging, or collective 
hunting. To put it briefly, cooperative breeding would have initially triggered the shared 
intentionality syndrome. But these basic capacities would have subsequently extended 
into adulthood transforming our foraging practices, which in turn would have selected 
for more complex forms of shared intentionality. 
The tamer picture of the Pan/Homo LCA I have proposed in chapter 3 would 
have been crucial for this purpose. For if early hominins were indeed tolerant of 
conspecifics cofeeding, they would be especially well suited not only for cooperative 
breeding but also scavenging since it would reduce the social stress generated by eating 
together around a carcass. Chimpanzees who rank high in food tolerance tests, for 
instance, have shown to be more collaborative and willing to share the fruits of their 
collaborative efforts than intolerant chimpanzees (Melis et al., 2006b). As we have seen, 
bonobos are more tolerant around food. In comparison to chimpanzees, they cooperate 
more and share more food items that are easily monopolizable (Hare et al., 2007). 
Therefore, increased tolerance around food in the Pan/Homo LCA would have given 
substantial leverage for the emergence of hominin species which actively shared the 
spoils of collaboration, for there is evidence that tolerance is reasonably evolutionarily 
labile (Hare & Tomasello, 2005). 
In a context as the one proposed by Tomasello and colleagues (2012), where 
global cooling and a drying would have caused an unprecedented radiation in terrestrial 
monkeys, scavenging could have been a reasonable strategy since they would have 
competed with Homo for many plant foods. Hunting smaller prey would have been also 
ecologically possible, but this type of hunting is also widespread among modern 
terrestrial primate species. Another available option would have been to procure meat 
from large mammals, which is riskier but could have been initially obtained through 
scavenging (Binford, 1981, 1987; Blumenschine, 1986; Blumenschine, Cavallo, & 
121 
 
Capaldo, 1994; Bunn & Blumenschine, 1987; Bunn et al., 1980; Potts, 1984; Shipman, 
1986). 
Rudimentary projectile technology would have made possible to drive predators 
from their kills, e.g., by throwing rocks and clubs at them. Even this simple technology 
would significantly reduce the risk associated with the activity, taking advantage of 
dangerous predators that suddenly become easier stationary targets. For a predator, it 
may be better to surrender a kill and try it again than being injured by a group of 
scavengers. Scavenging was likely the precursor of collective hunting. But aggressive 
scavenging is a cooperative, stag hunt-like activity that requires no complex 
coordination or role differentiation—although it requires commitment and tolerance 
around food. 
Around 800 kya scavenging turned into active collaborative hunting (Dubreuil, 
2010b), although others like Bunn (2007) believe that hominins were already hunting 
large mammals by around 1.6 mya. Collaborative hunting is cognitively more taxing 
than scavenging primarily because it increases the cognitive demands on planned 
coordination. It also likely required better tools (especially weapons) since hunters are 
not just driving rivals away. Certainly, it still requires a capacity to share the spoils of 
the hunt and to avoid free riders. But early Homo would have already developed many 
social cognitive skills that made possible such a demanding collective activity, including 
joint attention and basic communicative skills. 
Ontogenetic adaptations such as joint attention and communicative gestures are 
usually seen as having immediate adaptive value while contributing little to individual’s 
chances of survival and reproduction of the individual during its adulthood. These 
ontogenetic changes help children to survive in their current ontogenetic niche. But 
ontogenetic adaptations could have easily become essential skills for adults too. This 
would have been the case in contexts such as collective hunting (Tomasello et al., 2012). 
In fact, on the view I am defending, one distinctive contribution of collective big game 
hunting would have been to enhance our emerging capacities for shared intentionality 
over a gradient of cognitive complexity for planned coordination—at the same time, it 
would have continued expanding our baseline capacity for social tolerance and impulse 
control. Another is to increase the demand for different forms of partner control that are 
fueled by distinctively human forms of punitive attitudes, which likely increased the 
costs and payoffs in situations of partner choice and led to an increased sensitivity to the 
reputational effects of collaboration via social selection of collaborative partners 
(Boehm, 1999, 2007, 2012). 
122 
 
Crucially, then, the transition toward active collaborative hunting was largely 
leveraged by the interplay between the selective pressures that led to cooperative 
breeding in humans as well as organized, goal-oriented, collective hunting. Cooperative 
breeding increases sibling and peer competition between infants. But as children grow 
older, they start spending more time among peers since even under conditions of 
cooperative breeding most of the adult’s attention would be redirected toward younger 
individuals. As a result, the frequency and reliance of peer interaction gradually 
increases. The fitness benefit is first and foremost about the particular developmental 
periods involved, but it may extend to later developmental periods if traits developed at 
one period turn out to be good preparation for challenges faced at a later developmental 
period. This is a plausible assumption. Middle childhood is sometimes called the 
‘forgotten age’ due to the predominant focus in development psychology on early 
childhood and adolescence (Mah & Ford-Jones, 2012). But peer interaction during this 
period, e.g., in the form of play, could have helped as a preparatory step for more 
serious and risky collaboration during adulthood. Then, assuming random variation in 
time of onset, natural selection could have favored individuals with a more premature 
development of adult-like shared intentional capacities, including their distinctive 
punitive attitudes and concomitant sensitivities for partner choice. 
Of course, during the transition to a middle childhood, children are still 
dependent on adults. They continue to be engaged in a process of sibling and peer 
competition for care and attention, including against younger individuals who naturally 
receive most of the attention. As a result, engaging caregivers becomes progressively 
more complex as they focus their attention to the youngsters. But at the same time, 
children also become more physically apt to help and collaborate. Learning how to 
make themselves useful to adults in their everyday activities would be then a possible 
way to gain such care and attention. Younger children are not of much help to adults, 
but older ones (starting from 7 years of age in extant natural-fertility populations) may 
contribute to the overall productivity of the group as to generate an intergenerational 
interdependent economy (Kramer, 2005, 2010). This creates, in turn, a safe epistemic 
niche for the child to rehearse their collaborative skills and to learn about adult activities 
even without explicit teaching involved. 
The skills developed in the child’s interaction with adults are then redeployed in 
the context of peer collaboration. During middle childhood, a child has to learn how to 
make decisions with others with little or no adult supervision. They are typically low-
risk decisions, such as where, when, and what to play, in environments that still afford 
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social exploration. Adult individuals would be concerned with defense and childcare for 
the youngsters but they will likely not interfere with children businesses. In this context, 
it would have been important to learn how to treat others fairly or in a mutually 
satisfactory manner; not only because after certain age adults do not mediate peer 
interactions but also because they are the onset of the social relationships that are 
essential for survival during adulthood. At that stage, children have the opportunity to 
interiorize the social benefits of sharing resources with others and to learn how to be a 
reliable playing partner who keeps his/her commitments to joint activities. Moreover, 
the transition to middle childhood open a window of opportunity to learn the social cost 
of peer reprisal in low-risk contexts where failure to cooperate is not lethal. 
Recent studies on impression management show how sensitive modern human 
children are to the reputational effects of their social behavior on peers. Young children, 
but not other great apes, seem to be concerned about others’ evaluations of their 
cooperative and prosocial tendencies because they appear to adjust their behavior based 
on their prediction of how others will assess this behavior (Engelmann et al., 2012). 
They seem able to make reputational judgments about others as cooperators, based on 
direct or indirect evidence, i.e., they know that they are being judged by others and, 
consequently, they modify their behavior to affect those judgments. Of course, it is 
difficult to project features of extant human populations back into ancestral ones. But 
giving the child psychology that we see in extant human populations, it indicates that 
these features could have ‘migrated down’ in development as a preparation for 
challenges faced at a later developmental period—in particular, if longer periods of 
maturation of essential social skills can indeed benefit complex adult activities such as 
collaborative foraging.31 
5-year-old human children, for instance, have been shown to share more and 
steal less when they are being watched by a peer than when they are alone. In contrast, 
chimpanzees behave the same regardless of the condition. Previous research has shown 
that at this age children first engage in second-order mental reasoning (Frith & Amodio, 
2006; Sullivan, Zaitchik, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994) of the form “I am thinking about 
what you are thinking about me” (Banerjee, 2002), which is a central cognitive 
prerequisite of self-reputational behavior. The prediction in these studies is that subjects 
would help more and steal less when are being observed if they were concerned with 
their self-reputation as collaborative partners. In one of these studies, for instance, 
31 I owe this metaphor about traits migrating up and down in development to Michael Tomasello. 
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preschool children have to solve a task that requires more stickers than the ones they 
receive in an envelope from the experimenter. Under this condition, solving the tasks 
requires the subject to take some of the stickers that are left in the experimental room 
but which the subject is explicitly told are intended for another child who would play the 
game later on. Consistent with the hypothesis that children care about their reputation, if 
they try to solve the task when there is a novel peer in the room, they are much more 
prone to refrain from taking the stickers than when there is no peer in the room. 
Overall, experimental results indicate that 5-year-old human children (but not 
chimpanzees) share more and steal less when they are being watched by a peer than 
when they are alone. In the stealing task, for instance, subjects stole in 4% of all cases in 
the observed condition and in 24% of all cases in the unobserved condition. In the 
helping task, subjects helped in 11% of all cases in the unobserved condition and in 28% 
of all cases in the observed condition. In contrast, in the helping task, chimpanzee 
subjects helped in 34% of all cases, for the observed condition, and 36% of all cases in 
the unobserved condition. Similarly, in the stealing task, they stole in 20% of all cases, 
for the observed condition, and in 23% of all cases in the unobserved one. 
When we developed this sensitivity to social reputation is an important but open 
question. However, the proposal is that at some point in our evolutionary history 
(initially in play, but perhaps in other contexts as well) young children started to 
cooperate with peers or risked suffering the fitness consequences of not doing so. The 
primary selective pressures would have proceeded mainly upstream from adulthood and 
adolescence to childhood, enhancing their sensitivity to the reputational effects of their 
own cooperative behavior. Arguably, this capacity did not evolve in the context of child-
adult interactions since these relationships are hierarchically structured and, therefore, 
much more sensitive to covariables such as authority and fear of punishment. 
This is important because, during adolescence and sexual maturity, peer 
interaction becomes increasingly socially taxing in an evolutionary scenario such as the 
one envisioned by the interdependence hypothesis, where one must collaborate with 
one’s peers for basic subsistence. And probably of importance for fitness too since the 
social capital that children build during childhood in the form of networks of allies and 
friends will endure into adulthood, making a non-trivial difference in terms of their 
fitness. If there were selective pressures for obligate collaborative foraging, as the 
interdependence hypothesis postulates, then those individuals who were best able to 
collaborate with their peers would have had an adaptive advantage. It is in this context 
that it has been speculated that those individuals who had already developed especially 
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powerful skills and motivations of shared intentionality, beginning in infancy and 
continuing throughout childhood, would already have a special stock of skills needed for 
cognitively and motivationally activities such collaborative foraging (Tomasello & 
Gonzalez-Cabrera, 2017). 
The result of this process should have been some kind of ontogenetic 
preadaptation, i.e., an ontogenetic adaptation selected for at an early developmental 
period that turns out to be useful for a later development stage—especially when 
individuals reach sexual maturity and, therefore, not only survive but reproduce. This 
process creates an evolutionary feedback loop of downstream and upstream selective 
forces in the emergence of shared intentionality and its distinctive normative dimension 
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Figure 4.2. Selective feedback loop between cooperative breeding and collective 
hunting of big game. Cooperative breeding generates downstream selection in infancy 
and childhood for joint attention, basic forms of communication such as pointing, and 
increased helping skills. These basic capacities subsequently extend into adulthood, 
given the advantages they provide to coordinate adult activities, especially collaborative 
foraging. In turn, selective pressures stemming from increased interdependence in adult 
activities created demands for more complex adaptations for coordination and 
communication that extended downstream into childhood as a preparation for adult 
social interaction. This includes an initial understanding of social normative demands as 
a function of selection for displaying punitive attitudes toward those who do not meet 
our joint social expectations. The developmental trajectory is represented here with 
dashed lines. 
 
Initially, cooperative breeding generates downstream selection in infancy and 
toddlerhood for basic capacities of shared intentionality such as joint attention, 
communicative pointing, and other helping skills. These basic capacities subsequently 
extend into adulthood, due to the selective advantages they provide at the cost of 
relatively little or no disruption in the overall cognitive development of the organism. In 
particular, given the advantages these skills provide to coordinate adult activities, 
especially collaborative foraging, selective pressures stemming from increased 
interdependence created demands for more complex adaptations for coordination and 
communication that extended downstream into childhood as a preparation for adult 
social interaction. More importantly, as part of their preparation for adulthood, children 
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began to be progressively sensitive to the social normative demands of their social 
environment as a result of selection for displaying punitive attitudes toward those peers 
who do not meet their joint social expectations. Traces of this process can be observed 
in the increasing awareness of the child about their own social reputation. 
In sum, if the above model is right, there were selective pressures for infants’ 
ontogenetic adaptations for joint attention, cooperative communication, and helping, to 
‘migrate up’ because they were useful for children and adults in the context of 
ecological pressures for collaborative foraging. But ontogenetic adaptations geared 
toward a particular developmental period are also extended downstream in development 
as a natural consequence of random variation in age of onset and selective pressures 




Following my discussion in chapter 3, I have argued here that the more socially tolerant 
model of the Pan/Homo LCA I offered in that chapter is compatible with the idea that 
early hominins hunted in groups (see also Pickering, 2013). The tamer picture of our 
early ancestors I offered in that chapter played a crucial role in the present chapter in 
two different ways. One was to provide a cognitive baseline for my lineage explanation 
of normative guidance. Another was facilitating the gradual expansion of early hominin 
cooperative capacities since collaborative foraging would be implausible in a very 
aggressive and dominant lineage. However, I think that collaborative hunting is only 
part of the story of the evolution of normative guidance. 
Certainly, the traditional interdependence hypothesis of the origins of shared 
intentionality points to collaborative foraging, especially collective hunting, as the main 
driver in the evolution of our shared intentional capacities (Tomasello et al., 2012). But 
this explanation leaves open the question of why these capacities emerge so early in 
ontogeny. I have argued instead that cooperative breeding was the initial driving force in 
the evolution of our share intentional capacities (see Hawkes, 2012, 2014) while the 
distinctive normative dimension of some shared intentional states emerged largely as a 
consequence of the selective pressures on collaborative hunting. For obligate collective 
hunting requires shared intentional states that regulate collective activities in a way that 
is distinctively normative, i.e., they are mental states that are generalizable in scope and 




Finally, I have put forward a model of the role of ontogeny in the evolution of 
normative cognition. This model takes into account the tradeoffs that emerge during the 
transition from childhood to adulthood in order to integrate insights from both the 





Chapter 5. Sharing our normative worlds  
 
In chapter 4, I have argued that shared intentionality emerged from the interplay 
between the selective pressures that led to cooperative breeding in humans and 
collective hunting. On this account, selection did not only act upon adult cognitive 
capacities but rather upon the entire life cycle. Now, in this chapter, I will connect these 
issues with a particular ontogenetic account of this capacity. In particular, building upon 
usage-based models of language acquisition (Bybee, 1985; Givón, 1979; Langacker, 
1987), I will argue that the process of norm acquisition is the result of domain-general 
mechanisms of pattern-recognition, intention-reading, and affective processing. These 
mechanisms allow children to produce normative judgments that are generalizable, 
intrinsically motivational, and which trigger punitive attitudes against norm violators. 
Moreover, some of these normative judgments are moralized in a prototypical way often 
engendering moralized emotions like guilt and shame (but also less studied positive 
emotions) which contribute to these judgments being perceived as inescapable and 
authority independent (Mameli, 2013). As we will see in this chapter, this model leads 
to important philosophical consequences for one of the more heated debate in 
contemporary moral psychology, namely the debate on moral nativism (Dwyer, 2007; 
Hauser, 2006b; Hauser, Young, & Cushman, 2008a, 2008b; Joyce, 2006; Katz, 2000; 
Mikhail, 2007; Nichols, 2005; Prinz, 2009; Sterelny, 2010). 
In the view I have been defending, although moral judgments are not a unified 
class of mental states, shared intentionality can help us to define a particular kind of 
social normative thinking. Moreover, some prototypical moral judgments may emerge 
as a particular subclass of these mental states, for as I will argue in this chapter, 
emotional and affective dispositions not only play a key constitutive role in normative 
cognition but also they help us to single out a particular subset of prototypical moral 
judgment that are perceived as inescapable and authority independent (Mackie, 1977).32 
In particular, what I want to show in this chapter is how shared intentionality enables the 
32 It might be important to remember that this is a claim about the cognitive psychology of normative 
thinking and its origins, not about the semantics of moral language. The cognitivist/noncognitivist divide 
is difficult to bridge in metaethical discussions about the semantics of moral language because it is 
difficult to come with an appropriate formal semantic model (Schroeder, 2008). However, one does not 
face the same challenges in psychology where formalizing semantic content is not a theoretical goal. 




                                                          
representation of mental states of the form “x is morally required” in an agent-
independent way, and how they are prototypically moralized in virtue of their affective 
and motivational component. 
For this purpose, the rest of this chapter is divided as follow. In section 5.1, I 
will explain the philosophical motivations behind debates about the ontogeny of 
normative cognition through views of moral nativism. In section 5.2, I will contrast 
these views with one that extends the ontogenetic account of normative cognition 
introduced in chapter 4. In section 5.3, I will introduce a model of norm acquisition that 
builds upon usage-based theories of language development in cognitive linguistics. 
Certainly, the model does not depend on the validity of any particular approach to 
language development, but they help us to understand how the cultural transmission of 
social norms is possible through the motivational and cognitive infrastructure of our 
shared intentional psychology. In section 5.4, I will argue that this model allows us to 
understand how some normative judgments are perceived as inescapable and authority 
independent by selectively tuning the affective processing mechanisms involved in 
norm acquisition and norm execution. Finally, in section 5.5, I will draw some 
philosophical consequences from this discussion by arguing that at least not all of our 
moral cognition is built upon alleged innate moral information, which gives additional 
support to the fragmentationist view of moral judgments introduced in chapter 2. 
 
5.1. Moral nativism 
 
In chapter 2, I have argued that the class of moral judgments shatters into different 
prototypical classes of moral judgments such as judgments with Turiel’s signature moral 
pattern and judgments about inescapable and authority independent demands. I argued 
that these fragmented class of prototypical moral judgments could by clustered, 
nonetheless, around a special form of norm psychology that stems from our distinctive 
capacities for shared intentionality. I proposed in that chapter that the lineage 
explanation of shared intentionality could help us to explain the emergence of shared 
intentional normative judgments, which in turns fractionates into these different clusters 
of prototypical moral judgments, each of which might be a culturally relative and 
acquired through the interaction with our particular cultural environments. However, as 
pointed out at the beginning of the thesis, some dominant views in moral psychology 
(Dwyer, 1999; Hauser, 2006b; Mikhail, 2011; Mikhail et al., 1998) argue that moral 
cognition is not only a well-defined natural kind in the psychological sciences, but also 
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that moral thinking is innate. At least to an important extent, these views offer a quite 
different view than the one I try to defend in this dissertation—a discussion that I have 
postponed until this chapter. The aim of this section is primarily expositive, for I want to 
explain moral nativism in one of its most prominent versions, the so-called ‘linguistic 
analogy’, and provide the philosophical motivation behind debates about the ontogeny 
of normative cognition, which I will address in this chapter. 
The lineage explanation I have put forward in this thesis integrates facts about 
the evolutionary and developmental trajectory of shared intentionality and its distinctive 
normative dimension. This account connects normative thinking to domain-general 
mechanisms of shared intentionality that arguably played an important role in other 
aspects of the human uniqueness syndrome such as human ultra-cooperative tendencies 
(Tomasello, 2009b), enhanced mindreading skills (Call, 2009), and human-unique 
capacities for linguistic communication (Tomasello, 2008). I understand domain 
specificity here as the view that specialized learning devices support some aspects of 
cognition. This position is closely linked to modular views of the mind. But since 
domain specificity does not commit to all the assumptions of traditional Fodorian 
modularity such as informational encapsulation, the former can be considered as a more 
general version of the thesis of the modularity of mind (Fodor, 1983). Thus, the 
mechanisms of shared intentionality that support the kind of social normative thinking I 
propose in this dissertation are domain-general. For they do not just enable acquisition 
of norms and the development of the capacity to make social normative judgments, but 
also enable a number of different cultural skills that children normally acquire through 
social learning—more notoriously, as I will argue in section 5.5, many key aspect of 
their capacity for linguistic communication. To put it briefly, there are reasons to think 
that the basic cognitive and motivational infrastructure underlying shared intentionality 
is highly entrenched in human development. But many aspects of human cognition 
derived from those skills, including the kind of normative cognition I have been 
discussing in this thesis, are the result of those cultural environments that our shared 
intentional capacities help to construct (Tomasello et al., 2005). In this chapter, I will 
focus on this latter point. 
Roughly understood, psychological nativism is the view that certain cognitive 
capacities are innate. The idea of innate traits can be explained via genetically canalized 
developmental systems that take development to the same endpoint from many different 
environmental starting points (Ariew, 1996, 1999, 2007). However, both the appropriate 
account of innateness and its extent is controversial (Griffiths & Machery, 2008; 
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Mameli & Bateson, 2011), but I will set aside this issue to focus on a particular family 
of nativist views that stem from the Chomskyian model of language development. 
Nativist approaches are popular in the contemporary debates on human cognition mainly 
due to the prominence of linguistic nativism. It not surprising, then, that one of the most 
prominent nativist views of normative cognition has borrowed different elements from 
it. Building on Chomsky’s (1957) ideas, researchers such as John Mikhail, Marc Hauser, 
and Susan Dwyer, for instance, have vigorously argued that humans possess a universal 
moral grammar similar to the one put forward by Chomskyan linguistics (Dwyer, 2007; 
Hauser, 2006b; Hauser et al., 2008a, 2008b; Mikhail, 2007). The key argument in favor 
of the existence of a universal grammar in linguistics (and moral psychology) is the so-
called ‘poverty of stimulus argument’, i.e., the idea that the environment does not 
contain enough information to enable a learner to acquire the linguistic competence 
typically displayed by young children—at least, not by applying mere domain-general 
learning mechanisms to environmental inputs (see Botterill & Carruthers, 1999; Cowie, 
1999; Laurence & Margolis, 2001). 
Roughly speaking, the Chomskyan picture of language acquisition was forged as 
a reaction to the Skinnerian model of language development. According to Skinner 
(1957), children learn a language by deploying a variety of simple learning 
mechanisms—primarily, mechanisms of instrumental conditioning and principles of 
induction that allow stimulus generalization. But Chomsky (1968, 1980, 1986) famously 
argued that there are many abstract grammatical principles to which children lack any 
appropriate evidential access. Children’s language access consists of only a few series of 
discrete individual utterances. For example, understanding the relationship between 
indicative and yes-no questions requires identifying the organization of lexical items 
into subsentential constituents that cannot be captured as a set of simple lexical patterns 
(Chomsky, 1980). Hence, there should exist a specific language faculty with innate 
domain-specific information that is recruited in first language acquisition: an innate 
universal grammar which is common for all natural languages and that is common to all 
stages of child language development (Pinker, 1984). 
Of course, languages differ considerably from one another, but those differences 
are a matter of parametric variation. On the principles-and-parameters approach (see, for 
instance, Chomsky, 1981, 1982) the syntax of a natural language is described through 
the interaction of both general principles and specific parameters which are either turned 
on or off depending on the particular language we acquire from our cultural 
environment. As pointed out by Dąbrowska (n.d.), the list of relevant parameters differs 
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substantially from one linguist to another. Pinker (1994, p. 112) thinks that there are 
only a few, Fodor (2001, p. 734) suggests that there might be around 20, Roberts and 
Holmberg (2005, p. 541) argue that they might be around 50-100 of them, and some 
others have thought that might be hundreds of them (Kayne, 2005). There is no 
canonical list of parameters. For example, Baker (2001) discusses 10 different 
parameters, while Fodor and Sakas (2004) list 13, with few parameters in common 
between both lists (Haspelmath, 2007; Tomasello, 2005). And even Chomsky (1993, 
1995, 2001) himself has abandon this model in favor of a minimalist approach. 
In this line of thought, Hauser and colleagues have argued that the child’s moral 
judgments emerge from a universal moral grammar consisting of various abstract moral 
principles. Specific moral judgments are just the consequence of the interaction between 
these abstract moral principles and specific cultural environments through a process of 
moral learning—a process in which cultural environments set the parameters of the 
universal moral grammar to the specific values of one’s community (2006b, p. 43). As 
in the case of linguistic acquisition, the key argument in favor of moral nativism is the 
poverty of the stimulus argument. On this version of the argument, the capacities 
evident in moral cognition are acquired in a manner that goes beyond the information 
available in the child’s local learning environment. For example, John Mikhail (2009) 
has notably argued that the moral environments to which children are exposed are too 
impoverished to explain how children understand the moral/conventional distinction 
(Nucci et al., 1983; Turiel, 1983, 1998). So, the nativists argue, the moral/conventional 
distinction involves innate, domain-specific information. 
Another example comes from Hauser (2006b) study on the so-called ‘principle 
of double effect’, i.e., the idea that it is more acceptable to cause a harm for a greater 
good if that harm is a foreseen but unintended side effect than intentionally causing such 
a harm as a means to the same end. People often distinguish between actions that 
produce foreseen but unintended consequences, and actions that bring about those 
foreseen consequences in an intended way. This distinction is morally relevant, but 
Hauser argues that this and other moral principles are not only culturally universal but 
also typically opaque (if not completely inaccessible) to the agents through 
introspection. Thus, the idea is that in the right kind of conditions (e.g., when we face 
particular types of moral dilemmas), these principles reliably produce moral judgments 
that are fast, automatic, and non-conscious, in a way that systematically depends on tacit 
principles that are built-in in our cognitive machinery. In the same way, for instance, we 
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can explain how children reliably make moral discriminations such as those that we see 
in the literature about the moral/conventional distinction. 
I think that a closer look at the parallels between language and moral thinking 
can help us to deal with the poverty of stimulus argument.33 For the kind of parallel that 
I will draw in this chapter illustrates how children can acquire complex normative 
principles and capacities by deploying similar learning mechanisms to those deployed to 
acquire many of the complex aspect of language that Chomskian nativists used to think 
were innate. In particular, I will argue that evidence from developmental psychology 
largely supports a model of normative development that is in stark contrast with the one 
proposed by moral grammarians. This model builds upon an alternative linguistic 
analogy which rejects the idea of an innate universal grammar (see, for instance, Bates 
& MacWhinney, 1989; Bybee, 1985, 2010; Croft, 2000; Givón, 1979; Goldberg, 2006; 
Hopper, 1987; Langacker, 1987; Tomasello, 2003). According to this model, children’s 
understanding of the moral/conventional distinction is prototypical and culturally 
relative because it is a capacity acquired through social learning. That is, we learn from 
our cultural environments that prototypical cases of moral transgressions have the 
Turiel’s signature moral pattern discussed at the beginning of this dissertation. As I will 
argue, even core moral principles, such as the principle of double effect, appear 
gradually and in a piecemeal fashion through mechanisms of intention-reading, pattern-
recognition, and affective processing that are deployed in the child’s everyday 
interactions with others. 
 
5.2. The ontogeny of human social norm psychology 
 
In the previous section, I have introduced moral nativism in the version advocated by 
moral grammarians. For moral grammarians, moral cognition builds upon an innate 
faculty of syntax-like moral principles. Given this approach, moral grammarians pay 
relatively little attention to the developmental trajectory of these capacities. Core moral 
principles are innate and cultural environments set the parameters of this universal 
moral grammar to the specific values of one’s social group. Moral grammarians think 
that all moral judgments derive from this core moral faculty. But on the view I offer in 
33 Of course, the poverty of the stimulus argument could be rejected without embracing any particular 
model of language development. One could think that a similar model offers an appropriate picture of 
normative development, even when it does not accurately account the development of language. 
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this thesis, the capacity to make at least some prototypical moral judgments (i.e., 
judgments with Turiel’s signature moral pattern and judgments about inescapable and 
authority independent demands) stems from an ontogenetically robust form of norm 
psychology that builds upon our cognitive and motivational infrastructure for shared 
intentionality. In sections 5.3 and 5.4, I will argue that this form of norm psychology 
enables us to entertain shared intentional normative thoughts that can acquire the 
characteristic features of these prototypical classes of moral judgments through learning 
and socialization. However, in order to understand how this form of norm psychology 
gives rise to these prototypical classes of moral judgments we need to understand how 
this psychology develops in ontogenetic time. As a result, I will focus in this section on 
explaining my account of the developmental trajectory of our capacity for shared 
intentional normative thinking—a view that builds upon the ontogenetic account 
introduced at the end of chapter 4. 
Developmental trajectory is important. Discussions about built-in cognitive 
capacities and acquired ones try to make sense of our distinctive developmental 
trajectory. But as we have seen in chapter 4, the developmental trajectory of human 
normative cognition is expected to be highly intricate. Basic forms of shared intentional 
states initially emerged as ontogenetic adaptations for early childhood in a cooperative 
breeding context. This is the case of joint attention and declarative pointing. These 
capacities were subsequently extended in ontogeny because they were co-opted by 
adjacent developmental stages, including adulthood, since they were plausible useful for 
coordinating behavior in foraging contexts. When shared intentional states extended into 
adulthood, these basic skills for shared intentionality meet the selective pressures of 
adult activities such as collaborative big game hunting. Big game hunting required 
increased motivation and commitment to shared goals as well as careful monitoring and 
enforcing of those joint intentions. The coupling of these punitive attitudes with the 
gradient of generalizability and intrinsic motivation of shared intentional states was the 
origin of social normative thinking.34 
34 In small-scale societies, ethnographic evidence suggests that the regulation of cooperation by 
punishment is infrequent and often low-cost. However, this does not mean that punishment is completely 
absent, e.g., in the form of ridicule or ostracism (Boehm, 1999; Gurven, 2004). In addition, punitive 
attitudes as defined in chapter 2 have been reported among forager societies, for they complain or become 
upset when shares are not returned (Henrich et al., 2006). They also likely play an important role in 
partner choice, which according to theoretical models help to solve cooperative dilemmas without direct 
punishment (Aktipis, 2004; Barclay, 2006; Noë & Hammerstein, 1994). 
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However, I have also argued that selective pressures stemming from 
collaborative foraging pushed down the development of these social skills into earlier 
developmental stages. The demands of more complex forms of communication and 
commitment required increasing preparation and maturation, which favored the 
emergence of these traits in progressively earlier developmental stages in which 
collaborative activities are typically low-risk. As a result, the development of human 
social normative cognition was compressed by both upstream and downstream selective 
pressures, i.e., those that favored the retention of basic capacities for shared 
intentionality into later developmental stages and those that favored the earlier 
emergence of more complex forms of shared intentionality and its distinctive normative 
dimension. This section will focus on the developmental trajectory of this capacity. 
Several studies of cooperation in human children suggest that the above model 
of the developmental trajectory of normative cognition is roughly right. For example, 
from very early on children also seem to be much more prone to collaborate and to 
express sympathetic concern toward others than any other great ape. Experimental 
evidence shows that 12-month-old children point at an object to help an adult find it 
(Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano, & Tomasello, 2006). 18-month-old children show 
sympathetic concern for others and systematically attempt to comfort them when they 
get hurt (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Zahn-
Waxler, Radkeyarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992). They also understand other 
people’s goals and help them to achieve those goals, e.g., by getting out-of-reach objects 
or removing obstacles for them (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). 2-year-old children are 
also able to share resources with others even at some cost to themselves (Brownell, 
Svetlova, & Nichols, 2009; Svetlova, Nichols, & Brownell, 2010). In fact, children are 
not only more prone to share resources with other but also it has been shown that 
collaborative activities systematically promote equal sharing, even at the cost of 
children’s own resources (Hamann et al., 2011). This picture is very similar to the one it 
has been offered in the previous chapter since it relied on helping and sharing with 
others in the context of collaborative activities that are mediated by the sharing of goals 
and attention. 
Also, children from 2 years of age seem to display sympathetic concerns for 
others. Studies on child sympathetic responses typically measure arousal by relative 
changes in pupil dilation. This might be controversial. But for quite some time, it has 
been argued that the activity of the sympathetic nervous system correlates with changes 
in pupil dilation (Loewenfeld & Lowenstein, 1993; Lowenstein, Feinberg, & 
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Loewenfeld, 1963). In particular, it has been shown that positive or negative situations 
that require the organism’s attention typically trigger the activation of this system (see 
for example Levenson, 2003). In humans, for instance, even the anticipation of events 
that are emotionally salient increase pupil dilation (Bradley, Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 
2008; Nunnally, Knott, Duchnowski, & Parker, 1967; Partala & Surakka, 2003). 
Unusual social interactions (Gredeback & Melinder, 2010) and representations of 
impossible physical events (Jackson & Sirois, 2009) increase pupil dilation in children 
younger than 1 year of age. Sympathetic concern is important because it suggests that 
children do not display these behaviors out of purely instrumental reasons. 
In this line of research, it has been also found that 2-year-old children’s 
sympathetic arousal is similar when they themselves help others and when they see a 
third party helping others (Hepach, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2012). In both cases, 
sympathetic arousal has shown to be different from that displayed when the person is 
not being helped at all. Overall, these results show that young children do not require 
that they perform the behavior themselves and thus get credit for it in order to be 
motivated to help others. They seem to have a genuine concern for the welfare of 
others—children display signs of wanting others to be helped, regardless of whether 
they themselves are the ones who provide the help. Of course, sympathetic arousal does 
not necessarily translate in effective behavior and, therefore, it does not mean that we 
will display prosocial behavior all the time. But it points to an intrinsic motivational 
component that is characteristic of our shared intentional psychology in collaborative 
situations that require a modicum of coordination of our mental states. 
Importantly, other great apes can share, help, and even display certain 
sympathetic concerns for other. But at this point in children’s development, helping and 
sharing are supported by a different set of psychological mechanisms. For example, if a 
12-month-old child points at an object to help an adult find it, this gesture depends on 
cognitive and motivational capacities for shared intentionality—more precisely, in the 
form of joint attention.35 What the child is doing when pointing is directing the adult’s 
attention to the objects by using a gesture in order to initiate a joint attentional 
interaction. The gesture is effective insofar as there is a common ground with the adult 
in the form of a joint attentional frame. The child is not only experiencing the same 
thing at the same time but also knowing together with the adult that they are 
35 It might be worth to emphasize again that attention is an intentional state. Therefore, shared attention is 
a form of shared intentionality (Carpenter & Call, 2013). 
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experiencing the same thing at the same time. So, even these very simple activities in 
which children engage in their early developmental stages are real collaborative 
activities instead of mere group activities—at least in the sense that social coordination 
is achieved by a different way to represent the interaction. 
This becomes clearer in cases involving role reversal which is facilitated by a 
bird’s-eye view’ of the social interaction as introduced in chapter 2. There is evidence 
that 12- and 18-month-olds are able to engage in some basic forms of role reversal, e.g., 
dyadic, body-oriented role reversal imitation (Carpenter, Tomasello, & Striano, 2005). 
Very early in development, children then seem to be able to coordinate simple 
complementary roles with an adult partner. But role reversal requires from the children 
that they conceive both roles in the same representational format, such that they become 
interchangeable. They need to attend to both roles simultaneously and then combining 
both roles into a single mental representation that comprises the whole activity from an 
external viewpoint, which allows the reversal of roles in tasks with complementary 
actions (Fletcher et al., 2012). But this is not true of chimpanzees (Fletcher et al., 2012; 
Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005). 
Young children seem also intrinsically motivated to engage in joint activities, 
which is another important component of shared intentionality. 18-month-olds and 2-
year-olds systematically try to reengage the partner in order to continue the activity 
(instead of continuing the activity by themselves) when a cooperative activity breaks 
down, e.g., when a partner suddenly stops doing his/her role (Warneken, Chen, & 
Tomasello, 2006). This is true even when the child’s partner is not necessary anymore to 
complete the task. A similar behavior is shown even in 14-month old infants who seem 
to make some effort to reengage passive partners when performing simple coordinated 
activities with an adult (Warneken & Tomasello, 2007). Thus, children seem to be 
motivated by the joint activity in itself, rather than using the partner as a mere social tool 
to achieve their own goal (Warneken et al., 2012). 
Moreover, experimental evidence also suggests that children around the age of 3 
years honor joint commitments and expect that others do so as well, to the point that 
they often acknowledge when they have not honored those commitments (Gräfenhain et 
al., 2009; Hamann et al., 2012). This strongly suggests that from very early on humans 
develop a form of normative cognition particularly geared to dyadic interactions: 1- to 
3-year-old children possess a type of normative cognition based on joint intentions, 
personal relationships, and social emotions, that makes them able to be fair and to feel 
sympathetic with particular others. Hence, this developmental stage resembles the first 
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step proposed by advocates of the interdependence hypothesis, which I have argued can 
be understood as preparation for adult activities due to upstream selective pressures that 
allowed once typically adult skills to migrate down in human psychological 
development. 
As time progresses, children’s normative cognition also changes. By 3 years of 
age, children seem to coordinate complementary action roles with others through an 
agent-independent conception of those roles. Shared intentionality enables us to share 
goals with respect to some external event and being motivated to cooperate in their 
realization. It allows us to form intentions of the form “We want to do this together”. 
Thus, very early in life, children begin to coordinated and complement action roles—
e.g. the adult experimenter holds a box and the infant inserts a toy. They begin to share 
intentions or action roles in pursuit of a goal in a way that suggests that each partner is 
aware of both roles as in “You hold the box, I insert the toy”, which facilitates mutual 
help and role reversal. 
As explained in chapter 2, a representation is said to be ‘agent-independent’ if its 
content does not specify any agent—i.e., if the child understands that those roles can be 
variably filled by different agents over time. The development of this way to understand 
social interactions is gradual. While 3-year-old children form and use agent-independent 
representations of action roles, 4-year-old children may, for example, use these 
representations flexibly for episodic memory and future deliberation in planning their 
own and others’ actions (Rakoczy, Gräfenhain, Cluver, Dalhoff, & Sternkopf, 2014). 
The increasingly agent-independent way in which tasks and roles are represented is 
consistent with the evolutionary account offered in the previous chapter. For on this 
view, our shared intentional capacities became more complex along a cognitive gradient 
of generalizability that is supported by an increasing capacity to form agent-independent 
representations of social roles. 
In the previous chapter, I argued that with an increasing capacity to form agent-
independent representations, we should also expect to see a more collective form of 
shared intentionality. Consistently with this, children about 3 years of age seem to begin 
to be able to understand their social interactions in terms of interactions with groups as 
opposed to a mere collection of people with various dyadic relationships. Younger 
children’s social responses typically differentiate familiar from strange individuals. But 
at the age of 3, children start to respond to the groups themselves, based on social cues 
such as linguistic accent (Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke, 2007), physical and behavioral 
resemblance (Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2008). At this age, young children seem to 
140 
 
understand that part of being a member of a group is to commit themselves to the ways 
in which the group does things. They seem to understand that becoming a group 
member involves accepting the social norms of the group as the evidence I will review 
in the paragraphs below seem to indicate. Certainly, toddlers follow social norms but 
they may understand them as mere imperatives. They may agree to the imperative 
requests of adults but they do not seem to understand social norms and how they work 
since they do not actively enforce norms until the age of 3 years (Rakoczy, 2008; 
Rakoczy, Brosche, et al., 2009; Rakoczy et al., 2008; Rossano, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 
2011; Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012; Vaish, Missana, et al., 2011). 
There are many prudential reasons to conform to social norms, but 3-year-old 
children feel compelled to enforce them on others. At that age, children seem to begin to 
identify themselves with their groups by endorsing the explicit and implicit normative 
standards of the group and enforcing them selectively to ingroup members only 
(Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2012; Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012). For example, 
recent studies on norm enforcement in young children show that 3-year-olds view norms 
of conventional games as limited in scope to ingroup members, i.e., children 
spontaneously protest more against norm transgressions committed by ingroups than 
outgroups (Schmidt et al., 2012). In total, 9 of 16 children (ingroup condition) versus 3 
of 16 children (outgroup condition) uttered forms of protest, such as critique (e.g., “That 
is not how it is done!”) or normative tattling (“Look, he’s doing it wrongly!”), which 
were indicative of children’s disapproval of the transgression. However, this 
parochialism did not extend to prototypical cases of instrumental (e.g., using a music 
box in the wrong way) or moral transgressions (e.g., destroying other people’s property) 
where children treat transgressors equally. In all the instrumental tasks in the study, 
children spontaneously protested against the transgressors about half of the time 
regardless of the transgressor’s group affiliation, which demonstrates that children were 
neither indifferent to nor afraid of the outgroup individual.36 A similar result was 
obtained in the case of moral transgressions. 
Overall, enforcement of group norms seems to fit naturally on the trajectory of 
increasing group identification. For example, it has also been shown that 4- and 5-year-
olds display loyalty to the group by being less likely to reveal the secret in ingroup 
36 In the instrumental tasks, the experimenter performed an action such as activating a music box 
announcing to the child and the puppet “We do it like this!” Then, the child and the puppet could 
reproduce the action but the latter made an instrumental mistake by, for instance, trying to activate the 
music box by pushing it instead of turning its crank. 
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conditions than in outgroup conditions (Misch, Over, & Carpenter, 2016). They remain 
loyal to their group even when telling the secret would be materially advantageous, e.g., 
by obtaining additional rewards in the form of stickers. In the context of norms, children 
as young as 3 years of age seem to recognize the norms of the group and endorse them 
rather than merely responding to groups based on social cues such as linguistic accent or 
physical and behavioral resemblance. Once the children are able to identify and enforce 
the norms of their social groups they are able to make shared intentional normative 
judgments—i.e., judgments that are characterized by a gradient of generalizability, 
intrinsic motivation, and punitive attitudes, as explained in chapter 2. 
Importantly, young children do not need natural pedagogy (Csibra & Gergely, 
2009), normative language, or explicit instructions from adults—a practice that is less 
common in some societies (Lancy, 1996). Of course, all those cues help the normal 
development of children’s normative cognition. But they only need to see that the adults 
apparently expect things to work a certain way to jump to a normative interpretation of 
an action or activity (Casler, Terziyan, & Greene, 2009; Schmidt et al., 2011a). When an 
adult individual models an activity and shares the activity with the child, the child not 
only imitates adult actions but also infers normativity that the child then shares and 
enforce on others. In the absence of normative language and other pedagogical cues, for 
instance, experimental evidence shows that young children interpret adult actions as 
normatively governed by using intention-reading mechanisms that collect social-
pragmatic information—e.g., when an adult acts as if he/she recognized novel objects 
and knew exactly what to do with them . However, children seem to infer normativity 
from those cues as expressed in their verbal and behavioral protest, critique, or 
correction (which sometimes includes explicit teaching) making use of normative 
language as in “No! It does not go like this!” or “You must use this!” (Schmidt et al., 
2011a). Children’s normative learning is also not completely blind but rather biased 
toward adults and reliable role models. This result is expected in a model as the one I 
have proposed in the previous chapter, which predicts that shared intentional normative 
thinking is initially deployed in the context of adult interactions rather than children’s 
peer interaction. For example, it has been shown that from very early on children rely 
more on subjects that have proved to be reliable in the past (Rakoczy, Warneken, & 
Tomasello, 2009), but also the pick-up normative cues especially from adults (Rakoczy 
et al., 2010). 
In addition, children also seem to be promiscuous normativists—i.e., individuals 
prone to make fast generalizations about the normative structure of their social 
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environment. Children often jump to normative conclusions not only without any 
linguistic cue but also without any intentional or conventional cues. For example, a 
recent study has shown that 3-year-old children spontaneously infer the presence of 
social norms even when an adult had done nothing to indicate such a norm in either 
language or behavior (Schmidt, Butler, Heinz, & Tomasello, 2016). In this study, each 
child was placed in a room with an experimenter and a puppet. While the puppet sat 
quietly, the adult would use a collection of objects to play a simple game (e.g., pushing 
a ball with a hammer or fitting pegs into disks). The experimenters used objects from 
which the child could infer a conventional purpose (e.g., a human-made object with a 
hook) and objects that suggested no conventional purpose (e.g., a branch that happened 
to be usable as a hook). In one condition, the experimenter framed it as a demonstration, 
making eye contact and asking the child to pay attention. In the other two conditions, the 
experimenter acted indifferent as they played or pretended to have come up with the 
game by accident (e.g., by saying “oops” as they performed the action). Later, the 
puppet asked to participate in the game, but performed an action that was different from 
the action performed by the adult. 
The results of this experiment showed that children were able to infer social 
norms even from a single intentional action. More strikingly, they protested more (e.g., 
seizing the objects for a demonstration, calling to the adult to intervene, or using 
normative language to explain the right way to perform the action) when the action was 
pedagogical or intentional than when it was accidental, regardless of whether the objects 
involved in the game had a conventional purpose. In other words, children’s default 
assumption seems to be that adults’ actions are not random but instances of a 
normatively structured action type. A similar hypothesis, for instance, has been argued 
about children’s teleological thinking, i.e., the tendency to view all kind of entities as 
designed for purposes (Kelemen, 1999). This does not mean, of course, that children 
have these norms innately instantiated in their brains for all the arbitrary contexts in 
which apparent normative behavior is displayed, but rather than they are prone to make 
inferences about the normative structure of adults’ actions—especially when adults 
display signs of familiarity with the object or situation. 
Children’s reactions to violations of norms in game contexts appear to be quite 
similar to their reactions to violations of prototypical moral norms such as those that 
prohibit harming others. In both cases, children seem to be intrinsically motivated to 
follow those norms and they display punitive attitudes. Children also strongly object to 
norm transgressions of conventional games, and they protest using normative language, 
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e.g., “No! It does not go like this!” (Rakoczy et al., 2008). However, children do seem to 
differentiate conventional norms from moral norms on the basis of their scope. It has 
been shown that young children enforce prototypical moral norms equally on all 
violators while they enforce game norms only on members of their own cultural in-
group (Schmidt et al., 2012). Prototypical moral norms are represented by the children 
as robust, agent-independent norms, whose transgressions require minimal pragmatic 
cues to be detected—the children would only need to recognize the mere intention of 
harming others. Toddlers certainly respond when adults tell them things such as, “We 
don’t hit other children.” But at 3 years of age children can easily generalize these 
prohibitions in a normative way. 
 
5.3. Norm acquisition 
 
I have provided in the previous section a picture of the developmental trajectory of 
shared intentional normative thinking. This picture progressively builds upon the 
infrastructure of our shared intentional capacities beginning with simple capacities for 
shared attention and declarative pointing to shared forms of collaboration and 
commitment that trigger normative judgments which children share with other people. 
When the child is able to understand collective activities by forming shared goals and 
intentions, they are able to entertain social expectations about the activity that entail 
shared commitment. Thus, around the 3 years of age, children begin to enforce those 
normative judgments in themselves and others in a form of shared intentionality which 
is increasingly collective. For these judgments are not just mere expectations about what 
one specific partner should do in order to succeed in a certain task but judgments about 
what any individual should do in order to engage in the activity. 
However, although children have the capacity to make normative judgments and 
to pick up the norms that structure their social environments, they learn these norms 
from others. In this section, I will sketch a model of norm acquisition that helps us to 
deal with the poverty of stimulus argument of section 5.1 and makes sense of the 
ontogenetic trajectory of human social norm psychology explained in section 5.2. In this 
model, children acquire social norms primarily from their interactions with adults and 
seemingly competent models. Certainly, they have a capacity for shared intentional 
normative thinking but they rely on mechanisms of norm acquisition to make those 
judgments. According to the model of norm acquisition I want to propose, information 
stemming from social interactions is processed by three systems, each of which plays an 
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important role in the acquisition of social norms as shared intentional states: intention-
reading mechanisms, pattern-recognition mechanisms, and affective processing 






















Figure 5.1. Model of norm acquisition. Information stemming from social interactions 
is processed by a mechanism of intention-reading, pattern-recognition, and affective 
processing. This information is hypothesized to be integrated somewhere in the brain to 
form representations of norms that are stored in memory. 
 
This information is conjectured to be integrated somewhere in the brain to form 
representations of norms that are stored in memory. Intention-reading mechanisms 
process intentional information. Roughly speaking, they allow the child, for instance, to 
engage in basic mindreading tasks and to share attention with others. Pattern-recognition 
mechanisms help to process information about intentional and non-intentional 
regularities in children’s social environments. Pattern-recognition is paradigmatically a 
cognitive process that allows the child to recognize, for instance, patterns of discontent 
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and disapproval in their local social environments. It helps them to form perceptual and 
conceptual categories and analogies that are essential to navigate their normative 
environments. Affective processing mechanisms, in turn, play a crucial but not 
exclusive role as motivational mechanisms. Roughly, they work as mechanisms of 
valence in moral decision-making, but also as perceptual biases that allow the children 
to focus on the right kind of stimuli as well as to communicate the right kind of attitudes 
that are associated with entertaining normative judgments. Granted, there is an 
important overlap between some of these mechanisms, especially because empathy-
related processes include intention-reading mechanisms. But the categorization of these 
mechanisms does not need to be clear cut. 
This model builds upon usage-based theories of language development since the 
basic mechanisms deployed for language and norm acquisition are largely the same. The 
most important difference between these two learning processes is the role that 
emotional and affective mechanisms play in norm acquisition. For as moral 
sentimentalists have argued, emotional and affective processing is fundamental for our 
understanding of moral thinking (Hume, 1740/1978; Smith, 1759/2002). Thus, a 
hypothesis that requires further investigation is that these processes allow us to 
understand how some shared intentional normative judgments display the signature 
moral pattern proposed by Turiel and colleagues (Nichols, 2002, 2004), as well as why 
they are perceived as inescapable and authority independent (Mameli, 2013), by 
selectively tuning the affective processing mechanisms involved in norm acquisition and 
norm execution. 
Generally speaking, one advantage of linking normative cognition to the 
emergence of our shared intentional capacities is that it allows us to provide a more 
comprehensive view of human uniqueness. For it focuses on the evolution and 
development of a suite of cognitive and motivational mechanisms that lead to a set of 
interconnected symptoms that are characteristic of the human syndrome. As a result, it 
gives us a theoretical ground to speculate about the relationship between normative 
cognition and language, although certainly not of the kind that moral grammarians have 
in mind. On this view, human normative competences do not depend upon principles 
analogous to those of Chomsky’s universal grammar (Chomsky, 1968, 1980, 1986), but 
rather on domain-general mechanisms which play a central role in building our shared 
intentional cognitive infrastructure, including at least some important aspects of human 
linguistic communication. As explained in section 5.1, I will argue that these 
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mechanisms are domain-general in the sense of not being specialized mechanisms for 
norm acquisition. 
 
5.3.1. Acquiring social norms as shared intentional states 
 
Just as a reminder, on the view I am defending in this thesis, social norms are 
represented as shared intentional states that are characterized by a gradient of 
generalizability, intrinsic motivation, and punitive attitudes. Generalizability refers to 
the scope of the norms and the degree of abstraction in which they are represented. 
Hominin shared intentional capacities were initially deployed in dyadic interactions 
between infants and caregivers. But if the model offered in the previous chapter is right, 
the distinctive normative flavor of shared intentionality likely emerged in social contexts 
such as collective hunting of big mammals, which is a cognitively taxing activity in 
terms of planned coordination. Part of the reason why I think this is a crucial part of the 
story is because hunting big mammals is not a dyadic but a complex collective activity. 
As a result, this created pressures for modes to represent the activity in a more agent-
independent way. 
There is an important class of normative judgments are not about particular 
individuals, but about generic agents placed in generic situations and fulfilling generic 
roles. Joint activities such as collective hunting were likely much more computationally 
demanding than other forms of social interactions in that respect—although others 
activities such as collective defense, scavenging, or even the fire making and 
maintenance. Recursive mindreading may explain, for instance, the jointness of basic 
intentional states in early hominins, e.g., the jointness of certain mental states that are 
shared between infant and caregivers. But they are hardly computationally viable in 
contexts such as hunting, where decisions sometimes need to be taken quickly, under 
significant stress and time pressure, and at a high cost for both the individual and the 
group. Thus, the representational machinery deployed in those contexts should have 
been characterized by a gradient of generalization and abstraction.37 
37 The above scenario assumes that contexts like hunting were rather stereotyped and hence there can be 
norms about who should do what and when. It is difficult to determine to what extent this is a realistic 
assumption. However, hunting practices are highly stereotyped in chimpanzees (Boesch, 2002) and the 
evidence for the earliest ambush hunting by hominins and the pattern of animal movements found in the 
Kenya Rift suggests a similar picture (Kübler, Owenga, Reynolds, Rucina, & King, 2015). In the latter 
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Intrinsic motivation refers to the motivational force an agent feels when 
entertaining a normative thought. This is a characteristic feature of shared intentional 
states even in its most basic form—e.g., in both joint attention episodes and declarative 
gestures there seems to be an intrinsic motivation to join the attentional states of others 
and share information with them (see, for instance, Carpenter & Call, 2013; Gómez et 
al., 1993). We enjoy doing things with others and we naturally enjoy sharing with them 
attention, believes, desires, and other intentional states. Unlike great apes, we find 
sharing these states generally rewarding. So, like other shared intentional states, the 
norm is treated by the agent as an end in itself, rather than as a means to other ends. 
They exhibit a special motivational force that differs from mere instrumental 
motivation. The implicit normative mental states that regulated early collective hunting 
in humans, for instance, should have been somewhat robust—they would have 
predisposed individuals to stick to certain social standards even when there was little 
prospect for instrumental gain, reciprocation, or reputation building.  
Hunting of big game is dangerous and fairly unpredictable. In those 
environments, hunting partners need to be skilled, brave, quick decision makers, but 
most importantly, they need to be trustable and reliable. There would have been plenty 
of time for thoughtful consideration of prudential reasons before going to hunt. They 
would have had also many opportunities for partner choice. However, in the midst of a 
hunting trip, letting others down is not a good decision. Thus, even if they needed to 
know when to give it up as a bad job, they should have been intrinsically motivated to 
hunt and act together. It is true that after hours of finding nothing, hunters would need to 
decide when to quit, and in doing so they would have made an individually reasonable 
choice. But these decisions would probably have had a similar collective flavor in order 
to reduce conflict between partners. Hunters would have had a strong commitment that 
shields them from hurting their long-term interests by unnecessarily shrinking the pool 
of potential partners or taking the risks of direct reprisal and reputation damage. Hunters 
should have been very committed to the task even when the chances of being detected 
falling short of these standards were small. 
Of course, intrinsic motivation is not the same as overriding motivation, which 
means that in some other cases, intrinsic commitment could fail due to instrumental 
motivation to free-ride, risk aversion, fear, among other reasons. However, if early 
case, the site location in relation to limited animal routes in the area suggests that hominins were aware of 
animal movements and used the location for ambush hunting during the Lower to Middle Pleistocene. 
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hunter-gatherers displayed an intrinsic motivation to comply with the normative 
standards of the collective activity as I have argued, they would be motivated to meet 
those standards over and above mere instrumental motivation. Positive emotions such as 
pride, praise, and admiration would have also played an important role here. Yet the 
extent to which these emotions play a role in supporting normative-guided behavior is 
difficult to determine since much of the research in normative cognition has been 
focused on negative emotions under the assumption that punishing and enforcing norms 
are the hallmarks of normative thinking. I share this assumption. For as it has been 
defined in this dissertation, social normative thinking entails a tendency to enforce 
social norms. 
All shared intentional states are characterized by some gradient of 
generalizability and intrinsic motivation. But not all shared intentional states trigger the 
kind of punitive or corrective attitudes that are distinctive of the class of normative 
mental states that were selected for in social context such as collective hunting, i.e., 
shared intentional normative judgments. These punitive attitudes refer to the particular 
motivation to punish those (including ourselves) when one think that they have violated 
a social normative standard. Norm violations typically trigger punitive emotions like 
anger and guilt (when the norm violation is committed by oneself) and punitive 
behaviors like criticism, exclusion, or physical harm from most people within a social 
group, which are specifically directed at norm violators (Brown, 1991; Roberts, 1979; 
Sober & Wilson, 1998). Thus, punitive attitudes are especially important in the present 
account of normative thinking because they are an independent feature of shared 
intentional states. Some shared intentional states involve punitive attitudes, but punitive 
attitudes are not a distinctive feature of shared intentional states. In contrast, all shared 
intentional states are more general and abstract than basic I-mode intentions. Also, all 
shared intentional states are intrinsically motivational in the sense that they bring about 
a motivational force in virtue of their joint nature. 
These punitive attitudes point out to an important aspect of norm acquisition. For 
in the model I have been developing throughout the thesis, many normative judgments, 
including prototypical moral judgments, could arise from a particular interplay between 
agent-independent representations of norms and emotional dispositions. Children may 
acquire, for instance, representations of norms about behaviors that trigger the disgust 
system (Kelly, 2011). As we will see in the next section, the disgust mechanism 
transforms the representation of a shared normative standard into a form of non-
conventional normative standard, which is significantly different from the type of 
149 
 
representations of conventional norms (e.g., the norms of conventional games) that the 
child acquires early in life. These emotional dispositions are to a large extent learned. 
Certainly, affective responses can be understood in some cases as unconditioned 
responses in the sense that they can occur without any learning or conditioning. From 
the point of view of Pavlovian conditioning, disgust reactions may be very rigid (gape 
face, nausea, a sense of oral incorporation or contamination, quick withdrawal, etc.), but 
the range of elicitors has to remain flexible in order to make the system robust enough to 
environmental change. Thus, even disgust responses are highly sensitive to mechanisms 
that adapt these responses to circumstances. Food aversion learning is a typical example. 
Foods that make an animal sick cease to elicit approach responses when they are 
encountered again (Garcia, Hankins, & Rusiniak, 1974). Rats and other species can 
share information about safe foods through odors (Galef, 1996; Galef & Wigmore, 
1983). The link between these affective responses and our social environment is even 
less hardwired. 
 
5.3.2. The mechanisms of acquisition 
 
Humans share normative standards in the sense of sharing intentions of the form 
specified in the previous section. But in the view I want to propose, normative 
judgments and its distinctive set of emotional dispositions for norm compliance and 
punitive attitudes emerge in development as a result of the acquisition of shared 
normative standards through domain-general mechanisms of intention-reading, pattern-
recognition, and affective processing—including empathy-related processes such as 









• Joint attention—an 
ability to share 
attention with others 
through different 
sensory modalities 
• Capacity to follow the 
attention and gesturing 
of others 
• Understanding of 
communicative 
intentions—a capacity 
to actively direct the 
attention of others to 
distal objects by using 
non-linguistic gestures 
• Cultural learning—a 
capacity to learn by 
imitation the intentional 
actions of others 
• Statistical learning 
• Categorization—a 
capacity to form 
perceptual and 
conceptual categories 
of similar objects and 
events 
• Schema formation—a 
capacity to form 
sensory-motor schemas 
from patterns of 
perception and action 
• Analogy—an ability to 
create analogies based 
on similar functional 
roles 
• Emotional contagion—
a capacity to feel the 
same emotional states 
of other individuals 
• Emotional perspective-
taking—the capacity to 







the ability to entertain 
an other-oriented 
emotional reaction such 
as concern or sorry 
• Other emotional 
systems (e.g., the 
disgust system) 
Table 5.1. List of basic cognitive and motivational infrastructure for norm acquisition. 
 
Importantly, the above mechanisms closely resemble a usage-based model of 
language acquisition (see, for instance, Bybee, 1985; Givón, 1979; Langacker, 1987). I 
will come back to the relevance of this feature of the model in section 5.5 when 
discussing the linguistic analogy put forward by moral grammarians. But for the 
moment it might be worth pointing out that intention-reading skills lead to the 
emergence of shared intentional states that in turn make possible agent-independent 
normative cognition while pattern-recognition skills allow the children to find normative 
regularities in their local environment. This is similar to the role they play in language 
acquisition since intention-reading mechanisms facilitate the understanding of 
communicative intentions while skills of pattern-recognition help the child to find the 
regularities that emerge from the use of linguistic constructions. However, most models 
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of the development of early linguistic competencies differ from the present model of 
normative development since the latter emphasizes the role of affective processes in 
both the perception of normative social standards, normative motivation, and the 
communication of associated behavioral dispositions (e.g., the motivation to punish 
norm violators). In the proposed model, emotional, empathy-related processes are co-
opted to reliably match up the appropriate pro-social responses with the right situation, 
which is represented by the child in an agent-independent, we-mode way, as his/her 
shared intentional capacities emerge. 
All these mechanisms play an important role in norm acquisition. For example, 
as pointed out by moral grammarians, automatic normative judgments may implicitly 
require processing information about the goals, intentions, and consequences of actions 
(see, for instance, Hauser, 2006b; Hauser et al., 2008a; Mikhail, 2007). Information 
about intentional facts is processed by our intention-reading mechanisms, not only when 
acquiring normative standards but also (very likely) when executing them to produce 
normative judgments. Intention-reading mechanisms start to develop early in life, 
around 9-12 months of age (Tomasello, 1995) and have been extensively reported in the 
developmental literature (see Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Bates & MacWhinney, 1979; 
Corkum & Moore, 1995; Tomasello, 1998; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). We 
have the capacity to share attention with others and to follow, for instance, their visual 
attention and their pointing toward objects and events. We have built-in skills for 
understanding the communicative intentions as well as a capacity to direct others’ 
attention through non-linguistic gestures. We also learn by imitation from the intentional 
actions of others. We are not blind to intentional facts. 
In addition, as in the case of language, we are well-equipped to recognize 
patterns and regularities, not only in speech but also in other domains (Conway & 
Christiansen, 2001; Gentner & Markman, 1997; Gomez & Gerken, 1999; Marcus, 
Vijayan, Rao, & Vishton, 1999; Pelucchi, Hay, & Saffran, 2009; Piaget, 1952; Rakison 
& Oakes, 2003; Ramus, Hauser, Miller, Morris, & Mehler, 2000; Saffran, Aslin, & 
Newport, 1996; Schneider, 1999). These mechanisms also emerge early in development 
and seem to be very ancient, for some of them have been found in other primates, e.g., 
as mechanisms to distinguish individuals of the same species (Yovel & Freiwald, 2013). 
Pattern-recognition mechanisms include the capacities for statistical learning, 
categorization, schema formation, and the ability to create analogies would have been 
also relevant to understand non-linguistic regularities in the social domain. For example, 
prototype-matching is a mechanism of pattern recognition that describes the process by 
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which a sensory unit registers a new stimulus and compares it to the prototype, or 
standard model, of the stimulus. They do not require a perfect match between the 
incoming stimuli and the stored concept in the brain, but they are a highly efficient 
mechanism to maximize similarity in fast and unconscious ways. For this reason, 
prototype-matching can play an important role in social cognition since they help us to 
deal with social stimuli such as faces (Solso & McCarthy, 1981) or personality traits 
(Niedenthal & Cantor, 1984). These mechanisms would work well given the 
prototypical nature of moral issues such as inflicting physical harm on others or making 
unfair distributions of collectively obtained resources. 
Each of these mechanisms may act independently, but they often interact with 
each other to understand our normative environments. Pattern-recognition mechanisms, 
for instance, interact with other learning mechanisms that help to scaffold normative 
development. Given the distinctive set of intention-reading mechanisms we have, the 
regularities that we find in the social domain would not be simple physical or behavioral 
regularities but rather regularities about intentional, goal-oriented facts. These facts may 
work as the primary data of children’s normative learning, and they can be the input of 
pattern-recognition mechanisms as well. So, our capacity to recognize basic social and 
intentional patterns in our daily interactions with others would give us cognitive 
leverage to make the type generalizations that seem to be puzzling to some (see, for 
instance, Dwyer, 2007; Hauser, 2006a, 2006b; Hauser et al., 2008a, 2008b; Mikhail, 
2007). Pattern-recognition mechanisms would allow us then to make generalizations 
about what in our social environments would be considered cruel, harmful, unfair, or 
just simply immoral. Moreover, since a capacity to recognize patterns and regularities in 
our social environments is often fast, automatic, and non-conscious, these 
generalizations from particular exemplars and prototypical cases could make intuitive 
judgments about new cases similarly fast, automatic, and hardly accessible through 
introspection. 
These mechanisms not only help us to acquire norms but also the conceptual 
building blocks of normative and prototypical moral thinking. The idea that moral 
concepts and intuitive moral judgments are generalizations from exemplars is not new 
(Goldman, 1993; Johnson, 1993; Park, 2013; Sterelny, 2010; Stich, 1993). On this view, 
we would not only produce intuitive judgments involving thick moral concepts, e.g., 
judgments about what courage, cruelty, truthfulness, and kindness are (Geertz, 1975; 
Ryle, 1971; Williams, 1985), or perhaps concepts such as harm, justice, or rights that 
preoccupy social domain theorists, but also about metaethical concepts such as the 
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concept of moral judgment or morality itself. Both kinds of concepts would be acquired 
through exemplars and paradigmatic cases. If, as discussed in chapter 2, some moral 
judgments are actually clustered around a gradient of properties such as inescapability 
and authority-independence (Mackie, 1977), this pattern would also emerge from 
pattern-recognition mechanisms and its interplay with the intention-reading and 
affective machinery that is distinctive of our lineage. 
Similarly, since these mechanisms support the acquisition of these core concepts, 
these mechanisms may also help us to judge prototypical moral issues. For example, 
decisions about how to distribute certain resources may be judged as fair on the basis 
that they resemble prototypical or exemplary fair decisions. Certainly, the experimental 
tasks involving distribution of stickers that are common in the empirical literature 
(Gräfenhain et al., 2013) are not anything like the type of moral issues that adults have 
to deal with in everyday life, but the structural similarities between peer interactions 
between children and adult activities may still work as input for our pattern-recognition 
mechanisms. They facilitate social comparison. Similarly, judgments may be considered 
more or less similar to paradigmatic cases of moral judgments in our cultural 
environment. Certainly, the extent to which people explicitly engage in tasks of 
classification of judgments and norms into moral and nonmoral types is unknown, but 
there is unequivocal evidence that adult subjects do engage in this cognitive tasks to 
some extent (Levine, Rottman, Davis, Stich, & Machery, n.d.). In fact, recent studies 
suggest that starting around 6 years of age children are able to engage in intuitive folk 
metaethical judgments (Schmidt, Gonzalez-Cabrera, & Tomasello, 2017). 
 
5.3.3. Norm classification 
 
I have argued in the previous section that mechanisms of pattern-recognition, intention-
reading, and affective processing support different aspects of norm acquisition such as 
detecting normative regularities in one’s social environment, learning core normative 
and prototypical moral concepts, and executing them to make possible judgments about 
specific moral issues such as fairness. But I have also suggested that they may also help 
us in cognitive tasks such as categorization in which different classes of norms and 
normative judgments are distinguished. For categorization is a psychological process in 
which complex concepts are matched to a target item by checking whether its 
definitional or prototypical constituents apply to the target. Norm classification is part of 
the process of norm acquisition. As in the case of meaningful linguistic structures, we 
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do not simply store norms as discrete chunks of information but we also learn to apply 
the norm when appropriate. We acquire norms in a way that carries information about 
where, when, and how use these norms. This helps to store information in ways that 
make memory retrieval fast and efficient, but it also clusters information that helps to 
categorize norms into, say, moral and nonmoral kinds. 
Sometimes the distinction between different types of norms seems to be very 
implicit. As we have seen in chapter 2, across many cultures children seem to be able to 
distinguish moral from conventional transgressions from a very young age when these 
judgments are clustered around the properties proposed by Turiel and colleagues (Nucci 
& Turiel, 1978; Nucci et al., 1983; Turiel, 1983, 1998), but they seem to do so based on 
the responses of parents, teachers, and peers (Smetana, 1997). Children acquire the 
pattern of moralization of and from their social environments. In those cultures, 
caregivers tend to respond to perceived moral transgressions by drawing the child’s 
attention to the consequences of the transgression. They (sometimes explicitly and 
sometimes implicitly) link the child’s actions to other people’s distress, explaining how 
the victim feels so that the child can understand the suffering inflicted. This may then be 
used by the parents to inculcate a healthy sense of guilt in their children. 
This aspect of norm acquisition takes place not only when the child is the one 
who commit the transgression. Young children are exposed to songs, fables, and 
children’s stories that praise good behavior and disapprove bad behavior. Storytelling 
usually exposes the child to their local moral environments and the consequences of 
actions, and the emergent norms (if not explicit) are more or less stable across a number 
of scenarios. In contrast, caregivers are more likely to respond to perceived conventional 
transgressions by reminding the child the type of norms that apply in the context in 
question (Smetana, 1984, 1985). This process requires the set of mechanisms that I have 
outline in this section. As in the case language acquisition, it requires understanding 
adults’ communicative intentions, finding the normative regularities that are made 
salient to the child through storytelling, and perhaps most importantly, understanding 
the emotional perspective of both the storyteller and the characters in the story. 
As I will expand in the next section, the distinction between different types of 
norms and normative judgments sometimes relies on crucial differences at the level of 
affective processing mechanisms. Affect is a highly salient aspect of children’s social 
experiences that contributes to the early development of moral thinking and moral 
concepts. Affective information may be used to understand, differentiate, and remember 
moral and other types of social events (Arsenio, 1988; Arsenio & Ford, 1985; Arsenio & 
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Kramer, 1992). Young children tend to judge moral events as affectively negative and 
conventional transgressions as affectively neutral. Affect ratings are not only highly 
correlated with judgments about the obligatoriness and alterability of moral events, but 
also helps to remember those events more easily (Arsenio & Ford, 1985). As a 
consequence, differences in the tendency of prototypical moral and conventional events 
to elicit emotional arousal may lead to a differential encoding of those events. Highly 
arousing transgressions may be considered immoral in part because they are more 
affectively salient than less arousing events. Elementary school-aged children employ 
information about situational affective consequences (e.g., whether actors or victims 
were happy, sad, angry, fearful, or neutral) to correctly infer whether initiating events 
were moral, conventional, or personal (Arsenio, 1988). In general, social expectations 
about the emotional consequences of different social situations have been found 
essential to differentiate moral from conventional transgressions in the social domain 
tradition, and such expectations have been found to increase in complexity with age 
(Arsenio & Kramer, 1992). 
In many cases at least, children reactions to violations of game rules (Rakoczy, 
Brosche, et al., 2009; Rakoczy et al., 2008) seem to be very similar to their reactions to 
transgressions of prototypical moral norms such as those that cause actual harm 
(Rossano et al., 2011; Vaish, Missana, et al., 2011), but they seem to be able to 
differentiate these norms in terms of their scope (Schmidt et al., 2012). They apply game 
rules only in the appropriate contexts and only to the appropriate social group because 
they can understand that adults expect things to work a certain way (see, for instance, 
Casler et al., 2009). Children also interact with peers and they have to coordinate and to 
negotiate resource distribution with them. Some demands would be local and highly 
context-sensitive while others will be more robust and counterfactually stable. Thus, 
children may use these cues about context-sensitivity of other children’s protests to 
determine what transgressions are conventionally wrong in the sense of Turiel and 
others. 
To put it in the context of shared intentionality framework, skills of shared 
intentionality allow the children to represent joint activities from an agent-independent 
point of view in which all roles are interchangeable. These skills seem to develop very 
early in life. For example, after only a few demonstrations of the game (only one 
demonstration for a 2-year-old child) children seem to have a third-person 
representation of the interaction that allows them to take either role in the game 
(Warneken et al., 2006). A capacity to represent social interactions in this agent-
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independent way is very helpful for the child in order to evaluate their own behavior and 
to understand that others evaluate them in the same way that they evaluate others. But 
until that point in their development, child normative cognition is more trained to deal 
with interactions with caregivers rather than with groups of peers.  
The type of shared intentional states that they enforce on others, if they do at all, 
is basically restricted to particular individuals and, therefore, those shared intentional 
states are less norm-like. Once social interactions become more collective, children have 
to face different social challenges that seem to be accompanied by changes in the way 
they represent their social environments. Some shared intentional states then start to be 
clearly enforced, and sometimes in context-specific ways, while others end up being 
robust and stable across different possible social situations. 
 
5.4. Moral sentimentalism 
 
I have begun this chapter by explaining in section 5.1 the view that the capacity for 
making moral judgments stems from an innate moral faculty in the form of syntax-like 
moral principles. However, in sections 5.2 and 5.3, I have been trying to build a picture 
of the development of human social norm psychology and the mechanisms deployed to 
acquire social norms which differ from the one offered by moral grammarians. On this 
view, we are able to make shared intentional normative judgments that we are inclined 
to share with other people in virtue of our shared intentional psychology. But we acquire 
these norms from our social environment. I have also suggested that these shared 
intentional normative judgments somewhat resemble the signature moral pattern 
proposed by Turiel and colleagues, as explained in chapter 2. In this section, I will 
develop this idea in more detail by arguing that the tuning of the affective processing 
mechanisms that support shared intentional normative thinking may explain the 
ramification of this kind of normative thinking into prototypical classes of moral 
judgments—in particular, judgments with Turiel’s signature moral pattern and Joyce’s 
judgments about inescapable and authority independent moral demands. 
So far, I have focused on some general capacity for normative thinking via our 
shared intentional psychology but there are sufficient reasons to think that there is a 
substantial overlap between the type of normative cognition that the above learning 
mechanisms scaffold and moral thinking. In particular, the above picture of norm 
acquisition is largely compatible with one according to which at least an important 
cluster of prototypical moral judgments, such as judgments with Turiel’s signature 
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moral pattern and Joyce’s judgments about moral demands, are the result of the 
execution of affective mechanisms and the cognitive infrastructure of shared 
intentionality, which supports norm representation. On this view, many of the 
prototypical aspects of moral norms discussed in chapter 2 (e.g., the inescapability and 
authority independence of prototypical moral demands) are explained by this affective 
gradient and the role it fulfills in norm compliance and enforcement. For example, on 
Shaun Nichol’s (2002, 2004) ‘norm with feelings’ approach, disgusting transgressions 
are able to produce the signature moral pattern postulated by social domain theorists 
(Turiel, 1983). Disgusting transgressions tend to be considered less permissible and 
more serious than affectively neutral transgressions because they carry both the 
averseness of being transgressive and the additional aversive component of causing 
disgust. This means that disgusting transgressions activate further our affective 
mechanisms (in addition to the perceived violation of a norm), which makes us judge 
those transgressions more seriously. 
Similarly, disgusting violations might be considered to be more authority 
independent or objective. If the relevant authority changes or suspends a norm, then that 
would suffice to stop judging transgressions to that norm as an offense.38 However, even 
if that is the case, disgust reactions to the violation of the suspended norm will continue. 
These reactions then will make the perceive wrongness of those actions much more 
robust against authority contingencies. When the norm is suspended, disgust reactions 
continue being elicited by actions that are perceived disgusting, regardless of the 
authority. Those reactions will work as error signals, and these error signals will warn us 
about the violation of the suspended norm as if it were still in place. Normative 
judgments that are closely associated to disgust cannot be suspended easily. Even if the 
host of a party decides that spitting in one’s glass is OK, the action or the mere idea of 
the action may still be enough to provoke a disgust reaction. 
The view I am proposing is a version of Nichol’s theory, but one in which social 
norms are acquired, represented, and executed as shared, we-mode intentions. Despite 
these differences, both views share a number of commonalities. In both views, norms 
lead to moral judgments. They do so via the link between those norms and affective 
processing. This link is learned and acquired rather than innate. Moreover, the Turiel’s 
signature moral pattern is seen in both views as a byproduct of that link. There is indeed 
38 Perhaps in some cases we could still tend to judge these actions as somewhat wrong, e.g., as a result of 
prolonged conditioning. But the point here is that the judged wrongness of the action will be more 
authority contingent than in cases where the action is a disgusting violation. 
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a critical period in child development during which the child’s affective mechanisms 
interact with information about normative prohibitions in the form of shared intentional 
states to form what Nichols’ call ‘non-conventional normative theory’—which social 
domain theorists (wrongly, I think) identify with the whole class of moral judgments. 
This critical period begins around the age of 3 years with the emergence of the 
child’s agent-independent normative cognition reviewed in section 5.2 (Tomasello, 
2015; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013; Vaish & Tomasello, 2013). Of course, if normative 
judgments are a form of shared intentional states they are hybrid mental states with both 
a cognitive and a motivational component—with the motivational component fueled by 
affective mechanisms. Yet the key developmental difference would be the particular 
way in which these normative judgments (in the form of agent-independent 
representations of shared social standards) are wired to our affective mechanisms—e.g., 
in a way that they trigger the particular punitive attitudes we see in the child. Some 
norms might be linked to disgust reactions while other might be linked differently. But 
in all those cases, it is this particular association with our affective mechanisms what 
explains how agent-independent representations become norms that are spontaneously 
enforced by the child—even in the robust, authority-independent way that resembles the 
Turiel’s signature moral pattern. In other words, it is this link with our affective 
mechanisms that explains many of the numerous recipes of paradigmatic moral 
judgments: the generality, seriousness, and authority independence of Turiel’s and 
colleagues moral responses (Nucci et al., 1983; Turiel, 1983, 1998), and as I will argue 
in this section as well, Mackie’s (1977) inescapability and authority-independence. 
An explanation for this signature pattern is important in the context of this 
chapter because moral nativists have argued that the moral/conventional distinction 
involves innate, domain-specific information (Mikhail, 2009). More precisely, using the 
mechanisms of norm acquisition that I have introduced in the previous section, I want to 
explain why there seems to be a robust moral/conventional distinction. The thesis I have 
been defending in this dissertation is that while there are reasons to think that the kind of 
norm psychology that our shared intentional infrastructure affords is deeply entrenched 
in development, the prototypical pattern of moral judgments I have discussed in chapter 
2 is culturally relative and a function of the way in which norms themselves are 
acquired. As a result, nativism of the kind advocated by moral grammarians should be 
wrong, which also implies that either moral cognition has no relation whatsoever with 
linguistic competence or the relation between these two phenomena is different from the 
one moral grammarians have proposed. But although moral nativist theories have been 
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important and deeply influential in the literature, there are reasons to think that an 
alternative non-nativist model is preferable. As Nichols (2005) has argued, moral 
cognition is shaped by innate biases that come in the form of affective mechanisms. But 
affective systems shape normative cognition in ways that are neither innate nor specific 
to a certain domain. 
Generally speaking, Nichols’s views are framed within an important 
philosophical tradition, known as ‘moral sentimentalism’, according to which emotions 
and affective dispositions play a key role in understanding moral thinking. A large 
number of psychological findings emphasizing the role of emotions in moral thought 
support this view (see Haidt, 2007; Hauser et al., 2008b; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & 
Bloom, 2009a; Nichols, 2004, 2005; Pizarro, 2000, 2006; Prinz, 2007, 2009). In general, 
sentimentalists think that emotions provide the distinctive motivational force that 
characterizes human moral thinking. More specifically, it has been argued that affective 
responses to actions with certain sorts of consequences may actually explain the 
distinction between moral and conventional norms in the context of Turiel’s classic 
paradigm (Nichols, 2002, 2004). Transgressions of norms prohibiting such actions 
evoke Turiel’s signature moral pattern while transgressions of norms governing actions 
that do not trigger these affective responses fail to evoke such a pattern. In general, 
experimental evidence indicates that responses to Turiel’s dimensions of moral 
judgments (generality, seriousness, authority independence, and type of justification) are 
somehow mediated by affective responses (see, for instance, Kelly et al., 2007; Nichols, 
2002, 2004; Quintelier et al., 2012; Schnall et al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). 
In this view, generality, seriousness, authority independence are aspects of both 
norm compliance and the punitive attitudes associated to noncompliance. As a result, 
one should expect emotional and affective phenomena to play a role in norm compliance 
and in our attitudes toward norm violators. To begin with, although the motivational 
mechanisms behind norm compliance have not been rigorously studied yet, it is possible 
to speculate that emotional and affective process play a role in compliance motivation. 
For example, Chang and colleagues (2011; see also Koban et al., 2013) have shown that 
social emotions, such as guilt, arise when subjects deviate from social expectations and 
that they work as ‘social error’ signals that serve as the primary motivation to conform 
or adapt behavior. These findings indicate that a particular neural system (previously 
implicated in expectation processing) plays a critical role in assessing self-reported 
subjective feelings of guilt that in turn motivate cooperative behavior in experimental 
situations such as the ultimatum game. 
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But we have yet to learn how to tune our affective responses in order to motivate 
behavior in the adaptive direction. What counts as an appropriate response in one 
context is not the same in another, which means that error signals are also context 
dependent. Thus, we need to learn when and how much, for instance, we should feel 
guilty in a certain situation, in order that anticipated guilt would motivate behavior in 
the adaptive direction. As our social environments become more complex, social roles 
also become more diverse and specialized. But arguably, in some contexts at least, the 
mechanisms of norm compliance would need to be more counterfactually robust. For 
example, normative demands about keeping promises might be more robust across 
different types of social interactions than normative demands such as those related to 
appropriate behavior at weddings and funerals. They often have ritual significance and 
hence have a high affective load. Yet they are also quite context-specific, so displays of 
extreme joyfulness or sadness are only acceptable depending on particular ritual 
observances and factors such as social proximity. As a result, we need to develop a more 
robust motivation across the former type of scenarios such that we are always motivated 
to keep our promises more or less independently of the specific situation. Similarly, 
emotional responses would need to be tuned to the perceived severity of norm violations 
such that the motivation to comply is more reliable when the costs of violating the norm 
are higher. Therefore, we would need to learn what, when, and where normative 
demands are higher across these diverse social contexts via the selective tuning of the 
emotional and affective responses that support norm compliance. 
Moreover, emotional and affective phenomena also play an important role in 
acquiring the punitive attitudes associated to noncompliance. Children’s behavior is 
clearly normative when they punish other for transgressing those standards, but they 
have to learn where and how to do it. Social norms play an essential role regulating an 
individual’s social interactions with others in the general direction of coordinated 
collaborative activities and punitive attitudes help in this role. There is, of course, a 
tendency to romanticize the role of norms in fostering human social life. Consequently, 
there is also a risk of overlooking the negative role that normative guidance plays in 
organizing our social lives (see, for instance, Greene, 2013; Sterelny, 2012b). Norms 
fulfill the role of coordination devices but they do not necessarily maximize cooperative 
outcomes since punishment can also stabilize very maladaptive norms (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1992). The expansion of symbolic behavior and social norms in humans very 
likely played a role in entrenching social hierarchy—e.g., by creating a form of tunnel 
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vision (Seabright, 2004). But the stability of these forms of organization in large human 
groups also relied on institutionalized punishment. 
Crucially, empirical evidence also indicates that emotional and affective 
responses are involved in the generation of a punitive motivation directed at those who 
violate norms, including oneself. Thus, norm violations are closely linked to the 
experience of certain affective responses including anger and contempt against norm 
violators, and the experience of strong motivations to punish the transgressor (Haidt, 
2003), or even shame and guilt when one has violated those rules (Mameli, 2013; Vaish, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2011, 2016). Therefore, emotions seem to play an important 
motivational role in both norm compliance and normative-based punishment. 
Building on the idea that emotional and affective processing play a key role in 
norm compliance and the acquisition of the punitive attitudes associated with 
noncompliance, what I would like to argue now is that the selective tuning of one’s 
affective responses could also help us to explain why some shared intentional normative 
judgments could have a pattern that resembles Turiel and colleague’s moral signature 
pattern. These judgments would give rise to this prototypical class of moral judgments 
by learning to adjust our emotional responses to perceived transgressions in a way that 
they support both norm compliance and punitive attitudes toward norm violators. But 
this special form of norm psychology may also ramify into judgments about prototypical 
moral demands in the sense of Joyce and others (see Joyce, 2001; Mackie, 1977; 
Mameli, 2013). 
Let me begin with the former. Emotional and affective processing may explain 
the apparent robustness of the signature patterns found Turiel’s moral/conventional 
studies. In one of his experiments, Nichols (2002) found that transgressions that 
generate a strong affective response (disgust in this case) are distinguished from those 
transgressions that are affectively neutral. These transgressions were distinguished along 
all the four moral/conventional dimensions proposed by Turiel and colleagues. 
Transgressions that generated strong disgust responses were judged by the subject as 
less permissible, more serious, less contingent on authority, and they were also more 
likely to elicit non-conventional justifications in comparison to affectively neutral 
conventional transgressions. In a second study, Nichols (2002) also found also that 
subjects with high disgust sensitivity are more likely than subjects with low disgust 
sensitivity to judge a disgusting violation as serious and authority independent. Thus, 
the affective responses played an important role in prompting individuals to treat 
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disgusting violations as non-conventional, which indicates that responses to the Turiel’s 
moral/conventional task are mediated by affective responses. 
These experiments indicate that the disgust system generates the signature 
pattern of Turiel’s moral responses when subjects are questioned about the 
permissibility, seriousness, authority contingency and justification of the norms. As a 
consequence, Nichols’ studies provide evidence that moral-like responses to those 
questions can be induced by affective reactions. In an experiment, Wheatley and Haidt 
(2005) shown that when participants are hypnotically induced to feel a flash of disgust 
when they encounter an arbitrary word such as ‘often’ or ‘take’, they judge moral 
transgressions described in vignettes containing those words more severely than in those 
vignettes in which those words are absent. Similarly, Schnall and colleagues (2008) 
have shown that participants make more severe moral judgments depending on 
participants’ disgust reactions and sensitivity to their own bodily sensations. These 
findings suggest that at least some prototypical set of moral judgments may be grounded 
in affective responses, i.e., disgust is not just an affective factor that influences moral 
responses but rather the psychological explanation for why these judgments exhibit the 
Turiel’s signature moral pattern in the experimental situation. Disgust influences the 
perceived severity of the transgression, which in turn is one of the features of the 
signature moral pattern. 
There are reasons to think that distress in others produces intense affective 
responses. These responses emerge early in development (Nichols, 2001; Zahn-Waxler 
et al., 1992), and they can appear even in the absence of overt emotional signals through 
mechanisms of affective perspective taking and other relevant contextual factors 
(Hepach, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2013; Vaish et al., 2009). In the context of the 
moral/conventional task, harm scenarios elicit affective responses, and these responses 
produce judgments with the signature moral pattern described by Turiel. Therefore, it is 
possible to argue that both norms prohibiting disgusting behavior and norms prohibiting 
harmful behavior belong to the same class of normative judgments—the so-called class 
of ‘norms with feeling’ (Nichols, 2002). In Nichols words: “Violations of norms with 
feeling are judged as less permissible, more serious, and less dependent on authority 
than conventional normative violations. In addition, the level of affective response has a 
significant effect on the extent to which subjects distinguish norms with feeling from 
norms without” (Nichols, 2002, p. 233). 
This body of empirical data also suggests that conventional transgressions often 
do not evoke the typical signature conventional pattern. Nichols (Nichols, 2002, 2004) 
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studied reactions to a particular class of transgressions that do not involve harm, 
injustice, or violation of rights, such as rules of etiquette. But norms that prohibit 
disgusting behavior (e.g., not to snort and spit into the glass of water one is using) evoke 
one or more of the features of Turiel’s signature moral pattern when compared with 
norms that prohibit non-disgusting behavior (e.g., not to drink soup out of a bowl). 
Turiel’s results must be interpreted with caution. Nisan (1987) reports that 
although Kibbutz children and urban secular kids in Israel give the standard responses 
for both moral and conventional transgressions, in traditional Arab villages all rules 
(including those that are prototypically conventional) are taken to be authority 
independent and generally applicable, which are core features of typical moral responses 
only. Similarly, Haidt (1993) study shows that low socioeconomic status participants 
from Brazil and the United States judge all conventional transgressions as authority 
independent and generally applicable. More recently, Kelly and colleagues (2007) have 
shown that people may judge that norms proscribing harmful actions that are not of the 
schoolyard variety (which have been systematically used in previous studies) are neither 
authority independent nor general in scope. Similar results were found when alleged 
confounds (Fraser, 2012) were removed (Quintelier & Fessler, 2015; Quintelier et al., 
2012). 
As Kelly and Stich (2008) have shown, the above results then indicate that the 
regularities found in the moral/conventional task are neither pan-cultural nor as 
developmentally entrenched as initially thought. This makes it easier to explain the 
apparent robustness of the moral/conventional distinction via domain-general 
mechanisms. In these experiments, participants not necessarily exhibit all the features of 
the respective signature patterns. Also, these response patterns are not reliably evoked 
by particular types of transgressions. On the one hand, transgressions involving harm, 
injustice, or violation of rights trigger the signature conventional pattern (Kelly et al., 
2007; Quintelier & Fessler, 2015; Quintelier et al., 2012). On the other hand, 
transgressions that do not involve harm, injustice, or violation of rights can actually 
trigger the prototypical signature moral pattern (Haidt et al., 1993; Nichols, 2002, 2004; 
Nisan, 1987). 
Moreover, the tuning of emotional and affective responses may also help us to 
understand how some shared intentional normative judgments ramify in prototypical 
moral demands that are perceived as inescapable and authority independent, as defined 
by some philosophers (Joyce, 2006; Mackie, 1977; Mameli, 2013). Normative demands 
are not uniform. They sometimes require increasing conformity and more stringent 
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punitive attitudes toward norm violators in some particular social contexts more than 
others. As a result, affective responses have to be tuned to these high demands of norm 
compliance and punitive attitudes. As we have seen in chapter 2, one can use Mackie’s 
(1977) idea of inescapability and authority-independence to single out a particular class 
of prototypical moral judgments about moral demands. On this view, there is a 
privileged class of normative judgments that: “[...] involves a call for action, or for the 
refraining from action, and one that is absolute, not contingent upon any desire, or 
preference or policy or choice, his own or anyone else’s” (Mackie, 1977, p. 33). More 
precisely, these demands are inescapable when they are considered as applicable to all 
the individuals regarding of their ends, desires, or preferences, and authority 
independent if its normative force is not derived from someone’s approval or 
endorsement. This distinguishes a particular class of prototypical moral demands from 
mere practical demands such as “Keep promises!” or “Shut the door!” that are expressed 
in the imperative mood. This class of prototypical moral demands, and only this class, 
are experienced as inescapable and authority-independent. 
Other particular features could also be ascribed to this form of moral demands. 
Matteo Mameli (2013) has argued, for instance, that judging that something is morally 
required is characterized not only in terms of their inescapability and authority 
independence but also in terms of meriting. Normative judgment requires not only 
certain emotional reactions to violations; it also requires such reactions to be seen as 
appropriate or deserved. In this way, Mameli argues that there is a distinctive class of 
normative judgments of the form “x is morally required” that imply the deployment of a 
particular set of emotional dispositions: 
 
(i) A disposition to feel anger or contempt toward those that have not met a 
practical demand x. 
(ii) A disposition to feel guilt or shame when one has not met x. 
(iii) A disposition to feel anger or contempt toward those who do not manifest 
dispositions (i) and (ii). 
(iv) A disposition to feel guilt or shame when one does not manifest 
dispositions (i) and (ii). 
 
Mameli thinks that it is because of the robustness of dispositions (i)-(iv), and 
how such robustness plays out in counterfactual thinking, that we feel that those moral 
requirements are applicable to individuals irrespective of their ends, desires, 
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preferences, and so on. In his view, moral judgments of the form “x is morally required” 
express a practical demand in favor of an action which is seen as persisting even when 
its violation (or imagined violation) advances the interests of the violators or even when 
such an action is against the will of a particular authority. This feature of moral 
judgment is explained in terms of the robustness of dispositions (i)-(iv), i.e., the capacity 
of these dispositions to trigger those emotions regardless of the agent’s beliefs about the 
ways in which violations can advance the interests of violators or the potential approval 
or endorsement of these violations by the relevant authorities. For example, we would 
consider the demand for keeping promises to be inescapable and authority independent 
because we are robustly predisposed to feel shame when we break a promise and 
contempt towards those who break their promises across a wide range of counterfactual 
scenarios involving promises. These dispositions explain why we perceive some 
demands to be moral, in the prototypical sense of being inescapable and authority 
independent, since the counterfactual robustness of those dispositions is the hypothetical 
cause of these psychological features. Similarly, meriting may be explained in terms of 
the second-order emotions against people who are unresponsive or not sensible enough 
to the violation of a norm, e.g., a person who does not feel anger or contempt against 
norm violators.  
Moral demands that also include meriting seem to single out a special variety of 
moral demands that is not cross-culturally robust. For example, there is no ethnographic 
evidence of second-order punitive attitudes in forager societies (see, for instance, 
Boehm, 2012, pp. 206-209). So, whether people in these societies experience second-
order emotions against people who do not display punitive attitudes is unknown. It 
could be the case that this variety of moral demand is sensitive to our foraging ecology. 
Moreover, this variety of moral demand seems to be less developmentally delayed with 
respect to other features of prototypical moral judgments. For example, although 
children are able to distinguish between authority-dependent and authority-independent 
norms from about 3 years of age (Smetana & Braeges, 1990), the available evidence 
suggests that an understanding of emotions such as guilt begins at around the age of 6 
(Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988). 
If the above analysis is correct, the selective tuning of one’s affective responses 
help us to explain why some shared intentional normative judgments could ramify into 
both judgments with the Turiel’s moral signature pattern and judgments about 
prototypical moral demands in the sense of Joyce and others (see Joyce, 2001; Mackie, 
1977; Mameli, 2013). More generally, the above results give us further reasons to be 
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skeptical about the idea that moral cognition is a homogeneous domain, as I have argued 
more extensively in chapter 2. There seems to be no common property (or set of 
properties) that moral judgments share. As some have argued, morality is a very 
heterogeneous cognitive domain, and moral judgments only share some kind of ‘family 
resemblance’ between members (see for example Nado et al., 2009; Parkinson et al., 
2011; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008; Sinnott-Armstrong & Wheatley, 2012, 2013; Taylor, 
1978). There are different varieties of moral judgments, some of which follow the 
pattern found by many in the Turiel’s moral/conventional paradigm or the pattern of 
inescapability and authority independence that some philosophers ascribe to moral 
demands. 
Certainly, it is possible to argue that there is some broad and generalizable 
cluster of normative judgments along the lines of Nichols’ theory of norms with feelings 
(see also Kelly & Stich, 2008; Sripada & Stich, 2007), and within this broader 
framework we can try to capture some interesting varieties of moral judgments. In this 
line of argument, we can understand moral sentimentalism as a theoretical attempt to 
single out particular varieties of moral judgments. In this view, moral sentimentalism 
may explain some aspects and features of prototypical moral judgments, but they will 
not necessarily provide an account such that it explains all moral judgments and only 
them. This is what we should expect from the fragmentationist picture of chapter 2. For 
prototype- and exemplar-based moral thinking rejects the idea that the domain of the 
moral has sharp boundaries. 
 
5.5. Language and norms 
 
Following the proposal outlined in chapter 2, I have argued in the previous section that 
shared intentional normative judgments ramify in distinguishable clusters of 
prototypical moral judgments such as judgments with Turiel’s signature moral pattern 
and judgments about inescapable and authority independent moral demands. As 
explained in chapters 3 and 4, while our shared intentional capacities and its distinctive 
normative dimension reliably emerge in development due to the crucial role they played 
in human social evolution, our capacity to make moral judgments is more diverse and 
culturally labile. At least in some important cases, making moral judgments is a cultural 
result of the particular ways in which we share shared intentional normative judgments. 
In particular, I have argued that we can account for the psychological features of these 
prototypical moral judgments via the strategic tuning of the affective machinery that is 
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associated to this particular form of social norm psychology. However, as I will argue in 
this section, these mechanisms are domain-general since they are also mechanisms for 
language acquisition in usage-based approaches in cognitive linguistics. The 
fragmentation of shared intentional normative judgments into different subclasses of 
prototypical moral judgments is then learned and acquired, while the mechanisms that 
support their acquisition are domain-general. As a result, an important chunk of our 
moral judgments does not necessarily builds upon innate domain-specific information 
that is recruited in moral development as some prominent moral nativists have argued. 
Usage-based models of language acquisition are in stark contrast with 
Chomskyan models of language acquisition. Similarly, a usage-based model of norm 
acquisition could also challenge some versions of moral nativism as the one offered by 
moral grammarians in section 5.1. On this view, young children begin with no moral 
abstractions at all, or with only very few of those abstractions, e.g., the type of 
discriminations reported in the Turiel’s moral/conventional task (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; 
Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Turiel, 1983) or the different varieties of moral demands 
which are of central interests for some philosophers (Joyce, 2006; Mackie, 1977; 
Mameli, 2013). Core moral concepts such as the concept “x is morally required” would 
also be explained in the same way. 
The analogy between usage-based models of language acquisition and norm 
acquisition is theoretically motivated. In these models, linguistic constructions are 
meaningful while Chomskyan syntactic structures do not carry meanings themselves. As 
a result, usage-based models of language acquisition are models of intentional 
communication. Normative thinking is not just a decision-making mechanism in which 
we keep for ourselves the normative states that govern individual behavior. We also 
share those normative states in way that is meaningful to others—a process that played a 
fundamental role in taking hominins with increase social tolerance and enhanced 
prosocial skills, as explained in chapter 3, to ancestors able to coordinate social behavior 
in complex and efficient ways through the sharing of normative mental states, as 
explained in chapter 4. It is the sharing of these mental states what explains the 
emergence in our lineage of our distinctive social norm psychology. But while most of 
this infrastructure might be phylogenetically old and ontogenetically entrenched, the 
specific normative states that we share are not determined by these psychological 
mechanisms alone. This infrastructure facilitates cultural transmission. So, one reason to 
expect this analogy to work is that not only normative thinking but also intentional 
communication builds upon our shared intentional cognitive infrastructure (Liebal, 
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Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Moore, Mueller, Kaminski, & Tomasello, 2015; 
Tomasello, 2008). 
Moreover, there are independent reasons why one should think that moral 
thinking resembles intentional communication more than syntax. If the representations 
of core moral norms were grammar-like rules, they would not be belief-like mental 
states, they would be inaccessible for the agent, and rarely the subject of public scrutiny 
if at all (Sterelny, 2010). While the above model may explain how we may produce fast, 
automatic, and non-conscious moral judgments in the same way that we can interiorize 
many of the idiosyncratic features of natural languages in usage-based models of 
language acquisition, the model of the moral grammarian lacks a similar analogy to 
explain the interaction between moral grammar and reflective and conscious moral 
cognition. 
Although moral grammarians accept the existence of conscious, explicit, and 
reflective moral beliefs (see, for instance, Dwyer & Hauser, 2008 as a reply to Dupoux 
& Jacob, 2007), grammatical competence does not depend on explicit reasoning about 
norms or beliefs about grammatical correctness—at least not typically among native 
speakers. Whatever our representations of correct grammatical structures are, they are 
not belief-like mental states. They are unconsciously computed. As a consequence, 
syntactic rules and, even more so, the principles of a universal grammar are not the 
subject of public scrutiny. When they are indeed discussed and examined, it is typically 
a job for the linguist. In contrast, if the representation of norms and moral beliefs are 
supported by our shared intentional infrastructure, they are social expectations that are 
not only entertained by the agent but also intentionally shared. They are the focus of our 
shared social attention. 
Alleged moral universals such as the principle of double effect are very different 
from what we would expect if they were like, say, Chomsky’s projection principle 
(Chomsky, 1981). Moral principles can be questioned and they are the subject of further 
reflection and thought. The principle of double effect may be implicit and cognitively 
opaque. It can operate quickly and unconsciously in the background of our decision-
making process. But these principles are not utterly inaccessible. They can, in fact, be 
grasped through ordinary language. It was introspection, for instance, what allowed 
Aquinas (13th c./1975, II-II, Q. 64, Art. 7) to originally formulate the principle when 
discussing the permissibility of self-defense. The principle was spelled out in the 
familiar terms of foreseen consequences, intentional actions, and omissions because, if 
anything, the principle of double effect is a meaningful moral principle. Therefore, it is 
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not surprising that we learn meaningful moral norms in a similar way that we learn 
meaningful linguistic constructions. 
Moreover, a usage-based model of norm acquisition helps us to deal with the 
poverty of stimulus argument, since it explains how the child may acquire normative 
principles by deploying a similar set of learning mechanisms as those deployed in the 
case of language acquisition. The poverty of the stimulus argument typically addresses 
the impoverished Skinnerian picture of learning and social interaction. But norm and 
language acquisition is facilitated by a number of much more complex learning 
mechanisms. Intention-reading, pattern-recognition, and affective mechanisms start to 
develop early in life. From a cognitive point of view, all these mechanisms are domain-
general as they are not specific mechanisms of norm acquisition. 
These mechanisms are redeployed in a particular way in order to understand 
shared normative intentions in a similar way that they are deployed for learning, 
understanding, and sharing communicative intentions. We are able to join the intentions 
of others and we share ours with them. We share both a particular we-mode of 
representation and a particular motivational component. This facilitates human social 
environments to play a more active role in the successful transmission of culture, 
including social norms. The poverty of stimulus argument is often formulated as a 
problem of negative evidence since linguistic strings are not produced and then labeled 
as ungrammatical. But even if this is the correct picture of language acquisition, children 
systematically receive negative evidence in the normative domain. As some social 
domain theorists have argued, the learning environment of children is highly scaffolded. 
For example, caregivers usually respond to perceived conventional transgressions by 
reminding the child what norms apply in the situation in question (Smetana, 1984, 
1985). 
However, the content of norms and their scope could be initially learned from 
adults and other caregivers without need of pedagogical cues or normative language 
(Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011b) because the shared intentional infrastructure 
that is built into our intention-reading machinery emerges quite early in ontogeny and is 
specially prepared for child-adult interactions. This makes the understanding of adult’s 
social expectations when context-sensitive rules are introduced less demanding (Casler 
et al., 2009). Children comprehension of norms is more constrained by problems of 
emotional control than deficits in intention-reading capacities. As we have seen, 
children’s reactions to violations of game rules (Rakoczy, Brosche, et al., 2009; 
Rakoczy et al., 2008) are typically similar to their reactions to prototypical moral 
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transgressions, e.g., those that cause harm (Rossano et al., 2011; Vaish, Missana, et al., 
2011). At a younger age, children can afford overreacting because social interaction is a 
highly channelized child-adult interaction. But with time and increasing peer interaction, 
they have to learn to self-regulate emotions and to tune their affective responses 
appropriately. 
In sections 5.3 and 5.4, I have argued that the kind of norm psychology that I 
have been discussing in this thesis make us capable of entertaining shared intentional 
normative thoughts. These normative thoughts can acquire the characteristic features of 
prototypical classes of moral judgments through learning and socialization. Acquiring 
norms resembles many aspects of language acquisition since moral norms are 
meaningful rules rather than abstract, contentless syntactic principles. Certainly, the 
above model of norm acquisition is independent of any particular usage-based model of 
language development, but these models help us to understand how the cultural 
transmission of social norms is possible through the motivational and cognitive 
infrastructure of our shared intentional psychology. In order to understand how this form 
of norm psychology gives rise to these prototypical classes of moral judgments I have 
provided in this thesis a lineage explanation aimed to explain the gradual emergence of 




Nativist approaches are popular in the contemporary debates on human cognition due to 
the prominence of linguistic nativism. Moral grammarians, in particular, have argued 
that humans possess a universal moral grammar similar to the one posited by 
Chomskyan linguistics (Dwyer, 2007; Hauser, 2006b; Hauser et al., 2008a, 2008b; 
Mikhail, 2007). Drawing a parallel from usage-based models of language acquisition, I 
have argued in this chapter instead that norm acquisition is the result of domain-general 
mechanisms of intention-reading, pattern-recognition, and affective processing. This 
parallel is no accident since usage-based theories of language are developmental 
approaches to intentional communication which arguably rely on a similar set of 
cognitive and motivational skills that are distinctive of our cooperative lifestyle. The 
central idea of the model is that norms are acquired and represented by the agent as 
shared intentional states. These states are characterized by a gradient of generalization 
and abstraction, intrinsic motivation, and punitive attitudes. Although shared intentional 
states are hybrid mental states characterized by a gradient of generalization and intrinsic 
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motivation, only the representation of shared normative mental states are linked to a 
motivation to protest, complain, and punish those (including ourselves) who do not meet 
these social expectations. By tuning the affective profile of these mental states, this 
framework helps us to identify a cluster of prototypical moral judgments such as those 
reported in social domain tradition (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana & Braeges, 1990; 
Turiel, 1983) and different varieties of moral demands which are of central interests for 
some philosophers (Joyce, 2006; Mackie, 1977; Mameli, 2013). These clusters are 
ramifications of the cognitive lineage of our distinctive capacity for shared intentionality 
and shared intentional normative judgments, but norms that generate those judgments 




Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
The goal of this thesis was to explain and defend a naturalistic theory of normative 
cognition—in particular, human social norm psychology. More specifically, I aimed to 
provide a lineage explanation of this form of normative thinking, i.e., an explanation 
that specifies a sequence of changes that takes us from agents with an ape-like baseline 
capacity for social cognition to agents with human-like social norm psychology. The 
explanation I offer in this dissertation relied on a model of great ape and human 
cooperation that has been built over the last two decades of psychological research 
within the theoretical framework of shared intentionality. I argued that human social 
norm psychology is closely linked to our shared intentional psychology and that this 
capacity is in turn connected to prototypical moral judgments such as judgments with 
Turiel’s signature moral pattern and judgments about inescapable and authority 




As explained in chapter 1, the goal of this thesis was to explain and defend a naturalistic 
theory of normative cognition—in particular, a special form of social norm psychology 
whose evolutionary lineage can be traced back to the origins of our capacity for sharing 
intentional mental states. For this purpose, I addressed issues about the motivational and 
cognitive machinery of normative thinking as well as questions related to their 
ontogenetic and evolutionary trajectory. More precisely, the thesis aimed to provide a 
lineage explanation of this central form of normative thinking. In other words, it aimed 
to specify a sequence of changes that takes us from agents with an ape-like baseline 
capacity for social cognition to agents with some capacity for shared normative 
guidance. First, I tried to show how the emergence of our distinctive capacity to follow 
norms and make normative judgments is genealogically linked to the evolutionary 
lineage of our capacity to form shared intentional states. Second, I tried to show how 
this capacity is related to a diverse cluster of prototypical moral judgments such as 
judgments with Turiel’s signature moral pattern and judgments about inescapable and 
authority independent moral demands. Moreover, I argued that in explaining the 
evolution of normative cognition we also require an understanding of the developmental 
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trajectory of this cognitive capacity since normative thinking is to a significant extent 
the result of developmental tuning of our shared intentional capacities. 
Having outlined the general approach of the thesis, I argued in chapter 2 that 
moral judgments define a quite heterogeneous class of mental states. The best theory 
that we have to assume that moral judgments are a unified natural kind in psychology, 
i.e., Turiel’s social domain theory of moral development (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Nucci 
et al., 1983; Turiel, 1983, 1998), fails in its attempt. There seems to be no property (or 
set of properties) that unifies moral thinking as an explanatory target for psychology. 
Instead, we should understand particular accounts of moral judgments as targeting 
particular classes of judgments that are prototypically moral. For example, judgments 
that are inescapable and authority independent pick out a class of normative judgments 
that is important for independent philosophical reasons (Joyce, 2001; Mackie, 1977; 
Mameli, 2013), although not all moral judgments are judgments about moral demands in 
the sense of being inescapable and authority independent (Joyce, 2006, 2014). Similarly, 
not only moral demands are inescapable and authority independent, e.g., what counts as 
the correct solution for a mathematical equation can also be judged as inescapable or 
authority independent as prototypical moral demands. I argued that judgments that 
evoke Turiel’s signature moral pattern or judgments about inescapability and authority-
independent demands are, at best, prototypically moral. This does not imply the collapse 
of the psychological investigation of moral judgments, but rather that moral judgments 
cannot be investigated as if they were natural kinds or a single unified psychological 
domain. We could, instead, explain in what sense a certain class of normative judgments 
is prototypically moral as well as why and how they have the family resemblance they 
share by, for instance, linking those judgments (which may be culturally relative) to the 
lineage of more robust and developmentally entrenched psychological mechanisms. I 
ended this chapter by proposing that we could link those normative judgments to the 
lineage explanation of the motivational and cognitive infrastructure of our shared 
intentional psychology. Shared intentionality can help us to define a special kind of 
social norm psychology that is developmentally robust but which ramifies into different 
branches of prototypical moral judgments due to the diversification of our cultural 
practices and how we learn them. 
Following the above proposal, I focused in chapter 3 on the reconstruction of our 
ape-like baseline capacity for social cognition, which will serve as the starting point of 
my hypothesized lineage explanation. I began explaining how debates about the 
reconstruction of early hominins can affect philosophical debates about normative and 
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moral psychology as well as what the perils of reconstructing the social behaviors of 
these ancestors are. Then, I have argued that we are more justified in using an 
alternative model of the Pan/Homo LCA based on a mosaic hypothesis of human 
origins. According to this hypothesis, this ancestor would have been a large mosaic of 
traits seen in many primate species, including chimpanzees and bonobos. In order to 
support this model, I focused especially on comparative studies between humans and 
both Pan species, and discussed whether these similarities are traits inherited from a 
common ancestor, traits evolved independently due to similar selective pressures, or (as 
I think is more likely) a combination of both—i.e., with some traits inherited from the 
common ancestor while others being the result of parallel evolution. In particular, I 
argued that this alternative model does not fit well with some prominent views of human 
evolution such as demonic male view (Wrangham & Peterson, 1996) or the killer ape 
hypothesis (Dart, 1953), which have been very influential in the philosophical literature. 
Instead, they support a model of early hominins characterized by a level of social 
tolerance and prosocial skills that goes beyond these views. Taking as an example 
Kitcher’s (1998, 2006, 2011) account of the evolution of our capacity for normative 
guidance, I suggested that a better explanation of the shift toward a top-down capacity to 
understand and respond to commands could be framed in terms of shared intentionality 
(Tomasello, 2015; Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007; Tomasello et al., 2005). 
I developed further this idea in chapter 4. I argued that the above model of the 
Pan/Homo LCA is still compatible with the idea that early hominins hunted 
collaboratively in groups (see also Pickering, 2013). This model not only provided a 
cognitive baseline for my lineage explanation of normative guidance but also it helps us 
to explain the gradual expansion of early hominin cooperative capacities since 
collaborative foraging would be implausible in a very aggressive and dominant lineage. 
The evolution of collaborative foraging is closely linked to the evolution of our shared 
intentional capacities. According to the interdependence hypothesis of the origins of 
shared intentionality, for instance, collaborative foraging, especially in the form of 
collective hunting, was the main driver in the evolution of shared intentionality 
(Tomasello et al., 2012). However, this explanation leaves open the question of why 
these capacities emerge so early in ontogeny. For this reason, I argued that the initial 
driving force in the evolution of our share intentional capacities was cooperative 
breeding (see Hawkes, 2012; Hawkes, 2014) while the distinctive normative dimension 
of shared intentionality emerged as a consequence of the selective pressures on 
collaborative hunting. In this view, obligate collective hunting requires shared 
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intentional states that regulate collective activities in a distinctive normative way since 
these mental states are characterized by a gradient of generalizability, intrinsic 
motivation, which is common to all shared intentional states, but also a distinctive 
cluster of punitive and corrective attitudes (see Sripada & Stich, 2007). At the end of 
this chapter, I proposed an evolutionary model of shared intentionality that takes into 
account the tradeoffs that emerge during the transition from childhood to adulthood in 
order to integrate insights from both the interdependence hypothesis and the cooperative 
breeding hypothesis (Tomasello & Gonzalez-Cabrera, 2017). 
Expanding on the above model, I argue in chapter 5 that while the basic 
cognitive and motivational infrastructure underlying shared intentionality is highly 
entrenched in development, we acquire social norms from our cultural environments 
through this infrastructure. In particular, I argued that norm acquisition is the result of 
domain-general mechanisms of intention-reading, pattern-recognition, and affective 
processing. This model of norm acquisition builds upon a parallel with usage-based 
models of language acquisition. This parallel is no accident since these models of 
language acquisition are developmental approaches to intentional communication, 
which arguably rely on the same motivational and cognitive infrastructure that supports 
the distinctive cooperative lifestyle of our species. On this model, the agent learns and 
represents norms as shared intentional states. As other intentional states of this kind, 
shared normative mental states are hybrid mental states that possess a gradient of 
generalization and intrinsic motivation, but which are distinctively linked to a set of 
punitive attitudes toward those (including ourselves) who do not meet these social 
expectations. I argued that differences in the affective profile of these mental states help 
us to account for a cluster of prototypical moral judgments such as those reported in the 
social domain tradition (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Turiel, 1983) 
and a prototypical form of moral demands which has been of central importance for 
some philosophers (Joyce, 2006; Mackie, 1977; Mameli, 2013). 
 
6.2. Limitations and future research 
 
Admittedly, as a direct consequence of its methodology, this dissertation encounters a 
number of limitations that are unknown to other forms of philosophical understanding 
and which need to be considered here in some length. The most obvious ones are the 
evidential issues that come with historical approaches. Since the connection between 
evidence and distant events erodes with time, reconstructing the past is particularly 
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difficult. Evidence is scarce, and it tends to disappear as history unfolds. Reconstructing 
the social-cognitive lineage of our normative capacities just takes these issues a step 
further since they only can be inferred indirectly from this physical evidence. As a 
result, a reconstruction of the deep hominin ancestry of our social-cognitive capacities 
requires serious evidential bootstrapping, for no single strand of evidence can tell us the 
complete story about our hominin past. 
In this thesis, I have compared closely related species such as chimpanzees and 
bonobos in order to provide information about the baseline cognitive capacities of our 
early ancestors. Even unrelated taxa can offer valuable information about our 
evolutionary past through parallel, convergent evolution if enough similarity between 
the respective selective environments is guaranteed. This type of parallel is indeed more 
difficult to assess given the obvious differences between, say, dogs, macaques, and 
humans. But although risky, these inferences are not hopeless. For example, I have 
argued that the retention of juvenile traits such as playfulness and social tolerance could 
be explained by a parallel process of self-domestication, while cooperative breeding 
makes relevant the comparison between humans and callitrichid monkeys. Well-crafted 
comparative analyses within different lineages can yield meaningful conclusions, even if 
they do not solve all the problems of scarcity and low resolution of evidence that are 
common to evolutionary reconstructions. Future research will benefit from the inclusion 
of broader comparative analyses. 
The paleoanthropological record is also typically scattered. Although techniques 
to read the past from ancient cut marks in animal bones can be very informative about 
the origins of butchery, inferences about how hominins procured meat still need to be 
taken with a grain of salt. It is difficult to assess, for instance, to what extent there was 
division of labor or role interchangeability when the first evidence of butchering emerge 
in the fossil record. It is also difficult to evaluate with the available data whether meat 
was procured through scavenging or such-and-such form of hunting. Yet the fossil 
record is still crucial to determine the significance of the similarities and differences we 
find between closely related species. As pointed out in the introduction of this thesis, 
although all the three genera predating the Lucy specimen, i.e., Sahelanthropus, 
Orrorin, and Ardipithecus, have been found in the past 20 years, they have crucially 
changed the way we think about the origin of many distinctive human traits such as 
bipedalism, diet, and sexual dimorphism. Thus, future investigation should focus on 
more detailed evolutionary scenarios of hunting such as those linked to the ability to 
throw projectiles and endurance running, which could significantly benefit from these 
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comparative analyses. For example, while great apes occasionally throw objects with a 
fair degree of accuracy, only humans can routinely do it with both speed and accuracy 
(Roach, Venkadesan, Rainbow, & Lieberman, 2013). Certainly, some of the anatomical 
features required for this are already present in australopithecines and other early 
hominins, but the entire suite of traits only seem to have appeared about 2 mya in Homo 
erectus, around the same time that the features linked to endurance running emerge in 
the hominin fossil record. 
All this evidence was framed in the context of a particular view of the evolution 
of human sociality and cooperation that capitalized upon the idea of shared 
intentionality. Although there are many unresolved issues regarding the cognitive 
architecture and implementation of this capacity (e.g., to what extent shared intentional 
states are reducible to recursive mindreading capacities), shared intentionality has 
proved to be a functionally relevant distinction in contemporary developmental 
psychology. Part of its success relies on its capacity to explain and predict differences 
between great ape and human cooperation. But another is its peculiar and well-
document developmental pattern, which branches into various skills for sharing different 
kinds of mental states. I have argued in this thesis, for instance, that part of this 
developmental process is the emergence of a distinctive capacity for shared intentional 
normative cognition and that this capacity emerged as a consequence of shifts in 
hominin life history and selective tradeoffs between different developmental stages. 
Future work should look at these issues of cognitive architecture and implementation, as 
well as how they support or undermine the tradeoffs proposed by the evo-devo account 
of shared intentionality proposed in chapter 4. 
It remains controversial, however, when and to what extent our hominin 
ancestors engaged in shared intentional interactions. In this respect, the argument 
proposed in this dissertation relies on several assumptions about hominin cognitive 
competence and the likelihood that the social complex behaviors such as cooperative 
breeding and collaborative foraging would have emerged without the scaffolding of a 
capacity for sharing intentional mental states—in particular, the capacity for sharing 
social expectations about what others should or should not do in a particular situation. 
Further research should not only pay attention to the advancement of fields such as 
paleoanthropology and comparative genetics but also to the empirical study of the 
cognitive demands that these social behaviors presuppose as well as the developmental 
trajectory that these skills have across different ecological and cultural environments. 
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Finally, the literature in normative psychology has been traditionally focused on 
first-order normative cognition, while folk metaethical thinking has been less studied. 
We not only judge things to be right or wrong, but we also think about these judgments 
themselves. Suppose that two individuals are discussing whether the Earth is flat. They 
may think that there is only one correct answer to this question since it is a fact of the 
matter whether the Earth is flat or not. But would they think the same about moral 
issues? A number of moral philosophers have endorsed the claim that ordinary people 
have objectivist intuitions regarding these issues. Yet recent experimental evidence 
suggests that people’s judgments about the objectivity or relativity of moral issues 
depend on factors such as subjects’ age, personality traits, and social proximity. 
Moreover, it has been argued that children tend to be moral objectivists, while later in 
development people develop more relativistic intuitions (Knobe et al., 2012). However, 
this developmental trajectory has been inferred without applying the same experimental 
paradigms applied to adult subjects. Future research should look carefully at folk 
metaethical thinking in adults and children, incorporating these findings into a more 
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